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Abstract 
 
Privately built satellite cities are becoming an increasingly common form of 
urban development in peri-urban areas of Southeast Asian cities. However, 
while they are beginning to receive academic attention, the majority of 
studies focus on design and planning issues and have a limited capacity to 
fully explain how satellite cities are produced. In this thesis, I investigate the 
production of satellite cities in Phnom Penh drawing upon recent theoretical 
advances that critically consider the relational and territorial geographies of 
urban development. The satellite cities in Phnom Penh are driven by the 
mobility of urban development capital, concepts and expertise that are 
predominately intra-Asian in scope. In examining these intra-Asian 
connections I avoid casting satellite cities as universal, Western urban forms 
and contribute to debates that problematise the Western-centrism of urban 
knowledge production.  
 In the late 1990s, Cambodia emerged from several decades of 
conflict and communism to become more integrated into the regional and 
global economy. This political and economic transition led to rapid changes 
in the urban landscape, including the construction of satellite cities. Drawing 
upon interviews with key informants, I suggest that satellite cities are not 
simply a result of the government’s incapacity to provide infrastructure and 
plan for urbanisation, but the state also has an essential role in allowing land 
acquisitions and encouraging inflows of foreign investment. I examine in 
detail two satellite cities, one developed by a South Korean and other by an 
Indonesian company, and suggest that the South Korean company’s 
activities are underlined by the close relationship between their home 
country and Cambodia, as well as the supportive role of the South Korean 
developmental state. In contrast, the Indonesian company pioneered the 
‘satellite city’ concept in Indonesia and is now exporting the concept to 
other Asian countries. A critical examination of the intra-Asian geographies 
of satellite city production opens up the possibility of viewing Southeast 
Asian cities on their own terms without relying solely on Western theory.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Phnom Penh: a rapidly globalising city 
Cambodia is a relatively small Southeast Asian country sharing borders with 
Thailand in the west, Laos to the north, and Vietnam to the east (Map 1.1). 
The official population in 2008 was 13.3 million, of which 90 per cent are of 
Khmer ethnicity while the remainder consists mainly of Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and ethnic minority hill tribes (National Institute of Statistics, 
2008). Cambodia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was US$739 
in 2008, making it one of the poorest countries in Asia and the world. It 
consequently ranks very low in the United Nations (UN) Human 
Development Index, at 137 out of 182 countries. Approximately 80 per cent 
of the population lives in rural areas, and 71% rely on agriculture (primarily 
rice cultivation) as their main source of income (Vannarith, 2010).  
 Between the late 1960s and 1990s Cambodia had a tragic and 
turbulent history. The country was bombed heavily by the USA from 1965 
to 1973 as the Vietnam War spilled over the border (Owen & Kiernan, 
2006). This bombing set into motion a series of events that ultimately led to 
the communist Khmer Rouge taking power and committing a horrendous 
genocide, where 1.7 million Cambodians were murdered or died through 
starvation and exhaustion (Chandler, 2008). Between 1975 and 1979, the 
Khmer Rouge created an agricultural utopia, totally emptying the 
population of the capital city of Phnom Penh and coercing its population to 
work in rural cooperatives. When the country was liberated from the Khmer 
Rouge in 1979 by the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (the 
precursor to the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)) supported by Vietnam, 
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people started to return to Phnom Penh. During the 1980s, returnees 
inhabited any houses they could find, as most of the original residents of 
Phnom Penh were considered elites and had been killed or managed to 
escape the country. The infrastructure of the city was in ruins and the 
government lacked the budget and technical capacity to rectify the city’s 
problems. At the end of the Cold War, Cambodia lost its support from the 
Communist bloc and the UN took over the administration of the state under 
the auspices of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) from 1992 to 1993. UNTAC attempted to organise the first 
elections and initiate the country’s transition to peace, democracy and a free 
market economy (Hughes, 2003).  
 In the next decade, the country became open to investment and the 
infrastructure in Phnom Penh began to be rehabilitated. However, the city 
remained small and was yet to see investments of the scale that were to come 
later. Private business was once again permitted, especially taken up 
amongst Chinese Cambodians, who established companies importing 
products from neighbouring countries (Gottesman, 2003). Despite the efforts 
of UNTAC, the Khmer Rouge remained in control of some outlying 
provinces, and it was not until 1996 that the last Khmer Rouge leaders were 
defeated or defected to the government. The coalition between the CPP and 
FUNCINPEC, formed after the 1993 election, ended when Hun Sen ousted 
his co-Prime Minister in a coup d’état in 1997 (Hughes, 2002). The CPP 
subsequently went on to win the 1998 elections, and the party cemented its 
authority in the next election in 2003, albeit after a year of political 
stalemate when the country was effectively without a government 
(McCargo, 2005). It was after this point, as I argue in Chapter 5, that 
relative political stability brought the country into a capital accumulation 
process. The economy began to grow rapidly, with an average annual 
growth rate of 11% between 2004 and 2008 (Slocomb, 2010). 
 Before this time, Shatkin (1998) refuted the commonly held assertion 
that so-called ‘fourth world’ cities were excluded from the global economy. 
Shatkin argued that Phnom Penh was linked in various ways to the global 
economy, including the growth in foreign capital inflows (for example, in the 
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garment manufacturing industry) as well as illicit links with the global drug 
trade and its position as a transit point for illegal migrants. This was a time 
before the country returned to peace, but in the last decade the city has been 
ever more influenced by intra-Asian flows of capital, people, and 
information. What makes Cambodia an interesting case for research is that 
the country emerged from a period of conflict and communist government 
into a world where the importance of rising superpowers such as China, 
transient and fluctuating capital flows, and global and regional integration 
are ever more prominent (Hughes & Un, 2011). Foreign capital inflows to 
Cambodia increased tenfold between 2000 and 2006 (Hughes, 2009). 
During this time land prices in central Phnom Penh grew exponentially 
from approximately $250 to $2000 per square metre (GTZ, 2009). South 
Korea is a significant investor in Cambodia (indeed the biggest in 2006 and 
2008), and around three quarters of South Korean investment is in the real 
estate and construction sector, although this investment has fallen since the 
onset of the global economic crisis which hit Cambodia after 2009 
(KOTRA, 2010). At the same time, Cambodians who stored their money 
overseas during the period of political instability repatriated their cash, some 
of which was invested in property development and land speculation 
because of the potential to make huge profits.  
 Now is a crucial time to reflect upon what happened during this 
boom period and the reasons behind the rapid changes. In spite of these 
rapid transformations, there is a lack of research on contemporary urban 
development in Phnom Penh, although Simone (2008) and Paling 
(forthcoming) represent some recent exceptions. Much of the research on 
Phnom Penh has tended to focus on issues facing the urban poor such as 
tenure security, land rights, and evictions (Khemro & Payne, 2004; Payne, 
2005; Springer, 2009a). In contrast, the processes by which new urban 
developments are produced are less well understood. The boom in 
investment led to new urban forms that simultaneously changed the skyline 
of the city and caused an outward expansion to encompass farmland. 
Foreign capital has been behind a number of ‘flagship’ urban development 
projects, including Canadia Tower and Vattanac Tower, both high-rise 
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office buildings, while there are also new shopping malls and condominiums, 
as well as many new individual buildings built by local people and 
companies. Some of these projects were built on land previously occupied by 
low-income informal settlements and have therefore caused displacement. In 
peri-urban areas, there are six large-scale (100 to 2000 hectares) privately 
developed satellite cities, which are the focus of this research. In addition, 
there are many more gated communities, land sub-division projects and 
housing estates consisting of rows of two or three storey shophouses.  
 A particular focus of this thesis is the fact that urban planning has 
not kept pace with the level of urban development, as I discuss in Chapter 7. 
This is for a number of reasons, including financial constraints, a lack of 
technical capacity, and an unsuitable legal and policy framework. In 
addition, the challenges of urban development can seem rather insignificant 
when one takes into account the issues facing rural areas of Cambodia. 
Although Phnom Penh’s population has grown rapidly over the last 20 
years, as mentioned above, the country remains a predominately rural one, 
where most of the population works in agriculture and has poor access to 
education and healthcare. Therefore at the present time, urban planning 
can seem less pressing, but the rapid urban restructuring requires further 
analysis.  
   
1.2 Privately developed satellite cities  
 This thesis examines the production of private-sector-developed 
satellite cities around Phnom Penh. I define satellite cities2 here as 
integrated, purpose-built developments that are normally to some degree 
gated, providing access only to residents. Ranging in size from a few 
hundred to more than eight thousand hectares, they contain certain features 
associated with postmodern urbanism, such as villa and condominium 
housing marketed to emerging upper middle class urbanites and expatriates, 
                                                
2 In this thesis I use the term ‘satellite city’ throughout, but the terms ‘new town’, 
‘Urban Integrated Megaproject’, ‘new urban area’ and ‘privatopolis’ are also used 
by academics and developers to refer to broadly the same type of urban 
development. In the academic and planning literature the term ‘new town’ 
generally refers to new settlements built by the state. 
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consumption spaces such as shopping malls, office space, and private 
hospitals, schools, and other facilities (Gotsch & Peterek, 2003). Satellite 
cities in Southeast Asia are, for the most part, constructed and managed by 
the private sector, by companies located within the East Asian region3. They 
are normally constructed in peri-urban areas on rice-growing agricultural 
land or reclaimed marshland. In this thesis a distinction is drawn between 
satellite cities and gated communities, some of which are also situated on the 
urban edge. While there are many similarities, satellite cities are typically of 
a larger size, and more significantly, they integrate the various functions – 
residential, commercial and leisure – that are normally present in an urban 
system.  
 As this thesis highlights, Phnom Penh is but the latest location for a 
trend that permeated the larger cities of Indonesia in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Winarso, 2002) and that has since moved into Cambodia, China, Vietnam, 
India, as well as more widely in the Middle East and Africa. I argue that 
there are a number of reasons for this trend. There is the increasing 
globalisation of capital, especially in the property and real estate sector 
(Olds, 2001), which looks to expand into new and unexplored territories 
(Harvey, 2010). City governments are competing to lure this capital, under 
an ‘entrepreneurial’ mode of urban governance, in which a greater 
premium is placed on attracting private-sector investment (Harvey, 1989). 
These two factors are present in the majority of cities, and therefore do not 
provide a sufficient explanation. This thesis argues that satellite cities are 
being constructed in poorer and developing countries, where weak (and 
often corrupt) governance, ineffective planning laws, and a high level of 
social inequality between an elite and the poor masses combine to create the 
conditions that can be exploited by companies with the possibility to build 
large scale urban megaprojects.  
 The involvement of private sector actors in directing the future of 
Asian cities has become a growing trend in Southeast Asian cities (Shatkin, 
2008). Under neoliberalism, governments lack sufficient budget due to 
                                                
3 I include Southeast Asia within this definition of the East Asian region. 
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inefficient taxation or state downsizing at the behest of the international 
financial institutions, and therefore private companies have more of an 
opportunity to direct urban development. Large urban development 
companies have developed projects on an ever-greater scale. Examples 
include the Lippo Group and Ciputra Group in Indonesia and Ayala Land 
in the Philippines (Dick, 2009). These firms often use informal channels to 
lobby governments and bypass conventional planning regulations. Ananya 
Roy (2009b) has termed this process ‘informal planning’, and I will relate 
these ideas to satellite city development in Phnom Penh in chapter 7.  
 While the public sector is disadvantaged by the factors highlighted 
above, foreign investors are in possession of the necessary capital and 
expertise to construct urban development projects. They are also able to 
take advantage of the weak planning regulations in order to build projects at 
an unprecedented scale. According to Paling (forthcoming), this had led to a 
fragmented urban vision in Phnom Penh, where development is dependent 
not only on the government but also on a range of foreign and local 
investors and development partners. Satellite cities represent what Mike 
Davis and Daniel Monk (2007) have termed ‘evil paradises’ and 
‘dreamworlds of neoliberalism’: utopian and securitised ultra-capitalist 
enclave spaces that are removed from the poverty and hectic diversity of the 
wider urban environment.  
 However, while there is a rich body of literature on those in 
Indonesia (Firman, 2004a; Winarso, 2002; Zhu, 2010), and to a certain 
extent those in Vietnam (Douglass & Huang, 2007; Waibel, 2004, 2006) and 
China (Chen et al., 2009; Hsing, 2010), the development of satellite cities in 
Phnom Penh is yet to be fully explored. Furthermore, I propose in this thesis 
to look at the development of satellite cities from a different perspective. 
There has until now been a lack of emphasis on the role of intra-regional 
networks in the production of satellite cities. I am in agreement with Shatkin 
(Shatkin, 2010) who advocates a focus on ‘process’ rather than design. 
Focusing too heavily on design, as Dick and Rimmer (1998) have done, 
leads to overly simplistic statements about the ‘Western’ nature of Asian 
privately built satellite cities. Although the concept and design may be 
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evocative of American suburbia and gated communities, the production 
process is firmly grounded within East Asia. While the satellite cities in 
Indonesia were built by domestic companies, the more recently developed 
projects in other Southeast Asian countries are mainly funded by intra-Asian 
foreign direct investment. They are also based on models of urban design 
and governance practices in other Asian cities, or they utilise best practice 
examples which are extracted and emulated from other cities. The mobility 
of capital, concepts, and expertise has been and remains central to the 
process of diffusion of these urban projects throughout Southeast Asia. By 
investigating the articulation of urbanism, I consider city-building to be a 
relational, travelling phenomena that is simultaneously local and global. In 
other words, I am suggesting that to gain a more comprehensive 
understanding of the dynamics of urban change in Phnom Penh requires 
looking at the connections between the ‘in here’ and ‘out there’.  
 I focus in this thesis on two satellite city projects in particular. 
Camko City was the first of the satellite cities to be proposed in Phnom 
Penh, and is being built on 119 hectares of land just on the edge of the 
currently built up area in the city’s northern suburbs. The project is 
developed by South Korean investors and was the single largest FDI project 
in Cambodia’s history when first announced. A sign at the entrance to 
Camko City during the initial construction phase claimed that “new history 
is coming”, while the promotional video for this project proudly states that it 
will become the “the new civic pride of Cambodia”4. The second case study 
is Grand Phnom Penh International City (GPPIC), a similarly grand project 
being realised by the Indonesian property developer Ciputra.  
 
1.3 Bringing in Asian urban experiences 
 By examining the networks through which satellite cities are 
produced, this thesis exposes the diverse connections between East Asian 
cities. I seek to contribute to broader theoretical agendas which further the 
project of studying cities worldwide, attempting to avoid a dependence on 
frameworks developed in the North Atlantic world. There is currently a 
                                                
4 http://youtu.be/fA09C_uK1Qg, last viewed 05-07-2012. 
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growing clamour for caution in applying Western-centric urban theories to 
cities in other contexts. Influenced in part by the work of Jennifer Robinson 
(2002, 2006), a growing number of urban scholars have begun to appreciate 
the importance of considering all cities as ‘ordinary’ in order to 
postcolonialise the discipline of urban studies and move away from 
‘metrocentric’ assumptions (Bunnell & Maringanti, 2010). Such ideas are 
amplified by a number of urbanists who have suggested that research should 
approach the varied ‘worlding’ process of cities (Roy, 2009b), and that work 
on cities in the global South should not simply ‘add on’ case studies to 
existing Western theory (McFarlane, 2008). Watson (2009) suggests that this 
approach makes possible ‘seeing from the South’. Similar debates have been 
initiated within the field of economic geography (Pollard et al., 2009).  
 These arguments have been driven forwards in particular by 
relational comparative theorising that moves beyond fixed theorisations of 
place (K Ward, 2010) and seeks to present a more fine-grained analysis of 
globalisation (see M P Smith, 2001). This relational approach to 
understanding urban politics and policy-making is influenced by a number 
of theorisations that critically investigate global-local connections. Massey 
(1991) advocates a ‘global sense of place’, where place is considered open 
and defined by combinations of flows of capital, people and 
communications. In her more recent analysis of London as a ‘world city’, 
Massey (2007) calls for a ‘politics of place beyond place’, where London is 
defined as a relational construct through its relations with other places at 
various scales. Similarly, Brenner (2004) suggests that territory is relationally 
produced rather than static and bounded, and Allen and Cochrane (2007, p. 
1172) propose that urban regions are not “fixed political spaces ordered by 
scale” but “made and remade by political processes that stretch beyond it 
and impact unevenly” (see also Amin, 2004). These ideas also draw upon 
Harvey’s (2006a) notion of the dialectic of fixity and mobility under 
contemporary capitalism and the implications of investment and divestment 
on the urban built environment. 
Yet as McCann and Ward (2010) argue, a focus on flows and 
networks must always be balanced by an understanding of place specificities, 
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such as how local urban actors manage the impacts of and interact with 
global and regional flows. I am interested here in the ways that relational 
studies can bring into view intra-Asian urban networks, therefore rejecting 
the often-ingrained assumption that urban innovations originate in Western 
cities. While much urban research has charted the mobility of theory and 
models from the core to the periphery (Leichenko & Solecki, 2005; Stead et 
al., 2010), there is a need to be more critical in charting the networks of 
mobile theory, people, capital, ideas, and policy in and between cities 
(Edensor & Jayne, 2011; Roy, 2009a). 
 Working along these lines, researchers have begun to consider the 
ways in which cities in non-Western contexts are interlinked. This is part of 
a broader movement towards a consideration of the ‘worlding’ processes of 
Asian cities and the ways in which they are becoming models that are 
subsequently replicated throughout the region (Roy & Ong, 2011). Lowry 
and McCann (2011) have written on the ways in which Asian cities are 
acting as models for other cities in Asia and the West. Similarly, Bunnell and 
Das (2010), for instance, work on high-tech urban development policy 
transfer between Kuala Lumpur and Hyderabad, showing how global 
consulting companies were central to forging “geographies of serial 
seduction” (Bunnell & Das, 2010, p. 280). These consultants promoted 
Shanghai as a model for Indian cities, while the role of Singapore as a model 
has been equally alluring for some other urban governments (B H Chua, 
2011). More broadly, Dick (2005) has argued that the existence of flows of 
people, goods, money and information mean that Southeast Asia is a 
network of cities. Since the East Asian region includes a varied range of 
urban contexts, taking the region as a framework provides the ideal ground 
to straddle the divide between North/South and rich/poor (Bunnell et al., 
forthcoming).  
 
1.4 Research aims 
 The central purpose of this research is to understand the reasons 
why privately developed satellite cities are becoming a prominent urban 
development concept in Phnom Penh, and by employing an approach that 
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is influenced by recent ideas about relationality, to consider the ways in 
which intra-Asian urban networks are driving this phenomenon. These are 
my four main aims:  
− To extend contemporary academic debates that 
critically interrogate the ‘Western-centrism’ of urban 
knowledge production. I am positioning this research within 
the growing body of literature which introduces postcolonial 
approaches to urban studies. This is made possible by 
understanding satellite cities as a something other than an urban 
form with only Western origins, and instead tracing the networks 
through which they are produced. This aim is developed 
throughout the thesis, especially in chapters 3, 8 and 9.      
− To investigate the influence of contemporary political 
and economic changes on urban development in 
Cambodia. The majority of research on urban development in 
Cambodia has either specifically focused on issues around land 
rights, or is now rather outdated given the rapid changes in the 
last decade. In contrast, this research will investigate the recent 
economic and political changes and the related effects on the 
urban environment. This point is explored in chapter 5.    
− To critically examine the role of private sector actors 
in the urban development and planning of Southeast 
Asian cities under intensified globalisation. This aim 
involves investigating the relationship between state and 
corporate actors in urban development and planning, including 
examining the extent to which the state supports the activities of 
private actors, and the ways in which state deficiencies are taken 
over by the private sector. In particular, I develop ideas on the 
informal nature of urban planning. This aim is discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7.  
− To explore the intra-Asian mobility of urban 
development capital and concepts in the production of 
new urban spaces. Achieving this aim involves investigating 
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the reasons why overseas companies invest in Cambodia and 
their relationship with the state. This also includes looking at the 
role of the state in supporting business regionalisation/ 
internationalisation in the companies’ respective countries of 
origin. This aim is considered in chapter 8. 
 
1.5 Thesis outline 
 After this introductory chapter, the second chapter sets the context of 
the thesis by discussing the urban form of satellite cities and the differences 
between them and other private sector urban developments such as gated 
communities. I look at the proliferation of satellite cities in Jakarta in the 
1980s and 1990s and then in other cities in developing countries. The 
chapter also discusses the reasons for satellite city development. I argue that 
these include the demand from a growing middle class, the increasing 
globalisation of urban development capital, entrepreneurial actions of urban 
governments, and the growing involvement of private sector actors in city 
development and planning.   
 Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background to the research. I 
argue here that the development of satellite cities in Phnom Penh is driven 
by intra-Asian networks of urban development capital and concepts. By 
focusing on the East Asian region I build upon recent calls to take into 
account diversity of urbanism in a wider range of sites outside of the ‘West’ 
(J Robinson, 2006) and to cultivate ‘new geographies of theory’ (Roy, 
2009a). 
 The fourth chapter details the research design and methods. The 
empirical research draws on approximately 30 interviews with urban 
planning professionals, local and national government officers, NGO 
leaders, real estate agents and property developers conducted between 
October 2010 and December 2011, as well as 20 shorter interviews with 
people living near Camko City, and ethnographic data derived from casual 
conversations and interactions in Cambodia. It also makes considerable use 
of data gathered from a variety of sources including newspapers, research 
reports, investment statistics, legal documents and government policies.  
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 The remaining chapters present my theoretically informed findings. 
Chapter 5 provides the background to Phnom Penh’s urban development. 
This chapter principally relies on reports, newspapers, and other secondary 
data as academic research on Phnom Penh is relatively sparse. In this 
chapter I briefly cover the history of Cambodia and the influence of 
historical factors that are essential to understand urban development. The 
major part of this chapter is situated within the last decade, when the power 
of the ruling party was cemented and the country was fully opened up to the 
global economy. I discuss the effects of these political and economic factors 
on the development of Phnom Penh, in particular the real estate ‘boom’ that 
lasted from approximately 2005 to 2008 and led to a number of new urban 
forms that rapidly changed the landscape of the city.  
Chapter 6 looks specifically at one type of large-scale peri-urban 
development project: privately built satellite cities. I detail the extent of 
satellite city development around Phnom Penh, and provide a background 
to the two case studies – Camko City and GPPIC. I also discuss the impacts 
on local communities, the integration of these enclaves with the existing city 
and critically discuss the nature of demand for these schemes.  
 In Chapter 7, entitled Satellite Cities (Un)planned, I argue that private 
sector satellite cities are not simply a response to the state’s incapacity to 
plan Phnom Penh’s development and provide infrastructure. Although, 
certainly, loose planning regulations mean that this kind of large-scale 
development can occur more easily than in places with stringent 
development control. I suggest that the informal nature of planning has 
impeded attempts at comprehensive urban planning. Additionally, the fact 
that the state does not have the budget to finance necessary urban 
infrastructure nor the urban planning expertise means that the private sector 
can take advantage of providing this to the growing middle class. However, 
the state also has a key role to play. The state can rationalise such projects, 
allow land acquisitions by certain development companies at below market 
prices, and create incentives to lure the inflows of private capital.   
 The eighth chapter, entitled Tracing the Production of Satellite Cities, 
argues that satellite cities are driven by capital and models from within the 
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East Asian region. In particular, I trace back the networks of the two case 
study companies, one back to South Korea and another to Indonesia, and 
analyse how and why the two companies decided to operate outside of their 
national borders. In doing so, the chapter discusses the flows of urban 
development capital and the role of the state in supporting business 
internationalisation as an economic development strategy. The two 
companies have different imaginaries of Cambodia, and this has shaped the 
nature of their urban development projects. The chapter will also discuss the 
mobility of city building knowledge and, more specifically, the concept of 
the private sector satellite city. Overall, I argue that the development of 
Camko City is bound up with South Korea’s close political, diplomatic and 
cultural ties with Cambodia, which have been one of the major precursors of 
South Korean investment. South Korea’s state led globalisation policy has 
also supported the operation of South Korean firms overseas. The 
development of GPPIC, by contrast, is contingent on the activities of a single 
Indonesian company, Ciputra. The internationalisation of Indonesian 
companies is not as formally supported by the state as it is in South Korea. 
The South Korean firm behind Camko City did not have previous 
experience in satellite city development, but Ciputra, the developer of 
GPPIC, is one of the leading urban development companies and the 
founder of the business was behind the first private sector satellite city in 
Indonesia.  
 In the conclusion, Chapter 9, I outline main themes of the thesis and 
discuss the wider significance of the issues raised. I also offer a number of 
suggestions for future study.       
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2. Satellite City Development in Southeast 
Asian Cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citraland Surabaya 
 
Citraland Surabaya is also known as “The Singapore of 
Surabaya.” The project was built on 2,000 beautifully landscaped 
hectares between Gresik and Surabaya. 
Citraland Surabaya is designed to be a self-contained city, 
offering a perfect combination of style and excellence. This first-
class living environment is equipped with business, 
entertainment, sports and shopping facilities, including a 
commercial district, shopping area, water park, and 27-hole golf 
course that meets international standards. 
Today, Citraland Surabaya houses 3,500 families and continues 
to expand. Slowly but surely Citraland is carving a name for itself. 
A self-contained city with a “clean, green and modern” theme, it 
is more than just physical development that transformed 
Citraland into a Singapore-like city. Solid city management 
played a substantial role in supporting Citraland’s development. 
In acknowledgement of its ongoing improvement and stellar city 
management, Citraland received the Certificate ISO 9001:2000 
City Management. 
 
(Source: http://www.ciputra.com/java.html?start=1)  
 
 
The statement above is taken from the website of Ciputra, the developer 
behind Citraland, situated in the city of Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest 
city. Large privately developed and managed satellite cities such as this are 
being built on greenfield sites around large cities in Southeast Asia, and 
more widely, other parts of the developing world. The phenomenon is most 
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widespread in Indonesia, particularly in peripheral parts of the mega-city of 
Jakarta. It was estimated that in the mid-1990s before the onset of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, there were at least 23 of these satellite cities completed or 
under construction around Jakarta (Firman, 2004a). They range in size from 
a few hundred to 6000 hectares in size. More recently, satellite cities have 
appeared around other Southeast Asian cities, most notably in Vietnam 
around the two largest cities of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi.  
There is nothing particularly new about privatised urbanisation in 
Southeast Asia (Hogan et al., 2012). Satellite cities, however, represent an 
unprecedented role for the private sector in influencing the future 
development of urban regions. These ultra-modern urban environments are 
being built on the periphery of cities, and they are conspicuously devoid of 
local context. They reflect a multitude of factors, including changes in the 
structure and regulation of the global economy towards neoliberalism and 
the adoption of entrepreneurial strategies by the state that seek to attract 
capital (Brenner & Theodore, 2002), as well as other factors such as demand 
from a growing middle class, and weak or ineffective urban governance. 
Privately built satellite cities are found in various locations but demonstrate 
considerable path-dependency. Malaysia, for example, has not seen the 
development of satellite cities, although Iskandar Malaysia is a similar type 
of project, as I will elaborate upon later in this chapter.    
The aim of this chapter is to review research on satellite city 
development, and in doing so, identify areas to which this thesis can 
contribute and extend. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I explore 
the satellite city (and ‘new town’) concept from its apparent origin as a state-
led policy in the first half of the 20th century to the more recent history of the 
private sector developed satellite city, which has its origins in Jakarta from 
the 1970s onwards. While state-led satellite cities were built for housing 
and/or industrial development purposes, private sector developments are, as 
one would expect, motivated more by profit generation through property 
investment and real estate markets. Thus, they tend to reflect the interests of 
wealthy property buyers rather than the population as a whole. Secondly, I 
examine the location of satellite cities, which in the last decade have become 
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a more common urban feature on the periphery of many large Southeast 
Asian cities, as well as other rapidly developing countries in the Middle East, 
Africa and China. Thirdly, I discuss some explanations for satellite city 
development in terms of ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ factors. The latter include a 
growing middle class and ethnic segregation, while the former consist of 
economic liberalisation and globalisation, the role of the state and the trend 
towards the greater involvement of private actors in urban planning and 
development.  
 
2.1 Delineating satellite cities  
For the purpose of this thesis I will define a ‘satellite city’ as a 
purpose built urban settlement that is developed on previously rural or 
agricultural land, and generally designed to be an integrated urban system. 
As such, they contain villa and condominium housing generally marketed 
towards emerging middle and upper class urbanites and expatriates, 
consumption spaces such as shopping malls, office space, and other facilities 
such as private hospitals and schools. Rather than growing gradually over 
time, satellite cities are planned from scratch by urban planners or property 
developers. Satellite cities can range in size from a few hundred to tens of 
thousands of hectares, and are normally to some degree gated, providing 
access only to residents. This research is concerned with satellite cities that 
are designed and built by the private sector rather than governments.  
A number of other terms are found in the professional and academic 
urban planning lexicon to describe urban communities planned and built 
from scratch. The term ‘new town’ is primarily used in the context of 
modern era state planned settlements in both the UK and around the world 
(Alexander, 2009). It has in some cases, however, been used to describe 
private sector developed projects around Jakarta since the 1980s (Dick & P 
Rimmer, 1998; Firman, 2004a). Hogan and Houston (2002) referred to the 
same developments in Jakarta as ‘corporate cities’. Shatkin’s (2011) work 
refers to ‘urban integrated mega-projects’ in Kolkata, India, also introducing 
the term ‘privatopolis’. Some satellite cities are named with reference to a 
specific purpose or industry for which they are designed to accommodate. 
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New urban areas known as ‘eco-cities’ are designed with sustainable 
principles and attempt to incorporate sufficient employment for residents in 
order to reduce commuting to nearby urban centres (Pow & Neo, 2010). 
Examples include Dongtan Eco-City near Shanghai, China (Castle, 2008) 
and the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city (Tianjin Eco-City, 2012), and 
Lavasa near Mumbai in India (Datta, forthcoming). 
Although a variety of terms are in circulation, the most significant 
variation is between those planned and developed by the state with 
predominately welfare goals (often referred to as ‘new towns’), and those 
built in the tradition of post-modern planning by private developers on a 
for-profit basis (which I refer to as ‘satellite cities’). The former were 
generally constructed in the post-war period, while the latter have become 
more common from the 1980s until the present day. Nevertheless, this is not 
a clear-cut temporal distinction, as many projects are realised through 
partnerships between the state and private sectors. I have chosen to stick 
with term ‘satellite city’ throughout the thesis for simplicity, as it is the 
English language term most commonly used in the Cambodian context to 
refer to the type of urban megaproject on which this research focuses.     
Modern-era new towns  
The desire to construct new cities from scratch is far from a new 
phenomenon. New towns built in the post-war period were largely 
developed by the state and favoured no particular social class or income 
group as residents (Chen et al., 2009). In the UK, new towns were built in 
response to the problems of the 19th century industrial city. Stemming from 
Abercrombie’s Greater London Plan of 1945, there was a government 
desire to redistribute the population of London into a number of new towns 
in order to decongest the capital city (Pacione, 2008). The new town concept 
also became widespread in East and Southeast Asia in cities of 
Commonwealth countries (Singapore, Malaysia and pre-1997 Hong Kong). 
Garden cities and new towns became a feature of cities without a British 
colonial influence such as Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei, as well as those 
influenced by Soviet planning initiatives, such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Tianjin (Phillips & Yeh, 1987).  
18 
 
 
In the city-states of Singapore and Hong Kong, the planning of new 
towns was a response to population pressure because of rapid 
industrialisation. These new towns, for example Ang Mo Kio in Singapore 
and Sha Tin in Hong Kong, were mainly designed to provide public 
housing (Pun, 1987; L H Wang, 1987), only later beginning to have social 
services, amenities and employment opportunities. New towns were built 
both to provide new housing but also as tools for the decentralisation of 
urban growth in a region characterised by primate cities, in much the same 
way as the new towns developed in the South East of Britain in the post-war 
period. In Korea, new towns were used as a method of dispersing 
populations away from the primate city of Seoul, as part of the broader 
policy of industrial decentralisation towards the southeast of the country (T 
L Lee, 1987). Similarly, in Malaysia, the British initiated the construction of 
the new town of Petaling Jaya as a response to overcrowding in Kuala 
Lumpur, while other new towns were constructed in the post-1970s period 
in rural areas with the aim of providing non-agricultural employment for 
rural workers (B T Lee, 1987). The state has played a significant role in new 
town development, particularly in China, where new towns were realized 
through state-funded industrial development policies in the Maoist period 
(Kirkby, 1987). 
Postmodern-era satellite cities 
The satellite cities that form the focus of this thesis are different from 
state planned new towns because they are developed by private companies 
on a for-profit basis. Their development has changed in line with wider 
urban development trends from state led welfare-oriented projects to a form 
of neoliberal urbanism motivated by profit and driven by property and land 
speculation. Private sector developed ‘edge cities’ in the USA, for example 
Tysons Corner in Virginia, are partly reflective of this change. From the 
1950s onwards, office, retail and residential space began to appear outside of 
traditional urban areas. These places were normally previously greenfield 
sites with good road connections (Garreau, 1992). Although there are many 
commonalities, they differ from the satellite cites discussed in the remained 
of the chapter because they mainly grew more organically, are more 
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focussed on office development, and are not normally developed by a single 
company.  
In Asia, this kind of development originated during the 1970s in 
Indonesia at the time when neoliberal ideas began to dominate economic 
policy. Kaminer (2010) argues that the demise of classic new towns was not 
linked to their design failures and disapproval from public towards the style 
of living that new towns provided. Rather it was a product of the shift from 
Keynesian planned economics to the monetarism advocated by Chicago 
school economists such as Milton Friedman. The new economic order 
advocated curtailing the power of the state, which included reducing the 
role of comprehensive urban planning. Cities therefore began to be more 
influenced by the necessities of neoliberal capitalism.  
The capital for the development of satellite cities is primarily 
provided by the private sector and moves across national borders. In 
Indonesia, satellite cities were principally funded and developed by domestic 
investors, such as Ciputra and the Lippo Group. More recently developed 
satellite cities in countries such as Vietnam and Cambodia have seen foreign 
investors take a much bigger role in their development and financing. The 
position of foreign investors is dependent on the local context as different 
countries have diverse foreign investment regimes. Local legal frameworks 
may allow foreign companies to operate freely, while others require 
companies to enter into joint-venture agreement with a local partner. This is 
especially the case regarding the acquisition of land. This thesis suggests that 
understanding why and how foreign investment is occurring is central to a 
more comprehensive explanation of satellite city production, as is discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter.  
While satellite cities are privately funded, there are varying levels and 
types of state involvement. They are not necessarily directly attributable to a 
weak state, but reflect the power relations between state and corporate 
actors (as is discussed in section 2.4). Some satellite cities are explicitly part 
of state led efforts to boost the economy of particular regions of a nation-
state, such as Iskandar Malaysia, in the southern state of Johor. In socialist 
countries such as Vietnam, the state remains a major landowner and 
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regulator of new urban development, while in China the state owns all 
urban land (Yeh & F L Wu, 1999). In countries where the state has a weaker 
role in the land market, such as Cambodia, entrepreneurial urban 
governments nevertheless promote investment in urban development capital 
to further their ambitions.  The state can also have a role in a more informal 
fashion. The case of Indonesia reveals that satellite city development has 
occurred through a blurring of the boundaries between public and private, 
creating a situation where personal and familial connections between 
developers and politicians have enabled companies to bypass planning 
regulations (Dieleman, 2011).  
Besides the primary developer, there are an assortment of other 
actors involved in satellite city development from conceptualisation through 
to construction. Although some more experienced satellite city developers, 
such as Indonesia’s Ciputra, have the capacity to undertake most of the tasks 
internally, developers typically contract out specific parts of the process to 
other companies. These include consultants specialising in market research 
and positioning, masterplanning, infrastructure development and 
environmental impact assessment. They also call on the skills of external 
architecture, construction and engineering companies. The geographies of 
these development arrangements are becoming progressively more complex 
as urban planning is becoming increasingly internationalised. Many of these 
companies operate beyond national boundaries. A transnational capitalist 
class of globalising professionals and architecture firms transmit certain 
urban forms to cities around the world (Sklair, 2000). These ideas are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.    
In most cases, not everything within the satellite city is funded and 
built by the primary developer itself. It can be the case that a developer 
purchases land and completes the initial groundwork, such as roads and 
other infrastructure, then lures other companies to build additional facilities 
such as shopping malls and office building. In effect, they are designed to 
attract further investment. A satellite city in the early stages of development 
in Phnom Penh by the domestic company L.Y.P Group operates in this way 
(L.Y.P Group Co., Ltd., 2011). Similarly, Songjiang Town in Shanghai is 
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designed to attract further foreign investment in industrial production (J P 
Wu, 2008).   
According to Gotsch and Peterek (2003, p. 5), satellite cities contain 
“the universal toolbox of postmodern urbanity”. This toolbox includes the 
villa, condominium, international school, shopping mall and golf course. 
Typically, the shopping malls are home to global fashion and fast-food 
brands and local chain stores rather than local foods and independent 
businesses. Housing and facilities in satellite cities are targeted almost 
entirely at the middle and upper classes rather than for a mixture of social 
groups. The type of housing built is usually large villas and condominiums, 
sold at prices that only the relatively wealthy can afford. Attempts at 
government regulation of the housing market in satellite cities have had a 
poor success rate. In Indonesia, the government attempted to ensure that 
the benefits given to the private sector through land concessions for satellite 
city developments would help to solve the housing crisis caused by the 
rapidly expanding urban population (Silver, 2008). They passed a law in the 
1980s which stated that in all developments over 200 hectares, every luxury 
property built required three ‘small’ (22-36 m2) and six ‘very small’ (21 m2) 
houses to be constructed. By 1990, the policy had succeeded in increasing 
the supply of low-income housing, although most of the housing was built 
outside of the satellite cities on cheaper and less desirable land. A later 
decree enabled developers to contribute money per unit instead, equivalent 
to approximately $1,000 (Silver, 2008).   
 The terms ‘self-contained’ and ‘integrated’ are commonly used by 
satellite city developers when marketing their projects. Lippo Village in 
Jakarta is described as “the most successful integrated satellite city in Indonesia 
with complete international standard facilities and infrastructure. The 
development provides every need a modern township could conceivably require 
and has been home to over 50,000 people and created 45,000 jobs” (PT 
Lippo Karawaci Tbk., 2009 authors emphasis). From the perspective of the 
development company, building an ‘integrated’ city is a strategy to 
maximise profits. The developer creates a captive market and can 
theoretically profit from every aspect of the residents’ daily life, from living 
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and working to shopping and spending leisure time. However, the reality is 
rather different. In the Jakarta metropolitan region, the supposedly self-
contained satellite cities were still very much dependent on the capital city as 
an employment destination (Winarso, 1999). There are not sufficient 
employment activities for all of the residents, meaning that commuters face 
long car journeys to central Jakarta. Public transportation links are usually 
poor or non-existent. In Winarso’s (1999) survey, it was found that one-way 
journeys to work of up to two hours were commonplace for satellite city 
residents.    
The discourse of self-containment is also used as a strategy to attract 
other investors by asserting that the project is of a significant enough size to 
be independent from the urban region in which it is situated. This is 
achieved by convincing global companies that the projects are far removed 
from the chaos of the existing city (Douglass & Huang, 2007). Indeed, taking 
a cursory glance at the architecture and urban design of many satellite city 
projects it is nearly impossible to identify in which country the project is 
located. They represent what Sassen (2008, p. 113) refers to as the 
“hyperspace of global business”. But it is important not to position satellite 
cities as simply a product of the globalisation of urban form, where the 
origin of modernity is situated in the West, an important point to which I 
will return to in the next chapter.  
 One of the major selling points of satellite cities is the idea of high 
levels of security. The discourses of security and privacy are often central to 
the marketing literature of these projects. Security is achieved through 
access gates, walls and fences, heavy policing of the space by private security 
forces and the use of CCTV cameras. Exclusion is apparent within the new 
cities themselves, with more expensive properties occupied by wealthier 
residents having higher security than others. In BSD City, Jakarta, 8% of 
the houses were ‘luxury’, 27% were medium-type and 65% were small-type, 
all located within different zones (Firman, 2004a). Public space is highly 
regulated, governed by the management company rather than democratic 
and publicly accountable procedures. In Lippo Karawaci, Jakarta, for 
example, the management is the responsibility of a town manager, who is an 
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expatriate appointed by the developer rather than a representative elected 
by the residents. Residents pay a fee to the company for services; in a similar 
way to how local government taxes are normally paid. In the privately 
governed satellite city, there is minimal place for convivial sociability and 
random encounters. Residents are required to abide by the rules of the 
developer, which specify the kinds of behaviour that are deemed acceptable. 
Some satellite cities are gated in their entirety, which prevents access to 
anyone who is not a resident. This is made possible using fencing and secure 
access barriers at every road entrance. Security is not totally effective, 
however. During the 1998 riots in Jakarta, a shopping mall in Lippo 
Karawaci was destroyed by arsonists, and in other satellite cities the 
property of ethnic Chinese was targeted by looters (Firman, 2004a).   
However, the majority of satellite cities are in fact not completely 
‘gated’, private spaces. Although individual residential clusters are secured, 
the remainder of the development is open to access by the general 
population. This is a response to the potential commercial advantages of 
allowing public access to the shopping and leisure facilities, whilst retaining 
the image of privacy and security for those living in the residential clusters. 
In a similar context, the ‘superblocks’ (large, mixed-use city centre 
developments normally consisting of high-end shopping and leisure facilities, 
hotels, offices and apartments) of central Jakarta are not solely for enjoyment 
by the wealthy. Anyone is free to enter, even if consumption is not the 
primary purpose (Kusno, 2010). However, it important to bear in mind that 
processes of exclusion operate at symbolic and psychological levels even if 
physical barriers are non-existent (Lemanski, 2006). Given that satellite cities 
are built with high-tech electronic and telecommunications infrastructure, 
Gotsch and Peterek (2003, p. 6) suggest that “the ties among globally 
connected new towns at different places of our planet seem to be much 
closer than those with their local neighbours at the other side of the fence”.    
Although satellite cities are exclusive spaces that can be gated as a 
whole, or contain gated communities within them, they differ from 
traditional gated communities in terms of their sheer scale and the 
integration of an entire urban system that is controlled by the private sector. 
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The literature on gated communities is valuable, however, in 
conceptualising the privatisation of urban space and foundations for urban 
segregation. Gated communities have predominantly been associated with 
the USA (Blakely & Snyder, 1999), although there is a long history of gated 
or walled communities in cities elsewhere. In Asia, gated communities have 
been developed since the 1980s, although again, the phenomenon is not new 
and the colonial cities of the region were segregated along ethnic lines with 
the European colonialists and Chinese communities living in segregated 
residential areas (Abeyasekere, 1990; Leisch, 2002). In China, cities were 
characterised by gated work-unit compounds well before luxury gated 
housing enclaves became widespread (F L Wu, 2005).   
 
2.2 Situating satellite cities 
Satellite cities of the type mentioned in the previous section are not a 
ubiquitous phenomenon. They are generally situated in developing 
countries, and in peri-urban areas surrounding major cities. In this section I 
discuss where satellite cities have been developed, starting in Southeast Asia 
but now with a much wider geographical reach. The development of 
satellite cities exhibits a geographical variegation where there are some 
patterns but also differences because of the path-dependent nature of urban 
development.  
The first place where private sector satellite cities became a 
significant feature of the urban landscape was the Jakarta extended 
metropolitan region. A development named Pondok Indah was the first 
satellite city, and was built in the early 1970s by Ciputra (Firman, 2004a). 
The number of satellite cities grew rapidly from the early 1980s. By the 
middle of the 1990s there were 23 satellite cities of between 500 and 6000 
hectares under construction (Firman, 2004a) (Map 2.1). Dick and Rimmer 
(1998) suggest that competition during the 1990s drove developers to 
develop ever bigger and more integrated urban development projects. Of 
the 23 satellite cities being built in the 1990s, approximately 60% were 
postponed by 2001 because of the prolonged economic crisis. These new 
satellite cities equated to 16,600 hectares of land being transformed from 
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rural to residential use in the two decades up until 1999 (Winarso, 1999). 
The total area of these in fact exceeded that of Jakarta’s central district. 
Between the years 1987 and 1993, an average of 26,267 new housing units 
were provided each year by the private sector, compared to 4,406 each year 
by the state-owned Perumnas5.     
At the scale of the urban region, satellite cities are located in peri-
urban areas. Normally they are built on farmland, particularly paddy fields, 
and wetland areas. The location decisions of developers in the Jakarta area 
were driven primarily by low land prices and potential market demand more 
than any other factors. Low land prices allow developers to make huge 
profits when they convert land from rural to urban use. On average, the 
land price for new residential developments increased 100 times before and 
after construction (Winarso, 2002). Accessibility is not such a major concern 
of developers, because they have the ability to build access roads themselves. 
In the early 1990s, a group of satellite city developers collaborated to build a 
road to connect a number of newly urbanised areas. The planned new road 
link was never proposed in a government masterplan (Winarso, 2002). 
The largest satellite city built in Jakarta is known as BSD City 
(formerly Bumi Serpong Damai, meaning ‘Peaceful Land of Serpong’). This 
development covers an area of 6,000 hectares in Tangerang district, and 
according to the marketing brochure of the development is in fact half the 
size of Paris (Image 2.1 and 2.2). It was originally a joint venture between 10 
companies but now is being developed by Sinarmas, a large Sino- 
Indonesian conglomerate with operations in agribusiness, financial services 
and real estate. The project land was acquired in 1989 and has since then 
been under a phased program of development. In the next decade, the 
developers have forecasted that as many as 150,000 more houses will be 
built, working towards the ultimate target of a million residents upon 
completion.    
In 1997, a study in the Tangerang district of Jakarta found that 60 
companies held development permits for a land area of 27,090 hectares 
(Winarso, 2002). Of those 60 projects studied, more than half were 
                                                
5 Acronym of Perusahaan Umum Pembangunan Perumahan Nasional, the National 
Housing Development Company. 
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developed by a few large companies. Only one of those companies – Si 
Pengembang (part of PT Ciputra Group) – originated as a land 
development company. The others became involved in land development as 
part of a diversification strategy after witnessing the potential profits that 
could be made in the urban development business (Winarso, 2002). Leaf 
(1994) found that between 30% and 50% of land with development permits 
in and around Jakarta was not being developed but being kept off the 
market. In this way, developers use land as a speculative commodity in order 
to profit from future price increases.  
In Vietnam, there are a number of satellite cities recently completed 
or still under construction. In Ho Chi Minh City, Phu My Hung (also 
known as Saigon South) is financed by a joint venture between the 
Taiwanese company Central Trading and Development Group and the 
Vietnamese Tan Thuan Industrial Promotion Corporation (Waibel, 2004). 
Under construction since 1994, it is planned to cover 33 sq. km of land and 
house one million people on completion (Gotsch, 2004; Waibel, 2006) (Map 
2.2 and 2.3). Another example is the Na Be New Town, being built by a 
Korean developer and modelled on successful satellite cities already 
constructed in Korea. The largest of the satellite city projects surrounding 
Ho Chi Minh City, called the North West Metropolitan Area, is currently in 
the early stages of construction. A Malaysian company is undertaking this 
project, which will cost an estimated US$3 billion and will be some 18 
kilometres long and 5 kilometres wide. In the northern city of Hanoi, the 
Indonesian developer Ciputra is building a satellite city under the name 
Ciputra International City. This development is anticipated to contain 2,000 
luxury houses and 50 high-rise condominium towers. A Korean developer is 
constructing an even larger project named An Khanh (Star World). With a 
projected total investment value of more than $2 billion, the developers 
(POSCO E+C) envisage a city of 1,300 villas and over 6,000 apartments. Of 
the $2 billion forecasted cost, only approximately $100 million will come 
from the developers. The remainder will be provided by other local and 
global investors, as well as house buyers (Douglass & Huang, 2007). The city 
of Manila in the Philippines is the location of private urban developments 
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known as Eastwood City and Fort Bonifacio Global City. The company 
behind the latter project, Ayala Land, has a number of similar projects 
throughout the capital, also partially controlling the transportation 
infrastructure (a light rail network) connecting them to the wider urban area 
(Shatkin, 2008).   
The largest private city in the world (at the time of planning in 1989) 
named Muang Thong Thani (meaning Golden Town) was planned for 
construction 40km from the centre of Bangkok, aiming to house one million 
people on completion. However, it turned out to be “one of the greatest 
planning disasters of the twentieth century” (Douglass & Boonchuen, 2006, 
p. 83). The Sino-Thai developers Bangkok Land Co. Ltd. borrowed US$2.5 
billion to finance the mega-project, which the developers stated was a 
response to changing societal demands and the ability of developers to 
respond to and market the opportunity (Boonchuen, 2002). In 1996, 
construction was completed, comprising housing for 250,000 residents with 
related shops, offices, leisure and a convention centre. With the start of the 
Asian financial crisis, the project ground to a halt, and even today remains 
empty with the only used parts being the sports complex and convention 
centre (Image 2.3). It has been suggested that huge mega-projects such as 
this were in fact the causes of the collapse of the Thai economy during the 
financial crisis, given that middle-class housing supply far exceeded demand 
(Douglass & Boonchuen, 2006). Another reason offered for the failure of 
Muang Thong Thani was that it was designed to capitalise on a population 
(and capital) flight from Hong Kong when the former British colony was 
transferred to China in 1997 (R Marshall, 2003). This prediction never 
materialised. It is plausible that the spectacular failure of Muang Thong 
Thani discouraged further satellite city development in Thailand, although 
smaller gated communities are widespread (Dick & P Rimmer, 2003).    
While in the Indonesian context the private sector appears to have a 
greater power than the state in directing the future of new urban 
development, the Malaysian context is rather different. Large new urban 
developments in Malaysia are more directly initiated by the state. This 
process is particularly associated with former Prime Minister Mahathir’s 
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attempts to thrust Malaysia onto the world stage and attract foreign 
investment (Bunnell, 2004; Olds, 1995). The new city of Putrajaya built to 
house government ministries is a materialisation of Mahathir’s ideology 
(Moser, 2010). More recently, the Iskandar Malaysia development in the 
southern state of Johor was conceptualised by the government as part of the 
country’s second economic corridor. Iskandar Malaysia is very much 
directed by the state through the Iskandar Regional Development 
Authority. The government allocated $24 billion to support the masterplan, 
$1.3 billion of that being ring fenced in the Ninth Malaysia Plan for 
infrastructure construction (Rizzo & Glasson, forthcoming). It is estimated 
that a further $100 billion is needed to complete the project, a mixture of 
local and foreign private investment. Much of the foreign capital invested in 
Iskandar Malaysia originates in the Middle East, which underlines the 
importance of Islamic financial networks (Bassens et al., 2010).  
Broadening the scope out into the wider Asian region, the 
development of ‘New Cities’ (xincheng) in China replaced the previous trend 
for ‘development zone’ construction. Whereas ‘development zones’ were 
primarily industrial estates, the ‘New Cities’ represent purpose-built and 
wholly commodified urban environments, containing residential, office, and 
retail space at the urban fringe (Hsing, 2010).  State-led satellite cities were 
developed around Seoul, South Korea from the 1980s onwards (H M Kim 
& Han, 2012), and currently a privately built mega-project known as New 
Songdo City is under development (C Kim, 2010) (see Chapter 8). This 
development is a joint venture between American company Gale 
International and Korea’s POSCO E+C, and is situated within the Incheon 
Free Economic Zone, which provides incentives for private investment 
(McNeill, 2009a). The large cities of India, too, have adhered to a similar 
path. Kolkata West International City was being developed by the Salim 
Group, Ciputra, and Universal Success Enterprises, a company 
headquartered in Singapore (Chen et al., 2009). This type of project is often 
marketed towards wealthy overseas Indians (Bose, 2007). Yet a number of 
new satellite cities in India have failed to materialise as the developers 
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intended because of popular resistance from farmers and local communities 
due to inequities in the land acquisition process (Shatkin, 2011).  
Private sector developed satellite cities are not something that is 
unique to Asia. They are becoming central to neoliberal urban development 
in many developing countries. In the Middle East, numerous large new cities 
are being developed (Waleed Abdullah, 2012), for example, the Norman 
Foster designed Masdar City in Abu Dhabi. The desert periphery of Cairo, 
Egypt is becoming a zone of large complexes consisting of luxury gated 
communities and shopping malls, financed by UAE-based companies and 
modelled on similar projects in Dubai (Singerman & Amar, 2006). Cairo 
had 26 such satellite cities under development by 2005 (Abaza, 2011), 
housing 14% of the city’s population (Sims, 2008). Choplin and Franck 
(2010) have referred to these satellite city developments as contributing to 
the ‘Dubaisation’ of Africa, because Dubai has been conceptualised as a 
model that has infused urban development practices throughout the 
continent. In particular, they are referring to “Dubai-style walled-off islands 
with condominiums, gated communities and ‘Disneyfied’ landscaping” 
(Abaza, 2011, p. 1077). Choplin and Franck mention specifically projects in 
Khartoum, Sudan, and Nouakchott, Mauritania. The phenomenon is also 
widespread in East and Sub-Sahara Africa, to the extent that it is noted as 
an important emerging urban trend in the State of East Africa 2012 report 
(Society for International Development, 2012). In Kinshasa, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, a satellite city named La Cité du Fleuve (River City) is 
under construction on reclaimed land that is one day envisioned to be the 
new downtown (De Boeck, 2011). Other African cities with private sector 
satellite cities under development include Nairobi, Kenya (Tatu City and 
Konza Technology City) (Sabatini, 2011), Kigali, Rwanda, Dar Es Salaam, 
Tanzania (Kigamboni New City) (Society for International Development, 
2010), Luanda, Angola (Nova Cidade de Kilamba) (Redvers, 2012) and 
Kampala, Uganda (Kakungulu Satellite City) (Falk, 2012). Outside of Asia 
and Africa, satellite cities are present in South America and Latin America 
(Heinrichs et al., 2011; Hidalgo, 2005; Irazábal, 2006; Roitman & Phelps, 
2011).       
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Although this research is focused particularly on large satellite cities, 
especially those developed through FDI, foreign companies are not behind 
the construction of all satellite cities. Furthermore, smaller, less extravagant 
new peri-urban developments are in some contexts more numerous. Labbé 
and Boudreau’s (2011) work on Hanoi cautions against overemphasising the 
imposition of ‘spectacular’ foreign urban development models, arguing that 
such an emphasis is inappropriate because foreign capital is behind only a 
small minority of satellite city projects. While much of the extant research 
on new urban areas in Vietnam focuses on a select number of foreign 
projects (such as Douglass & Huang, 2007; Waibel, 2004, 2006), Labbé and 
Boudreau draw attention to the roughly 500 new residential developments 
around Hanoi. These are developed for the most part by state-owned 
Vietnamese companies and with a variety of built forms, financial 
arrangements and target populations.  
 Although satellite cities have been built in Indonesia, Vietnam, 
China, Cambodia, and around cities in other regions of the world, there are 
a number of places where satellite cities have not been developed. Although 
gated communities are popular with the middle classes on the outskirts of 
Bangkok, satellite cities, perhaps surprisingly, have not been developed in 
Thailand besides the one attempt mentioned earlier. This may be because 
Thailand already learned the mistakes that led to a property market collapse 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the failure of Muang Thong 
Thani. Similarly, in Malaysia, gated communities are ubiquitous, but 
companies have not yet built satellite cities. Here, the state has a stronger 
role as was highlighted with respect to the Iskandar Malaysia urban 
development project. Japan, too, has never seen this type of urban 
landscape. This reinforces the path-dependent nature of urban 
development. Each country has followed a unique urban development path, 
and satellite city development is contingent on the factors mentioned in the 
next section. Neoliberal urbanism has followed a variety of trajectories in 
different contexts (He & F L Wu, 2009; Liew, 2005). This is the 
underpinning of Brenner and Theodore’s (2002) notion that neoliberalism is 
‘actually existing’, since it is embedded within local, national, and regional 
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contexts that are influenced by institutional frameworks, laws and 
regulations, and policy regimes.   
At present, the vast majority of literature on satellite city 
development is centred on the Jakarta case, and to a lesser extent, Ho Chi 
Minh City and Hanoi. Yet while the concept likely originated and is most 
widespread in Indonesia, it is becoming a more common form of urban 
development on the peripheries of other large cities in Southeast Asia. More 
widely, privately built satellite cities are and in many other cities in the 
global South. The following section offers some explanations as to why. 
 
2.3 Factors influencing satellite city development  
The development of satellite cities is not an isolated process of urban 
change. A number of factors at global, regional and local scales can help to 
explain satellite city development. The changes in the world economy 
towards ever-greater neoliberal globalisation have resulted in freer flows of 
capital around the world. This has influenced national and local 
governments to be more entrepreneurial to compete with other localities to 
attract this mobile capital (Hall & Hubbard, 1998). At the same time, 
neoliberalisation has resulted in a weakening of the state, which in turn gives 
greater power to corporate interests in urban development and planning. 
Additionally, there is a demand from an emerging consumer class with the 
desire for segregation along the axes of social class and/or ethnicity, which is 
being capitalised upon by urban development companies. In other words, I 
suggest that explaining satellite city development requires examining the 
interaction between state, market and society at multiple spatial scales.  
Increasing globalisation 
 Since the 1970s, the expansion of globalisation, and simultaneously 
neoliberalisation, has supported free flows of capital and reduced 
government regulation of the market. Neoliberalism is premised on the idea 
that open and unregulated markets, free from state interference, are the best 
means to achieve economic development (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Before the 
1970s, in contrast, Keynesian ideals of control over the free flow of capital 
and redistributive justice took precedence (Harvey, 2006b). Neoliberal ideas 
32 
 
 
have encouraged economic globalisation and thus freed up global flows of 
investment capital, which has had an unprecedented role in shaping urban 
development. Also, foreign companies in the construction, planning, and 
architecture industries have gained access to national markets that were 
formerly protected (Guggenheim & Söderström, 2009).   
It has been argued that a small number of cities function as nodes 
which mediate global economic flows. Friedmann’s (1986) ‘world city 
hypothesis’ suggested that a few world cities were centres through which 
flow information, capital and people. Certain cities function as these centres 
more than others do, leading to the establishment of a hierarchy of cities. 
Friedmann’s analysis was influential and later built on by Sassen (2001), who 
emphasised the importance of advanced producer services. Sassen suggested 
that given the increasing internationalisation of economic activities, certain 
cities function as nodes that control the complexities of the global economic 
system. These cities – namely London, New York and Tokyo – function as 
command points in the organisation of the world economy, as key locations 
for advanced producer service firms, as sites of production and innovation, 
and as markets for the innovations produced. But globalisation has without 
doubt had a massive impact beyond these few ‘global cities’. The ‘ordinary 
city’ approach, for example, aims to promote urban theory that 
acknowledges the relational webs of interaction between cities and highlights 
connections beyond those merely of business services. This approach is 
inspired by the work of Jennifer Robinson (2006) in particular, and is taken 
up more comprehensively in the next chapter (Chapter 3).  
 An important element contributing to globalisation is the increase in 
worldwide capital flows via the international financial system. Global FDI 
flows reached a peak in 2007 but have since decreased to around $1.2 
trillion in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010). In 2010, FDI flows to Asia increased by 
24% on the previous year to $79 billion. This is likely attributed to the fact 
that capital moves to places that promise the greatest rates of return. Given 
the current state of the European and American economies, capital is 
moving to places with more potential, such as Southeast Asia. Intra-Asian 
FDI accounts for over half of the total inward flow of FDI in the region 
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(UNCTAD, 2010). The speed and scale of finance capital availability has 
increased with the inclination towards the deregulation of markets, the use 
of offshore financial centres and the elimination of controls to previously 
prohibited sectors such as property development (Olds, 2001).  
 The increasing globalisation of real estate and urban development 
capital are of particular significance in the case of satellite city development. 
Although the literature tends to discuss foreign investment from developed 
countries disproportionally targeting large, ‘global’ cities (Edgington, 1995; 
Haila, 1997; Sassen, 2001), foreign investment in property is a much 
broader phenomenon (Charney, 2003). The source and destination 
countries vary and are not necessarily those at the top of the world city 
hierarchy, as has been shown in the case of Central Europe (Keivani et al., 
2001) and China (F L Wu, 2002), for example. Property venture capital 
through speculator-developers has actualised its vision of the city in ever 
more peripheral locations (Harvey, 1974; Rao et al., 2007).  
In the East Asian context, the majority of real estate capital flows are 
regional in scope. It was reported by real estate firm CBRE that just over 
90% of the cross-border transactions originated within Asia, whereas non-
Asian capital accounted for a mere 9% (CBRE, 2009). In some cases, real 
estate capital accounts for a relatively large proportion of total FDI. In 
China, real estate accounted for more than 20% of total FDI inflows in 2010 
rising to almost 50% in early 2011 (UNCTAD, 2011).  
 It has been argued by Haila (1997) that the importance of real estate 
in urban development has been neglected. Haila asserts that there are 
several key forces behind globalisation of property markets: the operation of 
global actors (for example, consultants, developers and architects) who 
create an international image for cities, the spread of similar methods of 
construction and finance, foreign investment flows and the integration of 
markets, and building as signs. By the latter point, Haila alludes to the ways 
in which buildings represent a modern, international and elite image for the 
purchaser, or the government of the city in question. More recently, Dick 
(2009, p. 193) suggests that “the nexus between urban development and 
business development is a leitmotiv of the daily business press across Asia yet 
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has attracted curiously little attention in academic literature”. They suggest 
that the disciplines of development studies, urban studies and business 
studies have pursued separate research agendas concerning industrialisation 
and labour, mega-cities, and the growth of Asian business and regionalism. 
Olds (2001), citing Appadurai (1990, p. 8), asserts that today one cannot 
make sense of the residential and commercial property markets in cities 
without “taking sophisticated account of the very complex fiscal and 
investment flows that link national economies through a ‘global grid of 
currency speculation and capital transfer”. While this section has focused on 
the globalisation of capital, the phenomenon of globalisation can be 
understood by looking at other dimensions. These include the movement of 
people, images, information and ideologies (Appadurai, 1990). This range of 
flows also has important effects on urban form, as is examined in the next 
chapter (Chapter 3). 
The influence of increasing globalisation has been felt particularly 
strongly in peri-urban areas. Peri-urban areas are those that are outside of 
the core city, or in between two cities, but remain socially and economically 
integrated with the urban area (Hudalah et al., 2007). The process of peri-
urbanisation is therefore the process by which “rural areas of the outskirts of 
established cities become more urban in character, in physical, economic, 
and social terms, often in a piecemeal fashion” (D Webster, 2002, p. 5). 
Sieverts (2003) has argued that much of today’s urbanisation happens in 
these ‘in-between’ spaces that are neither city nor countryside.  
FDI has created a large demand for labour, resources and land 
particularly in the areas surrounding large cities. Over 90% of the FDI 
flowing into Thailand is invested in the Bangkok extended metropolitan 
region (D Webster, 2002). This spatial concentration of economic activities 
has spurred the formation of extended metropolitan regions, defined as 
“regional systems consisting of central cities, fringe areas of those cities, 
exurbs, satellite towns, and intensive traditional agricultural land uses” 
(Ginsburg et al., 1991, p. xiii). This phenomenon can be measured in terms 
of land conversion. In Indonesia, between 1991 and 1993 alone, 106,000 
hectares of agricultural land were converted to urban usage (Firman, 2000).  
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In the context of North America and Europe, suburban and post-
suburban areas such as edge cities have typically been understood as a 
resolutely residential space, although they have an economic role that some 
say is underestimated (Phelps, 2010). In China, however, foreign direct 
investment in manufacturing on the peripheries of mega cities such as 
Shanghai has spearheaded the growth of the national economy (J P Wu, 
2008). In Hyderabad, India, large infrastructure projects involving the 
construction of ‘world class’ infrastructure, such as the Hyderabad 
Information Technology Engineering Consultancy City, are occurring in 
peri-urban areas (Kennedy, 2007). The urban periphery thus represents a 
space where capital accumulates through the interaction of the global and 
the local (Maneepong & D Webster, 2008). The urban periphery is being 
designated as an area for development by governments, as Leaf (2002) 
suggests in the case of Hanoi. However, the globalisation of the urban 
periphery is the cause of contestation between the requirements of the 
international businesses who are investing, and local inhabitants and 
businesses (Keivani & Mattingly, 2007). The use of concepts such as 
‘extended metropolitan regions’ (McGee & I M Robinson, 1995), ‘mega-
urban regions’ (Douglass, 2000) and ‘desakota’ (McGee, 1991) have 
highlighted the belief that there is no global urban convergence, as the next 
chapter discusses in more detail (Chapter 3).      
Within this framework of global economic change, processes of 
neoliberalisation and globalisation are not universalising, but rather are 
conditioned by local contextual factors (Brenner & Theodore, 2002). In 
Indonesia, both foreign and domestic investment was low during the 
Sukarno years because of anti-capitalist policies. The growth of large real 
estate developments in Indonesia occurred later, after a series of 
deregulation measures (Winarso & Firman, 2002). These policies favoured 
indirect intervention rather than regulatory control. Of particular 
importance to the property development industry was the 1988 banking 
reform. This permitted foreign banks to operate in Indonesia, creating more 
competition and thus increasing the number of property loans (McLeod, 
1999). Demand for commercial and residential space was increasing because 
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of high economic growth rates. In the early 1990s the real estate industry 
was given a further boost because of the government’s deregulation policy 
which increased private sector activity in the land market (Winarso, 1999). 
Whereas developers once relied on banks as the primary source of finance, 
since 1995, the financial market became the main source of funds. Private 
capital inflows more than tripled between 1991 and 1996, from Rp. 4,410 
billion to Rp. 12,076 billion (Simamarta, 1997 in Winarso & Firman, 2002). 
The deregulation also simplified the procedure for procuring location 
permits and the requirements of environmental impact assessments (Firman, 
1997). In 1995, banks had lent Rp. 42 trillion for property development. 
According to Dijkgraaf (2009 in Firman, 2009, p. 333), “during the 1990s 
there was easy access for developers to investment funds since both the 
national and international market encouraged the growth of new town 
developments and the property sector in general”. Firman (2009, p. 333) 
goes as far to suggest that:  
“the new town development in adjacent areas of large cities 
in Indonesia during 1980s and 1990s had nothing to do with 
urban development. It basically reflected the situation of 
global capitalism, in which transnational capital flowed freely 
to many economic activities, including the property sector, to 
sustain and capture its benefits and existence”.  
 
 In addition to government monetary policy reforms, an increase in 
available mortgage financing for property buyers heightened the possibility 
for capital appreciation. Winarso (1999) gives an example: if a Rp. 100 
million house is purchased through a Rp. 20 million deposit and a loan of 
Rp. 80 million, and the property is valued at Rp. 170 million three years 
later, then the buyer has gained a capital appreciation of 350% on the initial 
deposit. Even after the interest charge of the mortgage, it is still a huge 
increase. Thus, the demand for property boomed, as people believed that it 
would present the opportunity to make big returns on their investments. 
Satellite city development in Indonesia has been contingent on the 
deregulation of the global and national economy.   
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The situation in the socialist countries of China and Vietnam is 
rather different. The Vietnamese economy has become increasingly open to 
the influence of foreign capital since the doi moi (‘economic renovation’) 
reforms beginning in 1986 (Beresford, 2008). The intention of these reforms 
was to create a socialist-oriented market economy, through the sanctioning 
of privately owned enterprises and an ‘open door’ policy towards FDI. In 
addition, the government approach to urban planning changed from top-
down Soviet style, towards a more flexible approach characterised by 
strategic planning. In China, the program of economic reforms led by then 
Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping opened the country up to foreign 
investment after 1978. Since the late 1980s, the management of urban land 
has been characterised by a leasehold system, compared to previously being 
allocated administratively and undertaken through state development 
projects (Yeh & F L Wu, 1996). The leasing system permitted a greater 
number of potential actors to be involved in urban development, including 
domestic and foreign investors, governments and state-owned enterprises (F 
L Wu, 2003).      
The next two sections demonstrate how increasing globalisation has 
had two competing effects on urban governance and the emergence of 
private satellite cities. On the one hand, cities have become more 
entrepreneurial in order to attract investment, and on the other hand, 
neoliberalisation has weakened the power of the state.  
Entrepreneurial cities and the desire for global urban space 
Increasing globalisation has heightened competition amongst cities 
to attract capital (Jessop & Sum, 2000). Urban governments now compete to 
lure financial and consumption flows into their territory. This new mode of 
governance has been termed ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey, 1989). It is 
generally believed to be the case that under an entrepreneurial regime, 
capital has a stronger role than the local state, which is relegated to a 
subordinate position. It is contrasted with previous ‘managerial’ practices in 
the pre-1970s period, which were focused primarily on welfare provision 
and administering services to the local population. Whilst the concept of 
urban entrepreneurialism originated and has been explored most fully in the 
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European and American context (Hall & Hubbard, 1998), entrepreneurial 
ideas have permeated urban governance practices in cities around the 
world. The process is not homogenous emerging from global economic 
forces, but contingent on local factors such as political cultures and national 
regulatory frameworks (Short & Y H Kim, 1999). Although it is clear that 
urban governments worldwide are appropriating entrepreneurial urban 
policies, the prior concept of ‘managerialism’ was rooted firmly in the 
perceived experience of Keynesian Western European economies. In Asia, 
although it is by no means a linear transition, the entrepreneurial city can be 
contrasted with the developmental city, stemming from the idea that some 
East Asian countries are termed developmental states. There are some key 
differences between the managerial city and developmental city. In the 
latter, local officials are often weaker as they are appointed by central 
government rather than elected by local citizens (Hill et al., 2012). While 
both managerial and developmental governments prioritise urban 
infrastructure development to spur economic growth, Keynesian social 
welfare is largely absent in developmental cities. Chapter 3 will deal in more 
detail with the different types of state in East Asia.   
There are many examples in East Asia where the state has made a 
significant effort to create a built environment that is conducive to attracting 
global investment (Douglass, 2000; Pow, 2002; F L Wu, 2003). The case of 
Bangkok illustrates how the central government intentionally attempted to 
create a world city through a number of urban megaprojects and privatised 
infrastructure developments (for example, Suvarnabhumi international 
airport, and the BTS Skytrain) (Douglass & Boonchuen, 2006). Similarly, 
Kuala Lumpur has followed a globally-oriented path of national 
development with the initiation of a ‘Multimedia Super Corridor’ and the 
Petronas Twin Towers (Bunnell, 2004). In South Korea, the state has 
funded and promoted infrastructure developments such as high-speed rail, a 
new international airport, high-tech industrial parks and ‘free economic 
zones’ (Douglass, 2000). Yet the process of world city formation and the 
development of urban space for global capital accumulation can be 
problematic (Douglass, 2005). This is in agreement with Sassen’s (2001) 
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argument that urban inequalities increase with intensified globalisation. 
However, the negative effects of globalisation have not been without 
contestation, and the case of Kuala Lumpur highlights the possibility of 
‘counter global’ claims to place by the indigenous people of peninsular 
Malaysia and those without legal claims to land (Bunnell & Nah, 2004).   
The state can act as an enabler to engineer conditions that are 
attractive to investors. This is especially the case in less wealthy countries 
where the state lacks the financial resources to fund infrastructure projects 
such as those mentioned above. Many Southeast Asian governments view 
openness to foreign capital flows as the one of the most important ways to 
catalyse economic development. Satellite cities are a physical manifestation 
of this economic environment. They can also be openly attracted by 
governments, or favoured because of their potential for further investment 
attraction. One satellite city in Ho Chi Minh City is promoted in such a way 
by stating that: 
“The New City Center (Saigon South) Master Plan presents a 
historic opportunity for Vietnam and Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC) to re-establish its position in the global economy 
while creating a modern well-planned city that can become 
the most desirable international business location in 
Southeast Asia” (Phu My Hung Corporation, undated).   
Weak states and the privatisation of planning 
While the development of satellite cities is in some ways planned or 
influenced by state policies, it can also be reflective of state weaknesses. In 
many cases, governments do not have the capital needed to invest in new 
housing, transport networks, power generation and urban planning. The 
unsuitability of government in providing these services has in some cases 
resulted from pressures for austerity from international monetary 
organisations, often in conjunction with national historical factors such as 
war or colonialism. It can also be related to decentralisation policies. In 
Thailand, for instance, the national government has been weakened with 
the desire for decentralisation. Local levels of government assume a larger 
role, which spatially fragments areas. Also, they often have a low capacity to 
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plan large developments (D Webster, 2002). On the other hand, Zhu (2010) 
argues that in the context of Jakarta with its high population density and 
land scarcity, the incapacity of the state is responsible for informal 
settlements. The growth of informal settlements encourages the middle 
classes to move into gated communities and satellite cities, as is elaborated 
upon in the next section.    
The private sector has therefore taken over tasks that were 
traditionally associated with being within the jurisdiction of the state. This is 
apparent in public-private partnerships for transport projects and 
infrastructure networks, but the most extreme example is the satellite city, 
where the entire urban system is planned, developed and operated by the 
private sector. These private sector developments exacerbate the segregation 
of urban populations by wealth. Lippo Karawaci satellite city in Jakarta, for 
example, has potable water available directly from the tap. This is not the 
case in the wider urban area, where piped water is not of a high enough 
standard to drink, if there is even a regular water supply at all. The 
inequality of access to urban space and services becomes a self-reinforcing 
process, because as the middle classes purchase services from private 
companies, the local state misses out on capturing potential revenue from 
higher spending customers. Also, political pressure to improve public 
infrastructure is reduced because those in the strongest positions are already 
looked after by the private sector (Sheng, 2010).  
This process has been termed the ‘privatisation of planning’, defined 
as “the transfer of power over and responsibility for the visioning of urban 
futures and the exercise of social action for urban change from public to 
private sector actors” (Shatkin, 2008, p. 388). Although private sector 
involvement in urban planning and governance is a marked feature of cities 
in the USA (Dear & Flusty, 1998), the cities of Southeast Asia have long had 
a minimal public sector involvement (Hogan et al., 2012). The role of the 
private sector was generally restricted to developing individual buildings, or 
larger sites at the sub-district level. More recently, private actors are 
developing sites such as satellite cities at the scale of an urban district, areas 
typically in the region of a few hundred or thousand hectares. This process 
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has numerous implications for urban life, politics, access to services and 
social integration.  
With the absence of a public sector planning vision and weak 
government regulation, large private companies have the opportunity to 
lead the development of the city. These large urban development companies 
include Ciputra and Lippo in Indonesia and Ayala Land in the Philippines. 
They have large land holdings and have developed satellite cities, 
commercial and residential space in the city centre and also have invested in 
transportation infrastructure. These companies are generally founded by 
businesspeople of ethnic Chinese origin and tap into ethnic Chinese business 
networks as sources of capital (Shatkin, 2008). The firms often use strategic 
alliances to lobby influential figures within the government to approve their 
projects and bypass conventional planning procedures. For example, in 
Indonesia, Presidential Decree 53/1989 states that industrial estate and new 
town development should not occur on irrigated, prime agricultural land or 
land designated as a conservation area. Yet there have been many violations 
because of the huge demand for land for new town and industrial estate 
development (Firman, 2009). The developers often wield considerably more 
power than the government. In Leaf’s (1996, p. 1623) opinion, “Ciputra has 
had more of an influence on the formation of Jakarta’s landscape than any 
other single individual, including [ex-President] Suharto”.  
Demand factors: class and racial segregation  
 Demand factors are also important in understanding the 
development of satellite cities. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, satellite 
cities are, given the relatively high housing prices, predominately intended to 
house middle and upper income groups. There is a growing middle class, or 
‘new rich’, in Asia. Members of this middle class are identifiable by their 
urban residence, modern education and skilled occupation, and a consumer 
lifestyle that involves owning the latest fashion and technology brands 
(Budiman, 2011). In China, for example, there are currently 190 million 
urban households, of which one third are considered middle class. That 
figure is forecasted to rise to 75% of a total 372 million urban households by 
2025 (Financial Times, 2011). This new middle class has different values, 
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expectations and lifestyles than other societal groups (Lui & Hsiao, 2006). 
They are not a homogenous group, but rather a diverse and fractured social 
force that varies between different contexts (V T King, 2008). The major 
distinction is between the owners of capital and those who possess high-level 
professional and technical skills (Robison & Goodman, 1996). Hsiao (2001) 
refers to the former as part of an ‘old middle class’ and the latter as a ‘new 
middle class’. This can be further broken down into the directors of family 
businesses, smaller regional traders, and politicians. In addition to wealthy 
local people, part of the demand also comes from expatriates, business elites, 
and temporary experts and consultants (Gotsch, 2004).      
In Indonesia, global capital concentrated economic growth in the 
Jakarta metropolitan region. High economic growth rates of up to 15% per 
year during the 1980s and 1990s increased the number of middle and upper 
class people (Hudalah et al., 2007). According to surveys, buyers in Jakarta’s 
satellite cities were mostly in their mid-30s, were highly educated 
(approximately 60% being university graduates) and 60% were working in 
the private sector. The average monthly salary of the residents was US$1246 
(Rp. 3.1 million in the local currency at the 2002 exchange rate), which 
equates to just over 20 times the average monthly salary in West Java (Rp. 
152,000) (Winarso, 2000 in Winarso & Firman, 2002). This group were less 
characterised by their position in the income scale than their consumption 
habits, being known simply as the ‘consumer class’ (Leaf, 1996). Even 
without such rapid economic growth, there has been a rise in middle class in 
the Philippines. Not including the established landowning and propertied 
upper class, the new middle classes included those whom Connell (1999) 
terms the ‘expanded bourgeoisie’, a group consisting of the increasingly 
educated group of professional and managerial workers. There was a large 
increase in the business class after the overthrow of President Marcos in 
1986, when new capitalists were no longer disadvantaged by the cronyism 
and patronage of the prior regime (Pinches, 1996). 
This middle class market has been exploited by the developers of 
satellite cities. Developers devote considerable resources in order to ensure 
that their projects are marketed in ways attuned to the aspirations of the 
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middle class (Image 2.4). Phrases denoting urban modernity such as 
‘modern and new lifestyle’ and ‘new residential culture’ are commonly used 
(Douglass & Huang, 2007). Marketing materials generally use English over 
the local language to confer a global image and appeal to foreign investors. 
Housing in satellite cities is neither typical nor common in the local context. 
In the Chinese context, imagined and hybrid ‘western’ urban forms are 
perceived by housing buyers as high-quality and modern (F L Wu, 2010). 
Thames Town in Shanghai is a pertinent example. This development 
contains Tudor architecture and an English church and pub. According to 
Shatkin (2008) much of the demand for new residential space in Manila was 
from overseas Filipino workers.     
The rise of the new middle class is evident in the ownership of 
detached suburban homes and the increased popularity of cars over public 
transport. It is also reflected in the growth of large American style shopping 
malls, which contain global brands and food and beverage outlets. However, 
the Asian middle class has developed under different conditions than in 
Europe and America. The group has grown much more quickly as 
governments, sometimes newly independent from colonial control, sought 
rapid modernisation balancing Western experiences and traditional values 
(Hattori & Funatsu, 2003). It was also common for middle class voices 
critical of ruling governments to be suppressed, making it hard for them to 
secure a space of their own. Thus, some have suggested that the new rich 
utilise consumption practices as a strategy of image and identity construction 
and thus class distinction (B H Chua, 2000). As Lee (2010, p. 136) observes 
in the context of Shanghai:  
“Under Deng Xiao Ping the city was one of the first sites to 
open up to foreign investment and Shanghai went through an 
economic boom... The austerity of the communist period 
made way for an abundance in luxury, culminating in 
buildings for the rich (housing and shopping mostly)... [T]he 
newly found possibility of consumption and the display of 
your consumer habits become your means of self-expression”.  
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 A proportion of the demand for luxury housing in satellite cities is 
bought for speculative purposes, to profit from rental income and/or 
potential increases in property values (Firman, 2004a). The land prices have 
in most cases increased quickly after construction, as the newly urbanised 
land becomes increasingly desirable. Property developers were in effect 
building for a demand that was not real and there was thus an over-supply 
of luxury housing, something not unique to Indonesia. This oversupply is 
one of the main factors that triggered the severe economic crisis that hit 
Indonesia in the late 1990s. A significant amount of loans were taken by 
developers from private financiers. These loans were unhedged and 
contributed to the growth in Indonesia’s foreign debts, which in turn 
triggered an economic crisis (Winarso & Firman, 2002).        
As mentioned earlier, in many Southeast Asian cities the state has 
been unable to provide high standard infrastructure, whether through a lack 
of funding or technical incapacity. These infrastructures and services include 
flood defences, water supply, sewerage systems, waste collection, public 
transport and road improvement, and telecommunication networks. These 
are services that can be provided by the private sector in satellite cities, 
where the entire urban system is built from scratch. The development of 
high quality infrastructure caters to the demand from those who can afford 
the extra costs required whilst excluding those who do not fit the particular 
market profile. George Benton, a senior executive of the Lippo Group based 
in Indonesia, justified this type of development in terms of a lack of 
infrastructure and services provided by the state for the ‘middle classes’:  
“The rich have no boundaries, they…are not dependent on 
any national government. The poor however get the 
undivided attention of the government because these are the 
people whose votes the government must rely on to stay in 
power. This leaves the middle class to fend for itself... We end 
up with cities like Jakarta which in terms of infrastructure is 
fraying at the edges... These things are all middle class 
problems, and so the solution is left to the private sector to try 
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and attend to some of these needs” (in Small, 2008, 
unpaginated).  
 
The process of satellite city development supports Graham and 
Marvin’s (2001) thesis that urban infrastructure networks are becoming 
increasingly ‘splintered’. They argue that in the modern era, until the 1960s, 
infrastructure networks were situated in a discourse that favoured the ideal 
of monopolistic and standardised service. This model was undermined with 
the growing legitimacy of neoliberalism and the retreat of the state, resulting 
in an unbundling of infrastructures into different elements. The result of this 
was the growth of ‘bypass’ strategies, which seek the connection of valued 
(i.e. wealthy and more profitable) users over others (Coutard, 2008). What 
Graham and Marvin identify as ‘premium network spaces’ can thus emerge. 
This results in a “poverty of connections” as higher income groups are able 
to live in “secessionary spaces...withdrawn from the wider urban fabric” (p. 
268). Shatkin terms the process ‘bypass-implant urbanism’. He suggests that 
in the context of inert government,  
“private developers have been granted considerable power to 
reengineer cities to create new spaces for production and 
consumption, and to facilitate the flow of people and capital 
between these spaces, by ‘bypassing’ the congested arteries of 
the public city and ‘implanting’ new spaces for capital 
accumulation that are designed for consumerism and export-
oriented production” (2008, p. 388). 
In the Indonesian context, after a set period satellite cities are intended to be 
transferred to the control of the public sector. In effect they are designed to 
be a type of build-operate-transfer (BOT) project. This is a form of public-
private partnership where a private company obtains a government 
concession to build a facility, operate it for a set period (normally 50 or more 
years) in order to recoup the initial investment and generate a profit, before 
it is transferred to public administration. This type of arrangement is 
normally used as a method to finance large infrastructure projects such as 
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new roads and railways. In practice, satellite cities have remained under 
private ownership and management.  
Alongside the need for better infrastructure, the desire for security is 
another key explanation of why the middle and upper classes are retreating 
into private cities and gated communities as a way to avoid the public city. 
These settlements are a spatial manifestation of rising inequality in Asia. 
According to that Asian Development Bank (ADB), income inequality 
measured in terms of the Gini Coefficient increased between the 1990s and 
2000s in most Southeast Asian countries except Thailand and Malaysia 
(ADB, 2007). It is not simply that the rich are getting richer and the poor 
poorer; but rather the expenditures of the wealthiest are increasing at a 
faster rate than the poorest (ADB, 2007). Increased inequality has 
heightened the fear of crime and thus the demand for enclave developments. 
The retreat of wealthy social groups into gated communities and 
private cities can be correlated with divides along the lines of ethnicity. This 
is particularly apparent in the Southeast Asian context, where the ethnic 
Chinese hold considerable economic power. In Indonesia, the Chinese have 
historically been discriminated against. This intensified during the 1998 riots 
stemming from financial and political crisis, and the Chinese were made 
scapegoats because of their domination of the Indonesian economy 
(Wibowo, 2001). This forced some Chinese to emigrate, while those who 
remained or later returned were encouraged to live in secure environments 
such as gated communities (Wibowo, 2001). In Jakarta, as a proportion of 
the population as a whole, the Chinese represent only 3%, while 10% of 
Jakarta’s population is Chinese. As ethnicity is a politically sensitive subject, 
in his survey of Lippo Karawaci, Leisch (2002) could not ask overtly whether 
residents were Chinese or pribumi Indonesian, hence religion had to be used. 
Pribumi Indonesians are largely Muslim, while Chinese are predominately 
Christian. Leisch (2002) found that only 8-10% of residents were Muslims, 
while the remaining 90% were Christian or Buddhist. This is not the case in 
every satellite city, however. In BSD City, approximately one third of 
residents were Muslims. A growing number of indigenous Indonesians, 
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Malays and Filipinos are moving into gated communities as they become 
more wealthy and increasingly insecure (Dick & P Rimmer, 1998).    
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has reviewed the existing literature on satellite city 
development. The chapter began by noting some differences between the 
mainly state-led projects of the post-war period, and the private sector 
developed satellite cities of the post-1970s. These privately developed 
projects are the focus of this research. They are a growing phenomenon that 
originally became popular in Jakarta, but have since become a more 
common urban form in peri-urban areas of large cities throughout 
Southeast Asia, and more widely, in developing countries in other regions of 
the world.  
The chapter discussed a number of factors that influence satellite city 
development. These include the increasing globalisation of capital as well as 
urban models and imagery, and the subsequent desire of cities to attract this 
mobile capital into their territory. This occurs in combination with a weak 
state, which unable to fund urban infrastructures from municipal budgets 
leaves the private sector to take on roles traditionally associated with the 
state. Demand also plays an important role, both in real and speculative 
ways. The demand can be split into ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors: the former 
including poor environmental quality and space limitations in the central 
city, while the ‘pull’ factors comprise of the perception of better living 
quality, environment and infrastructure. This causes segregation by income 
level, and in some cases, by ethnicity. The next chapter will go on to identify 
a major limitation of current work on the development of satellite cities, 
which have focused too exclusively on local explanations, despite the fact 
that the majority of satellite cities are in some ways influenced by actors 
outside of the country of development. This can be in terms of investment or 
the use of consultants, for example.  
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3. Intra-Asian Urban Networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A major theme of recent human geography has been the turn towards 
‘relational thinking’ (see Amin & Thrift, 2002; Jones, 2009; Massey, 2004, 
2007). It has been argued that relationality and mobility are central to 
contemporary urbanisation under globalisation (Amin, 2007). Cities are 
profoundly bound up with global networks of economic, political and 
cultural natures (Jacobs, forthcoming) and are considered “complex 
constructions created by the interaction of actors in multiple networks” 
(Healey, 2007, p. 2). A relational approach is a promising way to explore the 
present-day mobile world and the circulations of people, commodities and 
ideas (Jones, 2009). The globalisation of urban space through the flows of 
capital, knowledge and people means that cities are intrinsically linked to 
other, sometimes geographically distant, urban spaces. These relational 
ideas are an attempt to move beyond “static theorisations of place, space 
and scale” (K Ward, 2010, p. 473), and thus view the city as “open and 
constituted in and through relations that stretch across space and are 
territorialized in place” (K Ward, 2010, p. 481). However, while the 
relational is important, the approach has its limits (Paasi, 2004). It has been 
argued that relational theorising must also be balanced by an understanding 
of place-specificities, such as how local urban actors manage the impacts of 
and interact with these global and regional flows (McCann & K Ward, 
2010).   
 This chapter establishes the theoretical framework of the research. I 
suggest that the production of satellite cities is framed by multiple intra-
Asian networks, but local, territorial factors must also be taken into account. 
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Thus, the analysis cannot be focused on Phnom Penh in isolation; it must 
identify the various flows, trace them to their origin and examine how they 
are produced. The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. 
Firstly, I discuss research that has situated flows of capital and ideas in urban 
development at the forefront of analysis. The recent surge of interest 
surrounding ‘urban policy mobilities’ is also relevant here, although I argue 
that this research is up to now limited in its ability to explain certain aspects 
of urbanisation in Asia because of its focus on the state as the main channel 
of policy movement. Secondly, I focus in on the East Asian region, and 
demonstrate that various linkages tie together the region. These include 
political discourses and institutions, transfers of aid and investment capital, 
the migration of people and culture, and most importantly in this case, 
urban networks of the types alluded to in the first section. The third part 
goes on to argue how considering these intra-Asian networks can help to 
further the project of de-centring the West as the leading edge of urban 
theory and practice. By focusing on the regional scale, my analysis avoids 
either focusing on the extremes of global urban convergence or local 
difference. The fourth and final part of the chapter argues that the 
development of privately built satellite cities is driven by intra-Asian 
networks of investment, urban design/ architectural styles and techniques, 
and urban governance concepts. I suggest that existing research has been 
overly focussed on the planning and design of satellite cities at the local and 
national level, and has overlooked the role of flows of capital and urban 
development concepts in their production. 
 
3.1 Urban networks: articulating cities over space   
 Urban change in cities across the world is influenced by the 
increasing speed and scale of flows of money, people and information (Olds, 
2001). The globalisation of capital and its influence on the development of 
satellite cities was discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 2). This 
chapter moves on to outline the other aspects of globalisation. These include 
the movement of urban planning and design concepts driven by individual 
or group actors including architects, consultants and engineers, and the 
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mobility of urban policies by state and private actors. Tracing the activities 
of these actors and the related flows of ideas is central to understanding the 
production of cities (Nasr & Volait, 2003). 
Flows of knowledge, practice and urban design  
The phrase ‘global intelligence corps’ was coined by Rimmer (1991) 
to refer to the community of architects (and architecture firms), consultancy 
and engineering companies, and other ‘experts’ working on cities. The 
increase in the ease of travel and advances in information technology has 
globalised architectural practice (McNeill, 2005b). Guggenheim and 
Söderström (2009, p. 12) refer to architects as the “archetypal cosmopolitan” 
because of their global geographical reach. Bound up with the logic of 
neoliberalism, broader structural changes in the international political 
economy have created favourable conditions for the operation of architects 
in foreign markets. Particular architects have become famous and their 
‘signature’ style has been commissioned by entrepreneurial cities in diverse 
contexts. A widely cited example of this is the Bilbao Guggenheim museum 
designed by Frank Gehry, whose success in raising the profile of Bilbao has 
led other cities to attract their own signature architects to design spectacular 
buildings (McNeill, 2009b). More broadly, these ideas can be linked to 
Sklair’s arguments concerning the activities of a transnational elite class 
whose tastes and lifestyles inform the nature and appearance of city building 
around the world (Sklair, 2006). This transnational capitalist class include 
corporate, state, technical and consumerist fractions (Sklair, 2005). 
In addition to the practice of particular famous architects, certain 
architectural forms have become prevalent in cities worldwide. The 
skyscraper is a noteworthy example. With its origins in New York and 
Chicago, the skyscraper has since become a representation of national 
modernisation in developing countries, Southeast Asia being no exception 
(Bunnell, 2004; A D King, 2004). Anthony King (1996) has termed the 
process ‘Manhattan transfer’. South Korean and Japanese engineering and 
construction companies are behind many of the more recent skyscrapers in 
Southeast Asia; the Petronas Towers in Malaysia were built by Samsung 
C&T Corporation of South Korea and Hazama Corporation of Japan (see 
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Chapter 8 for an analysis of the activities of Korean construction 
companies). However, the USA was once a pioneer in tall building 
construction technologies, and a major exporter of the expertise, building 
standards, planning concepts and methods of construction required for the 
production of skyscrapers (Cody, 2003). Indeed, American companies once 
exported prefabricated steel frames, and later concrete components, needed 
to build the core structure of skyscrapers.    
Healey and Upton (2010) have written on the transfer of urban 
planning practice. They suggest that around the mid 20th century, national 
planning cultures were important. However in the present time, planning 
practice is increasingly internationalised and is characterised by the crossing 
of borders. Nonetheless, planning concepts have been transferred from 
colonial powers to the colonies during the 19th and 20th centuries (Perera, 
2008). Planning concepts have influenced cities elsewhere even in the 
absence of colonial links. The American ‘City Beautiful’ movement, for 
instance, was strongly referenced in Chinese urban master plans during the 
1930s (B Wang, 2010). During the 19th and 20th centuries, planning ideas 
were also mobilised from the Middle East and Mediterranean (Nasr & 
Volait, 2003). In the period immediately after colonialism came to an end, 
the established flows of planning knowledge were supplemented with those 
from new international organisations such as the United Nations and 
technical aid programmes from a wider range of donor countries (S V 
Ward, 2010).   
The work of transnational engineering consultancies and 
construction companies has also been the focus of some work. Peter 
Rimmer’s earlier research looked at the transfer of urban planning and 
public works technologies and skills through operation of consulting 
engineers across national borders (Dick & P Rimmer, 1986; P Rimmer, 
1988).  Engineering consultancies are an important part of the service 
industry, and those companies operating internationally were mostly from 
Western Europe, in particular London and Paris (P Rimmer, 1991). 
Throughout the 1980s the number of engineering consultancies in Tokyo 
and Seoul grew due to the increasing globalisation of South Korean and 
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Japanese construction firms. However, recent research on the relations 
between foreign and local engineers in Vietnam suggests that in some 
circumstances the transfer of models through international consultants does 
not occur smoothly (Baye et al., 2010). Related to this is the globalisation of 
construction companies. There is a scarcity of research on this topic, but 
Rimmer (1990), for example, examines the case of Japanese construction 
company Kumagai Gumi.  
Flows of urban policy 
The growing interest regarding urban policy mobilities can aid an 
understanding of the movement of policies, knowledge, skills, personal 
networks and corporate investment throughout the East Asian region. The 
notion of studying ‘policy transfer’, however, has a longer history in political 
science, where research sought to understand the processes of policy 
diffusion, convergence and transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). More 
recently, that approach has been critiqued by McCann (2011) for putting 
too much emphasis on the identities and activities of transfer agents over the 
social processes of knowledge transfer and for focusing on the national scale, 
thus ignoring the possibility that cities act globally in their own right. 
McCann suggests that the use of the expression ‘transfer’ implies 
unidirectionality and fixity, therefore obscuring investigations into the ways 
in which policies are altered when they are applied in different social, 
political and economic contexts. 
Building on this critique, McCann and a number of other scholars 
have made a case for research into urban policy mobilities. This approach, 
taking inspiration from the literature on mobilities and poststructuralism, 
posits policy formation and mobility as a socially constructed process 
coloured by power relations and constantly changing ideologies. Space is to 
be understood as an “unbounded lattice of articulations” (Allen et al., 1998, 
p. 65). In this work on policy mobilities, the city is positioned as open and 
networked rather than fixed and bounded. Along similar lines, another 
recent strand of relational research within urban studies has been the turn to 
considering cities as ‘urban assemblages’. This approach takes influence 
from post-structuralism and actor-network theory (Latour, 2005), and 
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gained popularity from works such as Amin and Thrift’s (2002) book 
Reimagining the Urban. For Farías and Bender (2009), cities should be 
conceptualised as heterogeneous amalgamations of human and non-human 
elements. By considering the city as assemblage, McFarlane (2011a) suggests 
that research has the potential to include and represent the relations 
between diverse actors, and consider the fleeting connections that stabilise 
and destabilise. The notion of urban assemblage has been the subject of a 
recent debate between Colin McFarlane, Neil Brenner and others in City 
journal. McFarlane (2011b) argues that assemblage “underlines the ways in 
which urbanism is produced as an unfolding set of uneven practices” and 
which assists us to view the urban “not simply as an output or resultant 
formation, but as ongoing construction”. On the other hand, Brenner et al. 
(2011) propose the idea that assemblage does not consider enough the classic 
political economy questions of class, capital accumulation, exploitation, and 
so on. I believe that the potential of assemblage thinking for this research is 
that it enables research to overcome analytical dichotomies such as 
local/global and fixity/flow (McCann & K Ward, 2011a).  
The policy mobilities perspective considers policy actors not as lone 
workers but as members of epistemic communities, and looks at the ways in 
which policy ideas are selectively fragmented and altered during the process 
of movement (Peck & Theodore, 2010). A diverse range of research on the 
subject of urban policy mobilities now exists. There has been work on a 
range of different types of mobile policies, for example, the movement of 
Business Improvement Districts between the USA and the UK (Cook, 2008; 
K Ward, 2006), and the influence of the concept of ‘new urbanism’ 
(McCann & K Ward, 2010). Clarke (2012) brings a historical perspective to 
scholarship on policy mobilities, with his research on the urban governance 
structures of the transnational municipal movement of the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  
Another focus of study has been the actors involved in policy 
mobilities and the strategies they employ. Research on the actors involved in 
mobilising policy have included the role of the state at both local and 
national scales (Cook, 2008), consultants (Cook & K Ward, 2012), social 
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movements (for example, Shack/Slum Dwellers International, (McFarlane, 
2009)), and international organisations (for example, UN-HABITAT 
(Parnreiter, 2009) and Cities Alliance (J Robinson, 2011)). These actors have 
been able to mobilise policy through processes such as ‘policy tourism’ 
(González, 2010; McCann, 2011) and ‘learning’ (Cook & K Ward, 2011; 
McFarlane, 2011c).  
However, I argue that the existing literature has not fully considered 
the ways in which private sector actors can drive the mobility of urban 
techniques. Larner and Laurie (2010, p. 224) have partially identified this 
deficiency, arguing that “to date almost no attention has been given to those 
actors operating within and across private sector companies”. Given that the 
private sector is the driving force for urban change in much of the Asian 
region, where the state’s role in urban planning and infrastructure 
construction is relatively weak or ineffective (Shatkin, 2008), I propose that 
the role of private sector actors needs to be included.  
 
3.2 Producing intra-Asian urbanisms 
 These flows outlined above can operate along various paths. They 
are not solely occurring between the ‘global cities’ of London, New York, 
and Tokyo, but have a diverse range of origins and destinations. This is 
particularly the case within Asia, as some research has begun to investigate 
(Roy & Ong, 2011). More widely, Yeung (2010, p. 2) highlights the 
importance of intra-Asian connections, and he contends that “networks of 
capital, people, and knowledge/technologies are fundamental in 
underscoring the dynamics of East Asian capitalisms”. Before considering 
emerging work on urban networks within Asia, it is worth mentioning that 
various other factors bind the region together (see also Duara, 2010). In 
order to contextualise the development of satellite cities, the chapter now 
turns to consider the national and regional networks which operate in 
different matrices of state/capital relations.  
Political forms 
The notion of the developmental state is considered a distinguishing 
feature of the political economy of East Asia. Termed by Johnson (1982), 
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developmental state theory is said to hinge upon a particular relationship 
between markets and public administration. The developmental state 
consists of government bureaucratic elites within a strong, sometimes 
authoritarian, state situating economic growth as the primary goal, and 
maintaining a central role in the regulation and planning of the economy 
(Woo-Cumings, 1999). The centre of social welfare policy in the majority of 
East Asia has been the role of education in economic development (Gough, 
2001). Holliday (2000) suggests that this East Asian model of ‘productive 
welfare capitalism’ is imagined through its dissimilarity to welfare regimes in 
Western conservative, liberal and social democratic contexts.  
 The idea of a ‘flying geese’ model has been used as a metaphor for a 
type of temporal regional economic development that has permeated East 
and Southeast Asia. The model, devised by Japanese economist Akamatsu 
Kaname in the 1930s, positioned Japan as the leader of the ‘flying geese’ 
formation because of the country’s superior level of economic development 
(Furuoka, 2005). The model suggested that as a particular country 
developed, the turn to more capital-intensive industries and increasing 
labour costs would give rise to the shifting of labour intensive industries to 
lower cost countries. Thus, behind Japan were South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and Singapore; and following these, the newly industrialising nations 
of Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. The model’s 
predictions largely held true, although of course it does not account for the 
role of specific political, economic and cultural factors in individual 
countries (Kumagai, 2008). Japan was used as a model for modernisation in 
Malaysia as part of Prime Minister Mahathir’s ‘Look East’ policy (Wee, 
2007). However, developmental state capitalism is only really present in 
Japan and later in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Indonesia, the 
Phillippines, and to some extent Thailand and Cambodia can be termed 
‘erstatz capitalist’ states (Yoshihara, 1988), and China and Vietnam have a 
form of market socialism. Yeung (2009) argues for a ‘hybrid capitalisms’ 
approach to theorise the different nature of East Asian political economies.  
  The developmental state model is generally believed to rest upon 
close alliances between the state, politicians, and business (Bae, 2011). In 
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South Korea, large conglomerates known as chaebol (for example Samsung, 
Hyundai, and LG) have received considerable state support (Gomez, 2002). 
As well as informal meetings and access to insider information, chaebol 
leaders have become politicians, and vice versa. The current South Korean 
president Lee Myung-bak, for example, was previously the CEO of Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction. Political patronage and cronyism also have 
impacts on the urban environment. In Manila, although definitely not a 
developmental state, politically connected private companies have a 
substantial influence in directing the type and location of urban change 
(Shatkin, 2008). Chapter 7 will deal with this subject in the context of 
Cambodia.  
 While the developmental state approach is valuable in highlighting 
the political and economic changes in East Asian countries that led to rapid 
economic growth and industrialisation, this state-centric approach is 
somewhat in opposition to relational theorising. Here I am referring to 
developmental state theory because these ideas provide the foundations for 
political and economic arrangements that guide networks and flows. Yeung 
(2009) argues that a global production networks perspective is a better 
framework through which to understand East Asian development now that 
East Asian economies are more articulated with the global economy through 
the operation of non-state actors. He states that  
“the changing international political economy in East Asia 
cannot be simply understood as a structural outcome of inter-
state politics and relations. Through their embedded links 
and multi-scalar connections, non-state actors and their 
networks are contributing as much to this changing 
international political economy” (Yeung, 2009, p. 212).  
Networks of capital 
According to Katzenstein and Shiraishi (1997), Asian regional 
integration has occurred less through formal institutions and more through 
market cooperation. The East Asian region is bound together not just by 
similar political structures but also flows of capital in the form of FDI and 
aid. While FDI flows can be multidirectional, aid flows, while not entirely so, 
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are more likely to be unidirectional from Northeast to Southeast Asia. 
Indeed, a large proportion of bilateral aid to Southeast Asia originates from 
the countries of Northeast Asia, particularly Japan. At present half of Japan’s 
development aid goes to Asia and approximately 25% to ASEAN countries 
(OECD, 2010). Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) to Southeast 
Asia surpassed that of the USA in 1987, and by 1989, the country had 
become the world’s largest donor of ODA. This remained the case until the 
early 2000s. Despite the fact that aid is not just a channel for the movement 
of capital, but also the movement of values and technologies, it has up to 
now not been considered within a mobilities framework.  
 Japan’s aid increased dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s at a 
time when Japan was attempting to consolidate its position in the post-
Vietnam war period. This led to closer trade and investment ties with 
ASEAN countries (Sudo, 2002). Aid was predominantly administered in the 
form of loans, partly because of Japan’s belief that countries would seek to 
develop faster with the pressure of loan repayments (Söderberg, 1996). The 
influence of Japanese aid in Southeast Asia was increased through Japan’s 
belief that the East Asian development model could be transferred to 
Southeast Asian developing countries. According to Kohama (2003, p. 40) 
“the basic motive behind Japan’s development policy is that ODA should be 
conducive to the long-term economic development of the recipient country 
... based on Japan’s own development experience”. In addition, aid loans 
were assessed on their potential to promote trade between Japan and the 
recipient country (Söderberg, 1996). 
 More recently, China, too, has an increasing role in providing aid to 
Southeast Asia. In 2009, China promised aid worth US$15 billion to 
ASEAN countries (China Daily, 2009). The package comprised loans, 
particularly directed towards Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, and an 
increase in scholarships for students from developing ASEAN countries to 
study in China. Chinese aid seldom has any conditionalities, augmenting its 
attractiveness compared with multilateral aid from international 
nongovernmental organisations or bilateral aid from OECD member 
countries (Sullivan, 2011). The rise of Sino-ASEAN linkages is in part due to 
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China’s image of rapid, dynamic development and the potential for stronger 
regional leadership, in contrast to that of Japan as a nation in relative 
decline (Ba, 2003). 
 Financial flows in the East Asian region are not limited to aid, but 
also involve investment and other movements of private capital. In the case 
of Japan as exporter of capital, government aid has been a prerequisite for 
future private investment (Blaise, 2009; Watanabe, 2003). This highlights 
the close links between the state and capital. Private investment flows from 
Japan to Southeast Asia intensified since Japan became top aid donor in the 
late 1980s. A notable example of this process is the development of the 
Laem Chabang port and industrial complex in Thailand. Japanese aid loans 
were crucial in financing the initial infrastructural development and 
investment from Japanese manufacturing companies hastily followed 
(Busser, 2008; Lincoln, 1992).  
 Economic links between ASEAN and Japan intensified particularly 
from the mid 1980s due to currency appreciation in Northeast Asia. The 
1985 Plaza Accord had the effect of causing Japan to increase its investment 
in East and Southeast Asia6. At the same time, governments of ASEAN 
countries opened up their economies to greater FDI (Huxley, 1996). 
Investment was largely in manufacturing given the lower production costs in 
Southeast Asia compared to Japan (Cai, 2007). Since the late 1960s, Japan 
has been the main source country for FDI into Southeast Asia. Later on, the 
newly industrialising economies of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong became significant investors in the region. Consequently, half of all 
the FDI flows in East Asia originate from within the region (Cai, 2007). 
China, whose integration into the regional and global economy has been 
rapid since the economic reforms in 1978, has become a growing economic 
power in terms of aid and investment.  
                                                
6 The Plaza Accord was an agreement signed between USA, Japan, France, West 
Germany and the UK at the Plaza hotel in New York. The five leading economies 
agreed to depreciate the US dollar against the Japanese yen and German Deutsche 
Mark as a means to rebalance the global economy. The value of the yen doubled in 
two years, which led to Japanese manufacturers to move production abroad, 
particularly Southeast Asia, to take advantage of cheaper labour costs (see S Y 
Chua et al., 1999; Kwan, 1994; Yamazawa et al., 1991).     
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 Although less than North-South links, the newly industrialising 
countries of Southeast Asia have exported capital to neighbouring countries, 
thus further enhancing regional integration. Around 40% of FDI in East 
Asia originates from within the region (Lipsey & Sjoholm, 2011). The 
government of Singapore has promoted overseas investment since the 1980s 
as part of the county’s development strategy. This state-led ‘regionalization’ 
strategy was pursued to overcome the limited land and labour resources and 
small domestic market (Yeung, 2000). The strategy is apparent in the 
emergence of growth triangles which made it easier for Singaporean firms to 
transfer their activities to neighbouring countries (Sparke et al., 2004). 
Singaporean companies have also invested in China (Tan & Yeung, 2000), 
particularly in the Southern coastal cities and Special Economic Zones 
(Willis & Yeoh, 1998). In East Asia, ethnic Chinese business networks are 
behind some of the capital flows, as the next section will elaborate upon. 
Migration and cultural flows 
  The cross-border mobility of people is another linkage that 
undergirds a sense of East Asian regionalism. Asian migrations involve a 
broad variety of experiences from transnational elite entrepreneurs from 
Taiwan doing business in China, to Filipino migrant workers living 
transiently in Singapore (Lorente, 2005). In an historical perspective, the 
region is bound together by ethnic Chinese migration networks, which 
stretch back many centuries. The ethnic Chinese settled throughout 
Southeast Asia and their commercial success has been well noted. Despite 
forming a minority in all Southeast Asian countries with the exception of 
Singapore, they generally dominate the economy. Their commercial success 
is often said to rely on cultural factors such as the importance of personal 
relationships, trust, and family values (Menkhoff & Sikorski, 2002), although 
these culturally essentialist ideas are widely criticised (Yeung, 2004). 
Although ethnic Chinese business has historically been rooted in national 
economies, it is becoming increasingly international (Yeung, 1999).  
Additionally, migration occurs on more temporary levels. Collins 
(2008), for example, has written about the movement of young people from 
South Korea to New Zealand for the purpose of university study. Tourism 
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also involves short-term movements of people. Intra-Asian tourist flows are 
being recognised as an increasingly important yet all too often ignored 
perspective in academic scholarship (Winter et al., 2008; Winter, 2007). In 
Cambodia, for instance, approximately 70% of tourists visiting the country 
are from within Asia (Winter, 2010).  
Besides the movement of people, there are identifiable flows of soft 
culture (B H Chua, 2004). The influence of Japanese popular culture has 
been widespread (Iwabuchi, 2002, 2004). More recently, a ‘Korean wave’ 
(hallyu) of pop culture consisting of pop music, film, television, food, fashion 
and computer games has become increasingly popular in Southeast Asia, as 
well as in China and Japan. This is part of Korea’s export strategy in the 
post Asian financial crisis years (Iwabuchi & B H Chua, 2008), and cultural 
exports had grown to $3.8 billion by 2011 (Heo, 2011). In Cambodia, for 
example, Korean music videos and drama shows are regularly broadcast on 
local television channels, projecting an image of consumerist modernity to 
an upwardly mobile Cambodian middle class. 
Intra-Asian urban networks  
As has been demonstrated, it is widely acknowledged that the 
countries of Northeast Asia have influenced the direction and speed of 
development in Southeast Asia, through both investment and ‘soft’ culture. 
However, just as important, yet largely obscured from academic enquiry, 
has been the mobility of skills, techniques and capital in urban planning and 
development within the Asian region. Intra-Asian networks have had a large 
influence on the nature and pace of urbanisation in the region. An emergent 
body of scholarship considers the multifarious ways in which cities in the 
Asian context are interlinked. For Roy and Ong (2011, p. xv), Asia is 
simultaneously a “geographical location, a space of urban innovations, as 
well as an emergent symbol for urban renovations that have global 
applicability”. Roy (2011b, p. 414) also suggests that “these (re)emergent 
cities have forged their own politics of connectivity, one that cannot be 
traced back to the imperial centre”, therefore disrupting the North-South 
divide through which the world has generally been structured. Considering 
the ‘worlding’ practices of cities, as Roy and Ong (2011) do, highlights how 
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the production of urban space occurs not simply through Western 
prototypes, but through locally derived solutions to urban challenges. 
Worlding is not a singular concept and signifies the articulation of urban 
space through diverse components from near and far. In this thesis I 
contribute to Roy’s (2009, p. 829) observation that “much less is known 
about the complex connections, exchanges, and references through which 
cities (everywhere) are worlded”.  
These linkages are commonly found between cities considered more 
‘advanced’ or ‘developed’, which have been used as models by other cities 
seeking to emulate their perceived success. Singapore is an eminent example 
of a city that has been constructed as a ‘model’ because of its rapid 
economic development and orderly urban planning. The Singapore model 
has been transferred to a number of different contexts. Chinese politicians 
have travelled to Singapore to learn about public administration (B H Chua, 
2011). In Shenzhen, for instance, the government sought to promote low 
cost, export-oriented manufacturing during the late 1980s as the first phase 
of industrialisation. The success of Shenzhen later influenced economic 
development policy throughout China. As Cartier (2002, p. 242) observes: 
“Shenzhen is Hong Kongized, Guangzhou is Shenzhenized, and the whole 
country is Guangdongized”. In the area of urban planning, Singapore’s 
model of urban greening and has been exported to the Chinese city of 
Dalian (Hoffman, 2011). This was achieved by learning from Singapore’s 
experience of removing industry from the centre of the city, and 
implementing a social education program to enhance environmental 
awareness as part of community-building. Dalian’s sister city of Kitakyushu 
in Japan was also used as a model of how to clean up a formerly industrial 
city centre.  
The transfer of the ‘Singapore model’ is also mobilised through the 
activities of private companies. Singapore-style condominiums are high-rise 
apartments located within a secured private complex that is normally 
complete with communal facilities such as a swimming pool and gym. This 
type of condominium is an urban form that is said to have originated in 
Singapore during the 1970s, but has since been become common 
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throughout East Asia. Companies such as real estate firm Keppel Land, part 
of the powerful government linked company Keppel Group, and 
Capitaland, a branch of Temasek Holdings, have begun to operate overseas 
(Guillot, 2009). Their activities are contoured by the government’s 
international development strategy, and they have taken with them expertise 
in high-rise construction and the marketing of condominium developments. 
Additionally, government departments in Singapore have created spin-off 
companies, such as Surbana (a subsidiary of the Housing and Development 
Board offering urban planning consultancy and undertaking township 
developments) and Jurong International (an offshoot of Jurong Town 
Corporation, which developed Singapore’s industrial estates), which operate 
within Asia but also more widely in the Middle East and Africa (B H Chua, 
2011).          
 Although less developed than Singapore, the development strategy of 
Kuala Lumpur was used as a model by government officials in Hyderabad, 
India. Bunnell and Das (2010) report how the Chief Minister of Andhra 
Pradesh favoured a kind of information technology-related urban 
development deemed successful in Malaysia. Many of the iconic features of 
Malaysia’s development in the 1990s, such as the Multimedia Super 
Corridor, ‘Vision 2020’ and Cyberjaya high-tech city, were replicated in 
Hyderabad. This replication was in part due to the involvement of 
McKinsey and Company consultants with technology policy in both 
contexts. Another recent contribution to this debate considers the 
connections between Hong Kong, Vancouver, and Dubai. In this case, a 
Dubai-based development corporation enlisted executives from the Pacific 
Place project in Vancouver to build an almost complete replica of that 
project in the Gulf state (Lowry & McCann, 2011). In an example of the 
circulation of what they term a “pan-Asian urban form” (Lowry & McCann, 
2011, p. 192), the original Pacific Place was built with capital from Hong 
Kong and China, and marketed towards East Asian migrants. These 
examples demonstrate how the development of cities in Asia is heavily 
influenced by intra-regional modelling and referencing. 
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3.3 Beyond Western-centrism in urban theory  
By considering the diverse networks of urbanism within Asia, this 
research contributes to the project of de-centring the West as leading edge of 
urban theory and practice. As Watson (2009, p. 2272) has argued, the 
development of cities outside of Europe and North America is now the 
“dominant urban reality”. By taking this approach, it becomes possible to 
reveal the “complex geographies” that “disavow simple binaries, hierarchies 
and categories” (Edensor & Jayne, 2012, p. 16). Similarly, Roy (2009a, p. 
828) argues that there is a “necessity to chart more intricate roots and 
routes” of urban theory. However, there are limits to such an approach, and 
Jacobs (forthcoming) reminds us that studies of mobilities have the potential 
to support the positioning of some cities as ‘exporters’ of ideas and others as 
inert recipients or emulators. As a means to avoid this, Hogan et al. (2012, p. 
62) declare that “what is needed is an altogether flatter or less hierarchical 
form of comparative analysis than that which is common in Anglophone 
urban studies literature”. The work of Henry Yeung in economic geography 
is also relevant here. Yeung (2010) asserts that studying intra-Asian flows 
and networks has the potential to help researchers avoid the two extremes of 
glorifying Western experiences and presenting an ‘exceptionalist’ area 
studies viewpoint (see also Yeung & Lin, 2003). This approach also enables 
‘theorising back’, as Yeung (2010) suggests that studies of flows and networks 
have not yet been well developed in Anglo-American scholarship. These 
ideas are equally applicable to the networks of capital and concepts that are 
driving urban development.   
Beyond the North-South divide in urban theory 
A growing critique recognises the limitations of global and world 
cities approaches, given that these approaches focus on a small range of 
economic processes, particularly the location of advanced producer services, 
and subsequently, a limited number of cities. Originating from the 
influential work of Robinson (2006), there has been a growing desire to 
consider all cities as ‘ordinary’, which would contribute to “develop[ing] a 
more cosmopolitan account of city-ness” (J Robinson, 2002, p. 532). The 
concept of the ‘ordinary city’ was initially coined by Amin and Graham 
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(1997) in a paper which developed the idea that the urban is “founded on 
the ‘multiplexing’ of diverse economic, social, cultural and institutional 
assets” (p.412). For Robinson (2006), this promotes the basis for research 
that is attentive to the diversity and intricacy of cities, and which is based on 
experiences from a wide range of urban contexts. Contrary to global- and 
world-city theorists, both Amin and Graham (1997) and Robinson (2006) 
are interested in promoting urban theory that acknowledges the relational 
webs of interaction between cities, thus emphasising the connections beyond 
that of high order business services.      
Robinson’s (2006) fundamental argument is that there has been a 
persistent and unconstructive polarisation in the field of urban studies 
between analyses of global- and world-cities on the one hand, and 
developmentalist accounts on the other. When poorer cities are viewed 
through a developmentalist perspective, they are often hypothesised as 
‘problem’ (McFarlane, 2008). Robinson (2002) suggests that global- and 
world-city theories focus on a small range of economic activities, emphasise 
hierarchies amongst, rather than networks between cities and therefore 
ignore the implications of urban hierarchies for cities that are not considered 
in global- and world-cities approaches, effectively writing them ‘off the map’. 
Robinson suggests that these extant approaches contain an inherent notion 
that cities should progress up the global city hierarchy, which may deny 
alternative forms of development. More seriously, she argues that urban 
theory is based upon Western notions of modernity, which categorises cities 
outside of the West as ‘other’, using classifications such as ‘third world cities’. 
Yet Sassen (2006) has admitted the limitations of the global cities approach, 
asserting that the global city is not a descriptive term, rather, it is an 
‘analytical construct’ which allows the identification of the global in specific 
local circumstances. As Connell (2007) comments, Western theory can help 
an understanding of urban processes, but researchers must be careful not to 
use it as a systematically operated template.    
Robinsons second major critique is that urban studies research on 
those cities that cannot be characterised as a global- or world-cities is framed 
through a lens of developmentalism. She asserts that this approach is 
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centred on cities, or parts of cities, which are perceived to be ‘structurally 
irrelevant’. These include studies on land tenure, community participation, 
the informal sector and urban governance. Whilst admitting that these 
studies are invaluable, Robinsons critique is on a more theoretical level. Her 
concern is that these studies are not being put into productive contact with 
wider debates in the field, despite the claims of the discipline to be 
“concerned with the dynamism and centrality of urban life in the 
contemporary global economy” (J Robinson, 2002, p. 540). In this thesis I 
agree with Robinson, who suggests that in order to overcome this divide, the 
city should be brought ‘back in’, not by denying the centrality of flows and 
networks amongst cities, but by means of using the city as a place through 
which the multiplicity of flows of information, people, ideas and capital can 
be examined (J Robinson, 2005).      
Convergence and difference in Southeast Asia  
Looking specifically at the Southeast Asian context, I take particular 
inspiration from Terry McGee’s attempt to conceptualise Southeast Asian 
cities without referring back to ‘Western’ experiences and theoretical 
discourses (McGee, 1991). McGee’s central argument was that large 
Southeast Asian cities grow in a substantially different way from those in the 
West. McGee suggests that in Southeast Asian Extended Metropolitan 
Regions (EMRs), a new urban form has emerged which he terms desakota (an 
amalgamation of the Bahasa Indonesia terms for village and town) (McGee, 
1989). Desakota signifies the co-existence of agricultural and non-agricultural 
activities, the fading boundary between city and countryside, and thus the 
merging of urban and rural lifestyles. This urban form, evident on the urban 
peripheries of Bangkok, Jakarta and Manila, as well as secondary cities such 
as Bandung and Chiang Mai, consists of a “region-based pattern of 
urbanisation to form an extended metropolitan zone” (Kelly & McGee, 
2003, p. 274). This, they argue, diverges from the Western experience of 
suburbanisation and densification of the central city, and requires a 
perspective which re-evaluates the basic view in urban studies that the 
distinction between urban and rural will remain as urbanisation advances 
(McGee, 1995). In addition to representing a spatial pattern, desakota has also 
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given rise to changes in household structure, social relations and local 
politics (Shatkin, 2004). However, such singular region-based typologies for 
‘the Southeast Asian city’ proposed by McGee (McGee, 1967, 1995) are 
now considered problematic and something that Bunnell et al. (forthcoming) 
have cautioned researchers to avoid.  
McGee’s thesis has been criticised by scholars such as Dick and 
Rimmer who suggest that McGee does not take into account the powerful 
effects of globalisation. Dick and Rimmer (1998) suggested that the concept 
of desakota is a form of ‘Orientalism’ because it is inward looking, and ignores 
the process of urban sprawl ubiquitous in North America. They discount the 
unique processes in Southeast Asia to propose that “the emerging urban 
forms take after North American patterns to a remarkable degree that has 
yet to be recognised, let alone explained” (Dick & P Rimmer, 1998, p. 
2319). McGee (2002) refutes their argument on a number of grounds. 
Firstly, Dick and Rimmer reduced the concept to apply to all of Southeast 
Asia, while McGee admitted that the concept does not fit all cases (for 
example, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore). Secondly, McGee argues that the 
desakota concept was not concerned with the geographic origins of urban 
sprawl and the ways in which it was imported to Southeast Asia. Rather, the 
concept theorised the “interaction of these components of urban sprawl with 
the in situ societies of these regions, within the broader political economy of 
the urban region where these processes were working their way out” 
(McGee, 2002, p. 22). This is in contrast to a “highly reductionist” (McGee, 
2002, p. 22) study of urban sprawl as it has spread from the US.  
Dick and Rimmer’s (1998) argument in the late 1990s was that a 
categorical division which posits Southeast Asian cities as paradigmatic 
‘Third World cities’ is incorrect, given that Southeast Asian cities have, since 
the 1970s, become more like Western cities under the influence of 
globalisation. Goldblum and Wong (2000, p. 36), for example, argue that 
“urban development in the extended metropolitan region of Jabotabek has 
followed largely an identical pattern in the West”. They are led to this 
conclusion because of industrial dispersal from the centre of the city to 
peripheral areas and new towns, and prime areas of central Jakarta being 
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redeveloped into office blocks, retail and leisure complexes. Dick and 
Rimmer disrupt the ‘Third World city’ paradigm by historically analysing 
how the urban form of Southeast Asian cities changed under different 
phases of globalisation from pre-colonial, to colonial, to post-colonial eras. 
They suggest that a convergence between urban forms in European and 
Southeast Asian contexts was apparent from the 1880s to the 1930s with 
increasing economic and political influence from European colonial powers. 
After the break with colonial control from the 1940s to the 1970s, and the 
establishment of independent national governments, they suggest that 
Southeast Asian cities ‘diverged’ from their colonial counterparts. This, they 
propose, gave rise to the classification of Southeast Asian cities as ‘Third 
World’ and ‘dysfunctional’ amongst Western scholars, with its emphasis on 
rural-urban migration, informal sector employment, poverty, poor housing 
conditions and general lack of systematic planning.  
From the 1980s onwards, Dick and Rimmer argue that Southeast 
Asian cities were “converging to a remarkable degree with those of the First 
World, especially the USA” (Dick & P Rimmer, 1998, p. 2309), due to the 
growth of telecommunications and global transport links, and increasing 
globalisation of trade and investment. As Southeast Asian cities have seen a 
growth in the middle-class, they have developed an urban form that is 
characterised by gated communities, high-rise offices, shopping malls and a 
private car dominated transport system of expressways, which Dick and 
Rimmer suggest are remarkably similar to those in the West, particularly the 
USA. Furthermore, they assert that “although there remain separate debates 
and literatures for the US and Southeast Asia, in reality many issues are the 
same” (Dick & P Rimmer, 1998, p. 2309). Similarly, Webster (1995) 
speculates that large Southeast Asian cities are becoming reminiscent of the 
archetypal postmodern city – Los Angeles – because they do not have a 
traditional city centre and are characterised by a multi-nodal urban form. It 
could be argued that Dick and Rimmer’s assertions go some way to 
exploring the differences amongst cities across diverse contexts and 
subsequently circumvent viewing Southeast Asian cities through the lens of 
orientalism. Yet on another level, Robinson (2006, p. 61) 
68 
 
 
and Rimmer’s approach “struggle[s] to escape from categorising 
assumptions about the differences amongst cities”, since they ultimately 
assert that Southeast Asian cities are becoming more like those in the West.  
This exchange of opinions between McGee and Dick and Rimmer is 
part of an ongoing debate within East Asian urban studies. This debate 
vacillates between a view that gives prominence to global convergence (for 
example, Dick and Rimmer), and a perspective that values the importance 
of local difference and agency. Scholars of globalisation have 
problematically suggested that the spread of ‘Western consumerism’ under 
globalisation has led to a cultural homogenisation. This in turn has been 
said to cause a convergence in urban lifestyles and forms (Knox, 1996). For 
example, Marshall (2003) asserts that an ‘emerging urbanity’ in East Asia 
consisting of real estate developments marketed as ‘world class’ can lead to a 
global convergence of urban form. According to Rowe (2005) this is in part 
due to the diffusion of city planning ideas from West to East. Indeed, it was 
reported in the 1996 World Architecture Survey that Western European 
architecture firms received half of their work contracts from Asia (R 
Marshall, 2003). Yet as McNeill (2005a, p. 42) mentions, since only three of 
the top 15 tallest buildings in the world are in Europe and America, in 
“debates over the future of urban form, existing Western-biased theories and 
models are of questionable relevance”.  
Many new urban projects throughout the global South, such as 
gated housing estates and shopping malls, often seem to be devoid of local 
context by attempting to replicate Western-style architecture and urbanism 
(C Webster et al., 2002). The style of housing in gated communities is a 
prominent example. In China, for example, housing styles in imitation of 
Western buildings are becoming popular in gated communities (Pow & 
Kong, 2007; F L Wu, 2006, 2010). Anthony King (2004) asserts that 
Chinese cities are undergoing a process of ‘villafication’, where the ‘villa’ is 
understood as a concept originating in Europe. In opposition to these 
claims, Roy (2011a, p. 310) purports that this process “embod[ies] much 
more than the internationalization of the American suburb”. Drawing upon 
her own research on gated communities on the periphery of Indian cities 
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(see Roy, 2003), she suggests that local factors should also be taken into 
consideration. These include:  
“land tenure systems that combine colonial landholding 
arrangements with national imperatives of planning...; where 
squatter settlements...proliferate alongside gated zones of 
residence and industrial factories and where ties of patronage 
and clientelism thrive in the interstices of...liberal democracy” 
(Roy, 2011a, p. 310).           
 
I believe that the involuntary assertion that ‘modern’ urban forms in 
Asia originate from the West is also problematic. Leichenko and Solecki 
(2005) argue that new landscapes of housing consumption in the global 
South are a result of the exporting of ‘American dream’ – “the ideal of 
homeownership of a single-family home in a suburban area” (p. 243). Some 
scholars have attempted to challenge these ideas by suggesting that gated 
communities have in fact long existed in Asia, perhaps even predating their 
emergence in the USA. Forbes Park in Manila is one example, which was 
developed immediately after the Second World War (Hogan et al., 2012). 
Gavin Shatkin also questions the credibility of relating Southeast Asian 
urbanisation to what has already occurred in the USA. He argues that:    
“trends in urbanization in Southeast Asia do not resemble the 
rejection of urbanity itself and the consequent exodus of the 
middle class from the centre to the periphery which is 
characteristic of the American model: rather, it is 
characterized by movements from public to private space, 
which may occur from centre to periphery, periphery to 
periphery, centre to centre, or periphery to centre” (Shatkin, 
2008, p. 386).  
This debate is pertinent to understanding the proliferation of satellite city 
developments, a point to which I now turn to.  
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3.4 Satellite city development and intra-Asian urban networks 
The proliferation of private sector satellite cities is an important 
emerging urban form in the cities of the global South. This phenomenon is 
beginning to attract scholarly attention, as Chapter 2 described. However, 
there has until now been a lack of emphasis on the role of intra-regional 
networks in their production. In concluding his research on Pacific Rim 
urban mega-projects back in the mid 1990s, Kris Olds (1995, p. 1736) 
recommended that “it would be useful for analysts of the UMP [urban 
mega-project] development process ... to work with new urban theories 
which focus on economic and cultural interconnections, flows, linkages, and 
interdependencies”. Shatkin (2011, p. 79) initiates this line of analysis with 
reference to satellite cities by stating that they are perhaps the “purest form 
of inter-referenced urbanism”, as they symbolise the complete adoption of 
urban planning and design principles “based on an interpretation of how a 
global urbanism should look and function” (p. 79). This is nothing new and 
even the satellite cities developed around Tokyo in the 20th century were 
heavily influenced by British planning ideas which promoted polycentric 
urban structures (Sorensen, 2001). Studying ‘inter-referencing’ can reflect 
the experiences of a much wider range of cities than the commonly used 
terms of ‘global cities’ or ‘mega cities’, therefore helping to replace the 
centrality of Western-generated models (Hoffman, 2011).  
Although those satellite cities built in Indonesia were predominantly 
developed by local conglomerates, the developers had connections to foreign 
places and actors through funding arrangements and design influences. 
More recent projects, such as those in Cambodia and Vietnam, are 
generally not developed by local companies. They are normally funded 
through intra-Asian foreign direct investment, based on the modelling of 
urban design and governance practices from other Asian cities, or they 
utilise best practice examples that are extracted and emulated from other 
cities. The mobility of capital, urban design/ architecture and urban 
governance concepts, and expertise is fundamental to the process of their 
diffusion throughout Southeast Asia.  
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Kolkata West International City in India, for example, is developed 
through an assemblage of varied actors and institutions. The project was 
financed through a joint venture between Salim Group of Indonesia and 
Universal Success Enterprises Ltd. of Singapore, while Indonesia’s Ciputra 
was the developer. Certain urban design styles and concepts can be 
replicated through the involvement of transnationally mobile consultants. 
The Singaporean company Surbana, for instance, is the project manager of 
Kolkata West International City and works on satellite city masterplanning 
in various countries (including Cambodia), exporting the urban 
development knowledge accrued in its home city of Singapore (Shatkin, 
2011). Surbana is an offshoot of the Singapore governments Housing 
Development Board, which has had a central role in developing Singapore’s 
new towns.  The image of certain cities deemed successful has also been 
reified in other contexts. Citra Raya, one of Ciputra’s projects in Surabaya, 
Indonesia is marketed as a ‘mini-Singapore’, capitalising on the city-state’s 
image as being wealthy, modern and liveable (Idawati, 2010). The urban 
landscape is planted with trees and public space is adorned with Singapore 
icons such as statues of the Merlion, Stamford Raffles and a replica of the 
Fountain of Wealth. The success of Hong Kong’s new town program 
influenced the developers of Muang Thong Thani in Bangkok (R Marshall, 
2003). Another example is the Hanoi North project by Korean developer 
Daewoo, inspired by the redevelopment of Lujiazui into Shanghai’s new 
financial district (R Marshall, 2003). 
Returning to the point made in the previous section, although the 
concept and design of satellite cities may be in some instances evocative of 
American suburbia (Leichenko & Solecki, 2005), the production process is 
firmly grounded within Asia. In this sense, there is need for a revision of 
Dick and Rimmer’s (1998) argument that in the age of globalisation there is 
a convergence in urban form between Southeast Asian cities and those in 
the West. On the simplest level, satellite city urban form borrows heavily 
from the style of American gated communities. In the case of the Lippo 
Group, it has been said that this is because the company director, James 
Riady, spent time in California whilst studying for a graduate business 
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degree (Silver, 2008). Gotsch and Peterek (2003, p. 5) has suggested that 
satellite cities represent the “tendenc[y] towards universalisation and 
standardisation” of urbanism under neoliberal globalisation. This may be 
partly true, but I am more in agreement with Shatkin (2010), who has 
suggested that focusing too heavily on design issues distracts the analysis 
from the larger societal and political process at work. A more insightful 
examination into the production of satellite cities requires a thorough look 
beyond urban form and towards the networks through which they are 
produced. This resonates with the idea that neoliberalism is ‘actually 
existing’ and plays out differently in varying contexts (Brenner & Theodore, 
2002).  
  Given that satellite cities are driven by regional urban networks, 
this thesis focuses on the regional scale as a way to move beyond viewing 
urban change as a binary between convergence and difference. This is one 
way of seeing “how the general and specific come together” (Pow, 2011, p. 
63). As I have argued in earlier parts of this chapter, the region is bound 
together by various institutional groupings, and by flows of aid, investment, 
and culture. I also suggested that urban change is driven by intra-regional 
flows of capital, skills and techniques. I suggest that this process underpins 
the importance of a regional approach. Similarly, Waley (2012, p. 2) asserts 
that the regional is a constructive scale to analyse urban change because it 
“opens up possibilities for a more sensitive understanding of convergence 
and difference”. As Ching (2000, p. 236) asserts, “regionalism represents a 
mediatory attempt to come to terms with the immanent transnationalization 
of capital and the historical territorialization of national economies”. 
Therefore, for Ching the region acts as a bridge between global and local 
forces.  
These ideas are also reflective of the recent turn to consider the 
advantages of area studies (Stenning, 2005). Although area studies have 
been critiqued for originating in colonial studies of ‘exotic’ cultures 
(Chakrabarty, 1998; Gibson-Graham, 2004), there is a growing sense that it 
can now be used as way to bring regions once considered provincial into 
mainstream theoretical debates (J Robinson, 2003). According to Pollard et 
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al. (2009), area studies can enable an exploration of the local and the global. 
Nonetheless, in considering the mobilisation and circulation of intra-Asian 
urbanisms, it is important not to relocate the problem of Western-centric 
essentialism by creating a new Eastern-centric version, as Hogan et al. 
(2012) have cautioned. Nor should it be suggested that the East Asian region 
is a bounded unit. The processes of regionalisation and globalisation are 
interlinked and overlapping (Ching, 2000), and in practical terms, activities 
in other parts of the world have considerable ramifications for Asia.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has constructed the theoretical framework of the 
research. The chapter started by reviewing studies that have investigated the 
various connections between cities that drive urban change in an era of 
increased globalisation. This included flows of knowledge, practice, urban 
design/ architecture, and urban policies. The second part shifted the scale of 
analysis down to the Asian region. I presented evidence to suggest that 
Southeast Asia’s development has been steered by intra-Asian linkages 
including political discourses and groupings, and the movement of people, 
money (in the form of both aid and investment), and culture. However, the 
mobility of skills, techniques, and capital in urban development are also 
having a large influence on urban change in the region. This is something 
that is largely absent from academic research. The third section suggested 
that studying intra-Asian networks could help to go beyond viewing the 
West as the pioneer in urban change. By examining the networks though 
which satellite cities are produced, this thesis exposes the diverse connections 
between cities. It also continues the project of de-centring the position of 
cities in the North Atlantic world that are habitually positioned 
unproblematically at the leading edge of urban theory and practice 
(Robinson, 2002). The final part of the chapter looked specifically at how 
the development of satellite cities in Southeast Asia is based upon intra-
Asian networks of investment, urban design/ architectural styles, and urban 
governance concepts.  
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I take forward this framework in later chapters, but first, the next 
chapter will consider in detail the methodology and research design strategy 
adopted in this study.  
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4. Methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In line with the theoretical approach laid out in the previous chapter, this 
research studies the regional flows of urban development capital and 
concepts by starting in place – Phnom Penh – and seeing how the regional 
flows interact with local actors (McCann & K Ward, 2012). I am also taking 
inspiration from Olds’ (2001) study that investigated the social aspects of 
globalisation, taking an actor-centred rather than an abstract view. I identify 
and trace the connections of the two case study satellite cities back to 
Indonesia and South Korea. I believe in the importance of comprehensive 
fieldwork, and thus I undertook an extended period of fieldwork for this 
research, spending around half of the three-year program of study living in 
Cambodia. The main research method employed is the semi-structured in-
depth interview, although I supplement this with ethnographic work and 
secondary data/ document analysis.   
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, I discuss the rationale for 
selecting the case studies explored in the thesis. Secondly, I detail the 
fieldwork plans and research methods employed, including document 
analysis, interviews and ethnography. Thirdly, I describe the strategy to 
analyse the data collected. Before concluding, I discuss some of the ethical 
issues that were negotiated and the influence of my own positionality on the 
research.  
 
4.1 Relational methodologies 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, this research takes a relational 
theoretical approach to the study of satellite cities. But how is relational 
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urban research ‘done’? Despite the burgeoning literature on policy 
mobilities, inter-referencing/ modelling, and urban networks, there is a 
relative lack of reflection on the methodologies thorough which relational 
urban research gets done. Most useful in this case are the methodological 
ideas developed through work on urban policy mobilities. Within these 
debates, political economy approaches advocate a methodology that 
understands spaces of regulatory change as relationally interconnected, 
where the source of certain ideas or policies is rarely one site (Peck et al., 
2010), in opposition to post-structuralist ‘low-flying’ and ‘ground-up’ 
approaches (for example, Larner & Le Heron, 2002). More recently, Peck 
and Theodore (2012) advocate a ‘distended case approach’ which balances 
the local depth of political economy techniques and the transnational reach 
of low-flying network-centric approaches. The concept of ‘assemblage’ has 
been used as a methodological tool to focus attention on both the relational 
aspects of policies and cities, whilst also considering the practices that gather 
diverse global elements into particular places (McCann & K Ward, 2012). 
The methods used in researching policy mobilities have generally 
involved “a judicious combination of observation, documentary analysis, 
and in-depth interviews, as a means of probing, interrogating, and 
triangulating issues around the functioning of global policy networks” (Peck 
& Theodore, 2012, p. 26). In Cook and Ward’s (2012) research on the 
assembling of urban waterfront policy, the methods employed were 
primarily semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the public and 
private sectors. Informants were asked about territorial issues in addition to 
more relational-type questions, such as discussions about comparisons, 
relations with elsewhere, study tours, and reference points. Larner and 
Laurie (2010) assert that the movement of models and policies is an 
embodied practice, as I highlight in chapter 8 when looking at the networks 
of personal friendships and connections that underlie South Korean real 
estate investment in Cambodia. Interviews are commonly supplemented 
with archival research and analysis of secondary materials, for example 
urban plans and policies, newspaper articles, and consultancy reports. Some 
research has specifically used critical discourse analysis of policy documents, 
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speeches, and other texts as a way to identify how policies are legitimised 
(Cook, 2008). This method was not utilised in this research because there 
are few formal policies, and those that exist are either not in English, or have 
been translated which may alter meanings. 
Another key method is ethnography, which although is traditionally 
associated with immersion in ‘the local’, has been increasingly used to 
consider ‘ethnographic circulations’ as a way of studying how scales from 
the local to global are actively produced (Roy, 2012). McCann (2011) 
argued that researchers should focus on the mundane channels of policy 
transfer, and Gonzalez (2010), for example, attended study tours with policy 
makers. This reflects “a shift from studying ‘sites’ to studying ‘fields’, that is, 
the relations between sites” (Gowan & O Riain, 2000, p. xii), although one 
site can remain key. Larner and Laurie’s (2010) research involved the 
combination of analysing publically accessible materials and personal 
biographies of actors. The latter requires longer term immersion in the field 
so that professional and personal networks can be investigated over time. In 
this research I agree with Larner and Laurie, because ethnography proved 
most useful as a way to obtain data in a more informal context, through 
building up relationships and partaking in casual conversations that helped 
to confirm the insights gained from formal interviews (see section 4.3).   
In undertaking relational research, the city is understood through its 
relations with other locations. Some researchers, for example Olds (2001), 
have used multi-sited fieldwork as a way to trace these connections between 
cities (see also Coleman & Von Hellerman, 2009; Hannerz, 2003). His work 
on ethnic Chinese property developers operating across the Pacific Rim 
involved fieldwork in Hong Kong, Shanghai, Paris, Vancouver, Manila, and 
Bangkok. Kelly and Olds (2007) suggest that research can take the form of 
either the study of multi-scalar forces in a single site (Burawoy et al., 2000), 
or network-based approaches which follow a multitude of linkages 
(Hannerz, 2003). My research synthesises aspects of both, in a similar way to 
Peck and Theodore’s (2012) distended case approach, as I explore the 
connections through which satellite cities are produced in Phnom Penh, 
whilst remaining open to the complex nature of urban networks. Multi-sited 
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fieldwork obviously requires considerable time and financial resources. In 
this thesis I felt it was more important to gain familiarity with Phnom Penh, 
the main site of the research, rather than undertake extensive travelling and 
perhaps risk misunderstanding the nuances of urban development in 
Cambodia. As well as the financial limitations, the limited time available 
would mean that only short trips to other locales would be possible, and thus 
it is questionable whether sensitive analyses could be undertaken. My 
research is geographically positioned in Phnom Penh but also looks at 
Indonesia and South Korea as specific sites where investment and 
knowledge is structured and contested. By interviewing South Korean and 
Indonesian actors in Phnom Penh, connections can be explored without the 
need to physically travel to those locations.    
 
4.2 Case study selection 
 This research adopts a case study approach, in order to investigate 
the contemporary phenomenon of globalisation within its real life context. 
By using case studies, the research can better illustrate the complexities of 
urban planning in the Cambodian context. Case studies were selected 
because of the potential richness of the information to be gathered, rather 
than their representativeness (Flyvbjerg, 1998). In and around Phnom Penh, 
many large-scale urban developments have appeared over the last decade, 
normally built by local Cambodian-Chinese enterprises (as is discussed fully 
in Chapter 6). However, most of these are solely residential estates. The 
most advanced examples of mixed-use satellite city projects are Camko City 
and Grand Phnom Penh International City, which are used as the primary 
case studies in this paper. These two are both developed by foreign 
companies. Phnom Penh is up to now a city that has been relatively ‘off the 
map’ of urban studies research.   
However, foreign businesses are not behind the construction of all 
satellite cities, and smaller developments too can represent significant drivers 
of change. As I mentioned in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), Labbé and 
Boudreau (2011) argued this in relation to urban development in Hanoi. 
Phnom Penh, being a relatively small city compared to most other Southeast 
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Asian capitals (it has a population of less than 2 million), means that satellite 
cities are an even more significant feature of the urban landscape. I have 
chosen here to focus specifically on the constituent networks of two large 
projects, although I am not denying that urban development in Phnom 
Penh is linked to wider spheres of influence (Paling, forthcoming). 
 
4.3 Data collection and sources 
 The fieldwork for this research was carried out between July 2010 
and January 2012. During this period, I firstly spent a three months 
affiliated as a Visiting Scholar with the Asian Urbanisms research cluster at 
the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. My 
theoretical and empirical approach fits well within the remit of this 
department and thus I greatly benefitted from attending seminars and 
conferences organised there. This affiliation also enabled me to consult their 
libraries, which have a larger range of resources on Asia than I could have 
access to in the UK. I used this time to prepare for fieldwork and plan my 
research strategy. In Cambodia, I was affiliated for my first three months in 
the country as a Visiting Researcher with the Development Studies masters 
program at the Royal University of Phnom Penh. My affiliation here gave 
me the opportunity to meet with local researchers and lecturers, as well as 
some of their international partners. During the remainder of my fieldwork I 
returned to Singapore periodically, in order to give some much needed 
distance from the field and use the library resources to refine the theoretical 
ideas.   
 The research presented in this thesis is primarily derived from 
qualitative data, although it is supplemented by some quantitative economic 
information such as investment figures. The research methods utilised 
included background document analysis, formal key informant interviews, 
shorter interviews with local communities, and ethnographic observations 
and casual conversations. Each of these is now discussed in turn.    
Background document analysis 
 Document analysis was conducted on secondary data and was 
obtained to supplement to primary data gathered from interviews. These 
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included: property market reports, newspaper articles, marketing brochures 
of urban developments, planning reports, laws and policies. I also gathered a 
small amount of quantitative data, most notably investment statistics from 
the Council for the Development of Cambodia. I had originally planned to 
obtain and digest this secondary data first, so that I could be more informed 
before I undertook the interviews. In reality, this was not possible as data 
was not as freely available as I had anticipated.   
Certain pieces of data could be obtained from libraries and the 
Internet whilst outside Cambodia. However, the majority had to be 
obtained whilst in Cambodia by using local libraries, archives and research 
institutes. Gathering data was difficult because the country lacks the 
financial resources to archive and organise documents, exacerbated by the 
fact that many of the knowledge institutions were destroyed during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. Furthermore, the lack of transparency and informal 
nature of urban development means that few documents related to 
particular projects are in circulation. I was granted access to the 
Municipality of Phnom Penh’s library, however, most of the documents here 
were from the 1990s and only vaguely relevant. There are very few urban 
planning policies in Cambodia, and they are for the most part insufficient to 
apply to the pace of contemporary urbanisation (something which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Most useful were a series of approximately 
30 research reports created through a partnership between the Mairie de 
Paris and the Municipality of Phnom Penh that I was given an electronic 
copy of by MPP staff. These reports culminated in the publication of a 
‘White Paper on Urban Development and Management in Phnom Penh’ 
(Bureau des Affaires Urbaines, 2007), which was intended to form the basis 
of the Masterplan of Phnom Penh (see Chapter 6). The developers of the 
satellite cities used as case studies provided me with brochures and plans. 
Most of these documents were in English, although some were in French. 
These marketing materials were used to analyse the ways in which the 
satellite cities are promoted and legitimized. This is similar to Kim’s (2010) 
analysis of place promotion for New Songdo City in South Korea.  
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Interviews with key informants 
 The major research method employed in this research was 
interviews with key informants in the government and property industry. 
This method was chosen because of the potential to uncover the rationales 
underlying complex processes and give greater detail on the strategies of 
foreign satellite city developers working in Cambodia (Schoenberger, 1991; 
Yeung, 1995). The interviews were semi-structured in nature, and an 
interview guide was developed in order to ensure that the intended issues are 
covered, whilst giving space for elaboration and discussion of other pertinent 
points that arose. The interviews were carefully prepared and in advance to 
anticipate various directions the discussion to go in (Wengraf, 2001). 
Although I am learning Khmer language, my level was not sufficient to 
undertake interviews, thus all interviews were completed in English. All 
respondents approached could speak fluent English. Most respondents were 
interviewed once, although some were met several times after the initial 
interview but in a more casual setting. I sometimes telephoned respondents 
after the interview to clarify particular to points, or to ask further questions 
that arose following interviews with others. Initial participants and their 
contact details were identified before starting fieldwork through internet 
research and liaising with personal contacts whom have prior experience 
doing research in Cambodia. The sampling strategy employed can therefore 
be described as purposive.  
On arriving in Cambodia, I contacted potential informants by email. 
After a very poor response rate I realised that email is not commonly used, 
and subsequently I telephoned respondents directly. This proved to be much 
more fruitful, and nearly all those telephoned were eventually interviewed, 
often after several attempts given people’s busy schedules. I was pleasantly 
surprised how straightforward it was to arrange interviews, as it is normally 
the case that it is hard to gain access to foreign elites because the context is 
unfamiliar (Herod, 1999). Further participants were recruited through 
‘snowballing’. At the end of every interview I asked for any 
recommendations of other relevant people to meet. In most cases, 
participants were very forthcoming in supplying me with potential names 
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and telephone numbers. Some even immediately telephoned potential 
interviewees to ask if they would be willing to arrange a meeting with me. I 
targeted those in high positions within their respective organisations (e.g. 
directors, managers), and this was successful in most cases. Only one 
informant outright refused an interview request, a senior representative of 
the developer behind Camko City. Appendix I provides a complete list of 
the interviews undertaken. It details the respondents’ position and the broad 
area of discussion. In total, 30 formal interviews were completed. Appendix 
II provides interview guides for the major groups of respondents; 
government officers, private sector actors, and local communities. 
The majority of interviews were conducted in the offices of the 
respective respondents. A small number were conducted in public space, 
such as in cafes. Interviews were in the region of one hour in length. All but 
a small number of interviews were recorded and fully transcribed. None of 
the interviewees requested for the interview to be ‘off the record’. I 
transcribed the interviews immediately after the meetings so as to remember 
what was said if the recording was difficult to comprehend. For those 
interviews where respondents did not wish to be recorded, notes were taken 
during the meeting and typed up and elaborated upon as soon as possible 
after the meeting. Recorded and transcribed interviews gave better data, as 
without having to take notes the conversation was much more natural and 
fluid. Direct quotations from the interviews are used in later chapters of this 
thesis. Informants’ names are anonymised to ensure confidentiality. Because 
the research is based on a number of specific projects, the quotes are in 
some cases traceable to certain organisations but not particular people 
within those organisations.  
 I tried to strategically order the interviews whenever possible so that 
the more general topics of discussion, for example the property market in 
Phnom Penh, were undertaken before the interviews with developers of the 
case study satellite cities. This was so that my knowledge of relevant issues 
could be built up, and therefore gave me the foundations to ask pertinent 
questions in later interviews. For instance, I needed to know more about the 
general level of supply and demand for luxury properties by speaking to real 
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estate agents, before I could confidently discuss the demand for satellite 
cities with developers. This approach also gave me the opportunity to 
‘practice’ my interview style before undertaking the most important 
interviews. Within each interview, I tried to approach the same question in 
several different ways to later compare the responses and thus ensure a 
higher degree of reliability (McDowell, 1998). Tough or more controversial 
questions were approached towards the end of the interview, so as not to 
discourage the interviewee.  
 In general, the NGOs and independent consultants I met were able 
to talk more candidly and freely. When interviewing representatives from 
the national and local government, the informants often gave an uncritical 
perspective, which is of course to be expected within that particular 
institutional context. However, I countered this strategy by meeting some of 
the younger staff, with which I had more in common, several times and thus 
obtaining more truthful responses. Property developers were, as presumed, 
the most closed given the sensitive commercial nature of their projects and 
their likely concerns that I could divulge information to others. By meeting 
with as many relevant people as possible, I was able to better ‘judge’ the 
validity of responses. When I was suspicious of the validity of interviewees’ 
responses I also used local friends as ‘decoders’, who could advise me on the 
potential ulterior meanings. I stayed in Cambodia for an extended period, 
and I was thus able to better infer meanings from the data as my personal 
understanding of the political, economic and cultural complexities and 
nuances increased.    
Interviews with local communities 
 While the abovementioned interviews gave valuable data on the case 
study developments and urban planning issues in Phnom Penh, they did not 
include the perspective of people living in the vicinity of satellite cities at the 
urban edge. I therefore conducted interviews with local communities living 
near the satellite cities to find out their perspective, and in what ways they 
benefit or are affected by the new developments. I initially visited the area 
surrounding both Camko City and Grand Phnom Penh International City 
on several occasions to investigate the kind of economic activities apparent, 
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the types of people living there, and the sorts of housing available. These 
communities are facing massive changes to their life and work as the city 
expands (DiGregorio, 2011). All the interviews were conducted in the 
vicinity of Camko City, as this is more populated. In this area, there are 
many small-scale industrial activities (e.g. metal working, rattan and bamboo 
furniture workshops) and some larger factories (e.g. garments, drinking 
water bottling). This industry is mixed with housing for (primarily) lower-
income people as well as rental accommodation for the (mainly female) 
garment factory workers who migrate from the provinces.   
The interviews were divided into two parts. The first part was 
structured in order to gather certain demographic characteristics, such as: 
gender, job, income, housing tenure (and legality of land title) and length of 
time living in the area. The second part was more semi-structured. I 
prepared a number of initial questions to initiate a conversation, but the 
interviews were designed to accommodate individual responses narratives. 
The interviews covered topics such as positive and negative effects of the 
satellite city on their daily lives, and their perceptions of the development. A 
total of 20 interviews were completed, which ranged in length from 15 to 30 
minutes.   
 I hired a research assistant to assist me in conducting the interviews 
in Khmer. I originally was introduced to her through a contact at a local 
university, as she had recently completed a Masters thesis on housing for the 
urban poor in Phnom Penh. She also had worked for over a decade with 
various housing rights NGOs, and thus had considerable experience in this 
type of research. She advised me on my original interview guide and then 
translated it to Khmer language. During the interviews, she took extensive 
notes and later translated them into English whilst elaborating upon the 
notes. Quotations used in this thesis are taken directly from my research 
assistants’ translation and thus may have some grammatical errors. 
Participants were initially sampled purposively because of their location in 
close proximity to Camko City, and further participants were ‘snowballed’. 
One informant was well known in the community and provided 
introductions to many further participants. I attempted to interview a range 
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of people from different areas around Camko City to ensure a variety of 
views were included.    
Ethnography  
Although interviews and the gathering of secondary data were the 
major research methods employed, I believe participant observation over 
the period of fieldwork underlies many of the views and arguments offered 
in this thesis. An ethnographic approach relies upon long-term observations 
and interactions with particular groups (Herbert, 2000), in effect “mak[ing] 
sense of their making sense” (Ley, 1988, p. 121). Because it occurs outside 
the formal context of an interview where nothing is imposed by the 
researcher, it can generate richer, and perhaps more natural, data. Most 
significant here was the fact that what I witnessed first-hand could be 
compared with the narratives in the interviews.  
The types of ethnography undertaken can be grouped into three 
categories. Firstly, I spent time walking around the two satellite cities in 
order to get a feeling for the style of living. Members of the sales team also 
gave me guided walking tours, which enabled me to be shown around each 
type of residential unit and ask questions. During the walking tours I could 
also estimate the level of occupancy by seeing if the properties were 
furnished and occupied. Researching gated communities has the obvious 
challenge of gaining access. By their nature, gated communities are 
explicitly designed to exclude anyone who is not a resident. I could therefore 
enter the residential areas solely when accompanied by a member of staff. 
When I was alone, I could access only the peripheral parts of the 
development. In order to avoid the problems of access, some researchers 
have actually lived inside gated communities (J H Kim, 2002). An 
acknowledged limitation of this study is that I have not been able to include 
residents of the satellite cities in this study, because of the issue of restricted 
access.  
Secondly, I resided in Phnom Penh for an extended period of 16 
months. During this time, I lived in several different parts of the city and 
witnessed how people live. The many conversations and experiences during 
my time in Phnom Penh all contributed towards growing my understanding 
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of Cambodian culture. I believe this was critical, since being non-local I had 
little prior knowledge except what I had learnt from books. Thirdly, I 
attended a number of seminars, lectures, exhibitions and conferences related 
to the research topic. At these events, a notable example is a property and 
construction exhibition, I had many casual conversations with 
knowledgeable people about my research. These chance meetings were 
much more informal and provided me with views and anecdotes to compare 
with the discourses mentioned in the formal interviews. In the forthcoming 
chapters, insights from these conversations are referred to as personal 
communications. Additionally, I presented at a number of events to local, 
mainly academic, audiences. During these events I was provided with some 
valuable feedback, which I later built into the thesis.  
 
4.4 Data analysis 
The key informant interviews were analysed through thematic 
analysis in order to uncover and classify emerging patterns in the data. I 
analysed the interview data manually, by firstly printing the transcripts and 
collating them in one folder. I read through the transcripts numerous times 
in order to undertake ‘open coding’ (Crang, 1997), getting close to the data 
and highlighting salient ideas, quotes and themes. After the process of open 
coding, I began to develop a more formal set of codes/ themes and sub-
codes through an iterative process of going between the interview material, 
theory, and my own ideas. These sub-codes, or ‘axial codes’ (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990), tease out the details of each main code. I used a system of 
numbers and colours to indicate occurrences of particular codes. For 
example, one of the main codes was ‘Cambodia – Korea relationship’, from 
which emerged sub-codes such as ‘political and diplomatic’ and ‘urban 
development expertise and experience’.  Another main code was ‘challenges 
to urban planning’, with sub-codes ‘unsuitable legal framework’ and ‘lack of 
financial resources’ situated beneath. The interviews with local community 
members were analysed in a similar way, with the exception of the first 
section of the interviews that consisted of structured biographical questions. 
The quantitative data from those questions (e.g. length of time living in the 
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area, daily income) was analysed with standard measures of central 
tendency. Regarding the secondary data – documents, laws, policies and so 
on – content analysis was designed to abstract the most relevant elements. 
This involved summarising and looking for certain connections between the 
materials (Flick, 2009).  
 These three methods, plus the ethnographic element, were combined 
in order to ensure that valid conclusions could be drawn. The combination 
of methods was complementary, in that more valid insights could be gained 
from juxtaposing them together (Sumner & Tribe, 2008). For instance, I 
cross-checked newspaper reports with the narratives given by interviewees, 
in a similar fashion to Lee and Shin’s (2012) analysis of new town 
development in Korea. It is worth stressing here that my planning, data 
collection and data analysis did not occur in a linear fashion. I was 
constantly refining ideas, exploring new areas during the time in which I was 
travelling regularly between the UK, Singapore and Cambodia. As 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539) has stated:  
“Overlapping data analysis with data collection not only gives 
the researcher a head start in analysis but, more importantly, 
allows researchers to take advantage of flexible data 
collection. Indeed, a key feature of theory building case 
research is the freedom to make adjustments during the data 
collection process.”   
 
4.5 Ethics and positionality  
 The research adhered to ethical standards as stipulated by the 
University of Leeds, and the research ethics committee granted me a formal 
approval. In order to adhere to these standards, I briefed the participants 
about the purpose of the research at the beginning of the interview. I 
assured participants that any information they give would be used solely for 
the purposes of my thesis and possibly academic papers to be presented at 
conferences or published in journals. Names of participants were kept 
anonymous in all outputs. I also aimed for an accurate portrayal of the 
researched community in this thesis and other publications stemming from 
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it. Participants were asked if they would like to read a copy of the thesis once 
a draft had been written. Regarding the interviews with local communities, I 
briefed my research assistant to explain to participants the topic and motives 
of the research, and if they would then agree to spare their time. My 
research assistant was briefed on research ethics, and instructed to keep 
respondents information confidential. This was a point drawn to my 
attention during the University’s ethical review process.  
It is well acknowledged that researchers’ positionality has a 
significant influence on the way in which research is conducted and the 
conclusions that are drawn (England, 1994; Rose, 1997; Valentine, 2001). 
This is even more significant when conducting research in a country 
different from where one is accustomed, especially in the global South 
(Sidaway, 1992). Although I had travelled to Cambodia several times before 
beginning this study, those trips were mainly for leisure with one short 
‘reconnaissance’ trip before commencing the PhD program. I had, however, 
previously lived and worked in Malaysia and Singapore, which I believe 
gave me some prior insight into what I might expect in Cambodia.  
During my fieldwork most of those interviewed were Cambodian, 
alongside a smaller number of Koreans, Indonesians, Europeans and other 
Southeast Asians. Being a non-Cambodian, it seemed to be easier to arrange 
meetings and gather secondary data compared with local researchers. A 
Cambodian friend appeared to face more obstructions in arranging 
meetings and obtaining information. This was especially the case when 
contacting representatives from the local and national government. My 
feeling is that non-local people are perceived as ‘safer’ because they are not 
connected in any way to national politics. Various other axes of identity may 
too contour the dynamics of interviews. Property development is generally 
thought to be a male-dominated environment, and this was confirmed in 
this research because almost all respondents were male. Gender no doubt 
influenced the flow of the interview and thus the nature of the information 
collected. Age is something that possibly worked in my favour. Due to the 
country’s history of war and instability, approximately 70% of the 
population are below 34 years (World Food Program, 2011). Most of the 
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people interviewed were of a similar age to myself and thus likely had more 
in common and were able to talk more freely. Researchers’ personality too 
may have a significant effect on the information gained from interviews 
(Moser, 2008). I tried to present a professional image through dressing 
appropriately, exchanging business cards and so on.  
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter began by discussing the relative lack of methodological 
reflection regarding relational urban research. My methodological 
inspiration comes from strategies developed in urban policy mobilities 
research, as I explore the connections through which satellite cities are 
produced in Phnom Penh, whilst remaining open to the complex nature of 
these urban networks. The second section discussed the case study approach 
adopted in this research. The two satellite cities appointed as case studies 
were chosen because they are both developed by foreign companies, they 
were the first satellite cities in Phnom Penh and therefore are at the most 
advanced stage of construction. There are other satellite cities planned but 
not yet built by local companies. The third part gave a detailed description 
of the research methods utilised and the rationale for using them. For each 
of the case studies, document analysis, key informant interviews and 
ethnography were used build up a picture of their development. Interviews 
with government officials and other relevant organisations aimed to increase 
an understanding of the challenges to urban planning in Phnom Penh. The 
data gathered through ethnography and document analysis informs the 
arguments proffered in all of the remaining chapters. The interviews with 
representatives from national and local government, as well as local 
communities, are presented in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the interviews with 
satellite city developers are introduced. The third section described the ways 
in which the data gathered was analysed. The interviews were analysed 
through standard coding techniques. The used of several research methods 
allowed triangulation in order to increase the validity of the conclusions 
made. The final part explored the issues of research ethics and researcher 
positionality. The fact that I am a young European male doing research in 
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Cambodia without doubt has an affect on the tone and flow of interviews 
and thus the insights gathered.   
 
 
 
Having situated this project within the extant literature, highlighted 
the theoretical framework, and explained the research methodology applied, 
the proceeding chapters turn to the empirical research. The next chapter 
provides a background to urban development and planning Phnom Penh.  
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5. Contemporary Phnom Penh 
 
 
 
 
 
Phnom Penh is a city that has become increasingly integrated into the global 
and regional economy in the last 15 years. Despite the rapid changes that 
this reintegration has engendered, recent urban development in Phnom 
Penh has scarcely been researched. Besides the general literature (for 
example Igout, 1993; Osborne, 2008), there is a relative scarcity of academic 
research on the subject. Gavin Shatkin’s (2008) work on Phnom Penh’s 
international connections in the late 1990s is a valuable but now somewhat 
dated exception, while Simone (2008) has provided a more recent account of 
the everyday lives of low income residents in the city. Simon Springer too 
touches upon the subject in his critical research on urban beautification 
policies and land rights (Springer, forthcoming).  
The majority of urban research on Phnom Penh tends to focus on 
the subject of urban poor communities, land tenure issues and forced 
evictions (for example Khemro & Payne, 2004; Payne, 2005). Although this 
is a very important issue (as I will cover in section 5.3), forced evictions are 
not occurring in all cases of new development. Less attention has been paid 
to the new urban developments in Phnom Penh, their international 
connections, and the role of local actors (although Fauveaud, 2011; and 
Paling, forthcoming begin to investigate this subject). Outside of Anglo-
American academia, there is a body of literature in French, not surprising 
given the colonial connections between the two countries, for example the 
work of Professor Charles Goldblum, at the University of Paris VII (Blancot 
& Goldblum, 1994). In terms of locally produced knowledge, the work of 
architect and urbanist Vann Molyvann is particularly significant. Vann’s 
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book Modern Khmer Cities was published in 2005 (Vann, 2005), and another 
monograph based on his recently completed doctorate is forthcoming.  
In the last four decades, Phnom Penh has experienced an extremely 
turbulent history. During the Khmer Rouge regime, the city was almost 
entirely depopulated, the notion of private property abolished, and all land 
and property ownership records destroyed. The aftermath of this turmoil is 
still felt today. When people began to return to the city in 1979 they took 
any property that was vacant, often never obtaining legal land titles, and this 
is causing numerous conflicts now that the price of land is increasing. The 
infrastructure of the city had to be rebuilt after years of neglect, and the 
government – weakened after decades of political upheaval – struggles to 
manage the city’s problems. This has been exacerbated as the city has seen 
unprecedented changes as it has become gradually more globalised.     
The objective of this chapter is to present a contextual understanding 
of Phnom Penh in order to give a foundation for the forthcoming chapters. 
Given the relative lack of research on Phnom Penh, as identified above, the 
information for this chapter is mostly gathered from secondary data 
(newspaper articles and other documents and reports) as well as my own 
primary fieldwork. The first part provides a background of Phnom Penh’s 
development from pre-colonial times up until the early 2000s. The second 
section is focused on the contemporary era, which I delineate here as from 
around 2003 onwards. It was at this time that the city began to develop 
rapidly as political stability led to an increase in both domestic and foreign 
investment. In particular, section 5.2 discusses the changing political 
economy of Cambodia and how this led to the development of a real estate 
market in the city. The third section relates the political and economic 
situation to changes in the urban landscape. The fourth section looks at 
some of the negative aspects of Phnom Penh’s urban development, in 
particular the policy of slum clearance and the somewhat precarious 
position of the urban poor. The final part of the chapter outlines the 
institutions responsible for urban planning and their respective roles, and 
details the formal legal and policy framework for urban planning at the 
national and municipal scales.  
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5.1 Historical background 
Phnom Penh was founded as the trading centre and capital of the 
Cambodian kingdom in 1432 after the fall of the Khmer Empire to the 
Thais. When Thailand captured the territory in the north of present day 
Cambodia, the capital was moved from Angkor Thom further south to 
Phnom Penh (Chandler, 1996). During the period between the fall of the 
Khmer Empire and the establishment of a French colony (1431-1863), 
Cambodia experienced a decline in wealth and constant territorial loss from 
its more powerful neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. Although it was the 
most important commercial centre, Phnom Penh was the capital city only 
intermittently during this period, as the various ruling kings established royal 
capitals in other areas of the country (for example, in Pursat province and 
Oudong). Phnom Penh’s permanent establishment as the capital of 
Cambodia occurred in 1866. The reasons for the move were both due to the 
distance from Thailand as well as commercial motives.  
The French negotiated taking over Cambodia with King Norodom 
because the king was tired of interference from Thailand and attracted by 
the security of French involvement. A treaty was signed between the French 
and Norodom in August 1863, which offered protection for the king in 
return for mineral and timber concessions to France (Chandler, 2008). In 
the French strategy Saigon would be the ‘French Hong Kong’, with the 
Mekong River providing a route through Cambodia into China. Over time, 
the French took an ever-tighter control of Cambodian politics and life. This 
included a new Article signed in 1884 that permitted the French to reform 
judicial, administrative and financial systems in order to make their 
protectorate more successful.  
In 1863 the city remained very small and had approximately 10,000 
residents. It was a cosmopolitan city with Chinese, Vietnamese, Thais, 
Laotians, Malays, and Indians involved in various economic and trading 
activities. The city more or less consisted of a single four-kilometre road 
along the river lined with Chinese shophouses. The French colonial period 
saw French planning principles being initiated and a period of modern and 
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rational planning in Phnom Penh. The French founded the Municipality of 
Phnom Penh in 1884, which implemented town planning policies for the 
first time (Igout, 1993). It was also the end of a Royal monopoly on 
property, with the French Protectorate designating public and private land 
and controlling the buying, selling and renting of property. The French 
introduced Beaux Arts planning ideas that included dividing the city into 
quartiers by function and ethnicity, creating wide boulevards and a grid plan 
system, and building municipal and commercial buildings such as the main 
railway station and the Central Market (psar thmei) (Chapman, 2002). At this 
time, there was also a considerable influence from Chinese merchants with 
the creation of a land market for shophouses (Willmott, 1970). Around the 
turn of the 20th century, as many as 22,000 of Phnom Penh’s total 
population of 50,000 were of Chinese descent (Igout, 1993).  
The transformation of Phnom Penh continued in the twentieth 
century (Map 5.1). The city gradually expanded outwards to the west by 
filling in lakes and building a series of concentric, semi-circular dykes (Vann, 
2005). This was part of the earliest masterplan of the city devised by Ernest 
Hébrard, the first head of the Indochina Urbanisation Directorate. 
Hébrard’s 1925 plan divided the city into distinct districts, proposed a road 
network, tree-planting along main boulevards and the strict alignment of 
buildings in relation to roads (Map 5.2) (Grant Ross & D L Collins, 2006). 
Urban planning was very much an imported colonial activity, and according 
to Grant-Ross and Collins (2006), there was no indigenous concept of urban 
planning at that particular time. They described the Cambodian town as a 
“loosely organised and spontaneous system of wats (temples), waterways and 
houses” (Grant Ross & D L Collins, 2006, p. 130). However, it is a little 
known fact that Angkor Wat and the surrounding temples near the present 
city of Siem Reap were once at the centre of the world’s largest pre-
industrial city, which had a sophisticated urban planning system (Marks, 
2007). During the Khmer Empire (between the 8th and 14th centuries), it is 
estimated that the city sprawled over a thousand square kilometres (similar 
to Greater London today), was home to a million people, and was ‘hydraulic 
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city’ founded upon a complex water management network (D Evans et al., 
2007).  
Cambodia became independent from France on the 9th November 
1953. Following independence, Cambodia was headed by King Sihanouk, 
who led the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (People’s Socialist Community) political 
movement. After independence, the population of Phnom Penh grew 
rapidly from 360,000 in 1950 to 760,000 in 1970. During the 1960s, the 
newly independent government embarked on large-scale public works and 
planning projects. These works were primarily domestically funded by the 
state, but also through foreign grants by countries keen to influence a 
strategically located, non-aligned country like Cambodia (Grant Ross & D L 
Collins, 2006). New buildings were completed in an architectural style 
known as New Khmer Architecture, with an emphasis on developing a fresh 
architectural identity (Vann, 2005). New Khmer Architecture blended 
modernist architectural ideas with features adapted to Cambodia’s culture 
and climate, such as steep roofs, ventilation and shading. This style was used 
to construct new buildings representative of a young state, such as 
universities, ministries, and a National Sports Complex.  
Emphasis was also put on housing projects. King Sihanouk ordered 
the governor of Phnom Penh to remedy the housing shortage caused by 
rapid population growth and in-migration. This was achieved by building 
housing suitable for rental and sale to low-income groups (Gleeson, 2009). 
The most emblematic development of this kind was the Tonle Bassac 
neighbourhood, which consisted of community facilities and affordable 
medium rise apartment blocks. During the 1960s, Phnom Penh was widely 
reported to be one of the most attractive Southeast Asian cities. After a state 
visit, the then Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, remarked that 
he found the urban design and architecture in Phnom Penh very attractive 
and was impressed at how the urban landscape was used as a tool for nation 
building (K Y Lee, 1967).         
In 1970, Sihanouk was ousted in a coup d’état by General Lon Nol, 
who established the Khmer Republic (Chandler, 1996). The Khmer 
Republic was a military-led government fully aligned with the United States 
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against communist North Vietnam. During this time, urban planning in 
Phnom Penh stagnated. The government was more concerned about US 
bombing of the city’s periphery as the communist forces closed in on the 
capital. The population swelled to over one million due to high numbers of 
refugees migrating in from rural areas in an attempt to escape the fighting. 
Some of these new residents lived in ‘refugee villages’, but these could only 
hold a small proportion of the incomers. Others built houses spontaneously 
on squatted land out of wood, straw and corrugated metal (Igout, 1993).   
The Republican government proved weak, and in 1975 the 
communist Khmer Rouge took power. Their reign in Cambodia involved 
creating an agrarian utopia, abolishing markets, private ownership and 
money. The city of Phnom Penh was almost entirely emptied and people 
were sent to the countryside to work in agricultural cooperatives. Those who 
were considered intelligentsia, non-Khmer race, or caught criticising the 
regime were killed, and many more died of starvation and exhaustion. As 
many as two million people – one in four of the population – died during the 
four-years of Democratic Kampuchea (Kiernan, 2004). Estimates suggest 
that the city was home to only a few thousand residents during this time. 
Figure 5.1 displays the population of Phnom Penh from 1950 until 2008.  
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Figure 5.1 Population of Phnom Penh, 1950 – 2008  
(Source: phnompenh.gov.kh) 
 
 
The Khmer Rouge were toppled in 1979 by the Kampuchean 
United Front for National Salvation, with the backing of Vietnam. People 
flooded back to Phnom Penh from the provinces. These people consisted of 
former residents, who attempted to return to their previous homes and 
former rural residents who came to seek refuge in the city. New rural 
migrants often took any property that was available. The government gave 
people the right to occupy the properties where they were staying in, and it 
was permitted to buy and sell these properties on the emerging market. The 
city was very chaotic at this time, due to the fact that many of the new 
residents had not lived in a city before, and the infrastructure had 
completely broken down under the Khmer Rouge (Gottesman, 2003). 
During the 1980s, Soviet aid was crucial in rebuilding the city’s 
infrastructure. Urban business and profit generating activities were boosted 
with the decision to give greater economic freedom to the Chinese 
community who had connections with China and the regional diaspora 
(Gottesman, 2003).          
There was a gradual transition from radical communism to 
moderate socialism throughout the 1980s. The Khmer People’s 
Revolutionary Party (KPRP) devised an economic model that had three 
parts: a state, collective and family economy. This permitted a limited 
degree of private ownership, and was increased in 1985 with the 
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introduction of a private sector, and in 1989 with the creation of a sector 
consisting of state-private partnerships. The 1989 reforms included a change 
in land tenure policy, enhancement of tax policies and the removal of state 
subsidies for production through privatization (Hughes, 2003). The KPRP’s 
first five-year plan (1986-1990) encouraged further liberalization, and 
included the rebuilding of agriculture and the transportation infrastructure, 
and the creation of new industries (Guo, 2006). 
In the late 1980s Cambodia embarked on a transition from war to 
peace, from authoritarian rule to a ‘hybrid’ democratic system, and from a 
state-planned economy to a free-market one (Un, 2005). There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly, the failure of communism in terms of 
economic development and wealth generation during the Democratic 
Kampuchea period left few other options than to move towards a different 
economic model (Hughes, 2003). The government believed that the private 
sector would be much better at achieving economic development, since the 
state did not have enough money (Ear, 1997). A second factor was down to 
external influences. Cambodia was heavily dependent on aid from the 
Soviet bloc, accounting for 80% of the governments’ budget (Guo, 2006). 
When this aid ended in 1991 with the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
establishment of a new economic model was critical. The richer and more 
stable Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries such as 
neighbouring Thailand at this time made it their business to put forward 
their ambitions for a regionally integrated post-Cold War community 
(Hughes, 2003). Cambodia was also influenced by Vietnam’s doi moi – 
literally meaning ‘renewal’, the term for Vietnam’s reform policy coined in 
1986, which led Vietnam in the direction of a socialist-oriented market 
economy (Boothroyd & Pham, 2000). Thirdly, party officials began to lose 
interest in promoting a communist ideology. Those in government were 
allowed to supplement their incomes through activities in the private sector, 
so in effect they had good reason to support economic liberalisation 
(Gottesman, 2003).  
The Paris Peace Accords on a ‘comprehensive political settlement of 
the Cambodia conflict’ in 1991 paved the way for the creation of a liberal 
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democracy and periodic elections. The accords were negotiated amongst the 
various Cambodian and international parties, including communist 
Indochina, ASEAN and other influential Asia-Pacific and Western powers. 
Included in the agreement were guidelines on avoiding interference in 
Cambodian internal affairs, respect for human rights and freedoms, 
protection from the unlawful deprivation of private property and freedom 
from discrimination (Hughes, 2003). Although the declaration stated that a 
development strategy should not be imposed on Cambodia, it was stipulated 
that the private sector should be encouraged. There was no military 
intervention, but “a project was underway to bring Cambodia into line with 
liberal internationalist and free market principles” (Hughes, 2003, p. 96).    
The UN was given the task of administering the implementation of 
the Accords, through the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC). The UNTAC mission of 22,000 military and civilian 
personnel entered Cambodia in March 1992 and was present for 18 
months. During this time the UN provided 50% of the government budget, 
which was needed with the demise of Soviet Union aid. The authority was 
tasked with the running of key ministries, such as foreign affairs, national 
defence and finance, as well as the disarmament of forces and the organising 
of fair elections that would in turn lead to the formation of a democratic 
constitution.  
With the exit of UNTAC in September 1993 and a coalition 
government between FUNCINPEC (French acronym for United National 
Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) 
and CPP in place, attempts were made at formulating a new legal 
framework and increasing national revenue. One strand of this was a new 
investment law ratified in August 1994, which sought to increase the 
country’s attractiveness to foreign investors through a low tax rate (9%), 
corporate tax exemption of up to eight years, and exemptions for dividends 
and proceeds (Um, 1994).   
The political instability of 1997, when CPP leader Hun Sen ousted 
his coalition partner FUNCINPEC leader Prince Norodom Ranariddh, hit 
the economy hard. Economic growth was negative in the second half of the 
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year and flat for the year as a whole (Peou, 1998). Another round of 
elections were held in 1998, the outcome being a second coalition between 
the CPP and FUNCINPEC, and at this time inward investment increased 
by 33% on the previous year due to the 117 foreign investment projects 
worth $800 million being approved by the Council for the Development of 
Cambodia (CDC) (Peou, 1999). In the mid-1990s ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations) countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand and 
Singapore, were Cambodia’s major trading partners (Moller, 1998).  
Despite the gradual development of a market economy during the 
1990s, the city of Phnom Penh remained scarred by the troubles of the 
1970s and 1980s. The focus of the municipal government was on the 
renovation of main streets and the installation of street lighting. Public 
spaces were considered dangerous by city dwellers and a curfew was 
practiced until 1992, later reintroduced in 1998 following bouts of political 
violence. Many rural dwellers were attracted to the city because of the 
higher salaries and employment opportunities, and driven from rural 
provinces due to insecurity and the continuing Khmer Rouge insurgency (M 
Marshall, 2006). Much of this demand for service sector work was due to the 
presence of the UNTAC. The UN required many low-skilled local workers 
such as drivers. The arrival of thousands of well-paid international 
expatriates also created demand for other services, such as bars and 
restaurants. Because many of the existing houses were already occupied, 
new migrants and those returning from refugee camps on the border with 
Thailand built houses on any free land they could find. This included along 
canals, railways and around the capital’s many lakes.   
Phnom Penh remains without any form of public transport. For 
those without their own car or motorbike, moto-taxis and tuk tuks (in 
Cambodia these are a motorbike with a trailer seating four or five adults) are 
to be found on almost every street corner. A bus system was trialled in the 
city with support from JICA in 2001, but was discontinued due to lack of 
custom. However, there may soon be public transport in the city. In 2011, 
the MPP released a tender to attract bids from private companies to run a 
city bus service, although at the time of writing the results are unannounced. 
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In addition, French transportation engineering company SYSTRA is 
working with the MPP to undertake a feasibility study for a tram network. 
An updated urban transport masterplan for the capital is in the process of 
development by JICA.    
 
5.2 Contemporary Phnom Penh: the real estate boom 
Phnom Penh remains relatively small compared to most Southeast 
Asian capital cities. According to the 2008 census, Phnom Penh’s population 
is officially 1.3 million people (National Institute of Statistics, 2008), 
although unofficial estimates regularly place the figure at nearer to two 
million people. Furthermore, it is estimated that there are an additional 
quarter of a million people who commute to the capital daily from towns 
such as Kampong Speu and Ta Khmau in Kandal province (Chhay & 
Huybrechts, 2009). The total administrative area of the Municipality of 
Phnom Penh is 517 square kilometres. In 2011 the outer districts remained 
predominately rural with much potential for urbanisation: the average 
population density of the four inner khan (the Cambodian term for a district) 
was 25,300 people per square kilometre, whereas the average population 
density of the peri-urban khan was 1,800 people per square kilometre (MPP, 
2011a).  
The city is by far the largest in Cambodia, with a population at least 
eight to ten times that of the second largest city of Battambang. However, 
other cities have actually seen more rapid growth over the last decade 
because of their intensified global-local connections: Siem Reap because of 
the growth of tourism and Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville) because of its 
position as Cambodia’s major deep sea port and the related export-oriented 
industries that are attracted there. Tourism is becoming a major industry in 
Kampong Saom and is likely to increase greatly in the future, especially 
since the airport has opened in 2011. Towns on the border with Thailand 
and Vietnam, such as Poi Pet, have also encountered rapid growth because 
of increasing cross-border trade. Established urban centres from pre-colonial 
and colonial times such as Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang and 
Kratie are shrinking because of out-migration (ADB, 2010).  
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 The contemporary economy of Cambodia is dominated by four 
main sectors. Garment manufacturing accounted for the largest proportion 
of economic growth between 1998 and 2006, at 28%, while tourism 
contributed a further 13%. The construction and real estate industry, which 
grew rapidly in the 2000s as is discussed in this section, represented 13% of 
economic growth (Ear, 2008). Agriculture, particularly rice growing, is the 
other major economic sector. Despite the development of industries, the 
government remains reliant on foreign aid. Aid to Cambodia accounts for 
approximately 65% of total government expenditure in health, agriculture 
and transport, and almost 90% of the rural development budget (Ear, 2007). 
Aid has increased year on year, and in 2010, aid pledges had reached $1.1 
billion (Sokha, 2010). China is the largest aid donor, formally pledging aid of 
$257 million in 2008 (Burgos & Ear, 2010). In comparison, the USA 
pledged $57 million and Japan $113 million. Remittances from Cambodian 
migrants overseas (particularly in Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Australia and USA) accounted for between $300 million and $600 million in 
2006 (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2010).   
The development of satellite cities is set in the context of Cambodia’s 
political economy and changing position in networks of global capital 
accumulation. A real estate market emerged as the economy transitioned 
from a socialist to a market-oriented economy in the years after 1989. At the 
same time, the large influx of well-paid foreigners arriving as part of the 
UNTAC peacekeeping force looking for high-end villa accommodation 
created a demand for rental housing in the Boeung Keng Kang area of the 
city. However, there were only small investments in urban development, 
thus there was little pressure on land and prices remained mostly very low.  
The real estate market took off significantly after 1998, and grew 
even faster between 2004 and the peak in 2008. The price of land in central 
Phnom Penh increased exponentially between 2004 and 2007, from around 
US$250 to US$2000 per square meter in some key locations (GTZ, 2009). 
This was due to a combination of interrelated factors. The overarching 
reason is that during the late 1990s and early 2000s, Cambodia became 
relatively peaceful and politically stable for the first time in almost three 
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decades. An iconic moment was when Ieng Sary, governor of the former 
Khmer Rouge stronghold of Pailin, defected to the government in 1996 
along with thousands of guerrilla soldiers. This marked the final demise of 
the communist forces, all of which had defected within three years. 
However, internal violence continued in 1998 with the coup d’état by the 
CPP against FUNCINPEC. The next election in July 2003 resulted in a 
political stalemate for 11 months, as a new government could not be agreed 
upon between the opposing parties (McCargo, 2005). After the formation of 
a government in 2004, the economy grew rapidly. Between 2004 and 2008, 
Cambodia reported an average GDP growth rate of 11% (Slocomb, 2010). 
The country was granted considerable international legitimacy by joining 
ASEAN in 1999 and becoming a member of the World Trade Organisation 
in 2004. During this time, foreign money began flowing in to Cambodia, 
wealthy Cambodians began to repatriate their funds stored overseas and 
also invest their liquid cash savings.  
The government gives considerable energy to promoting Cambodia 
as a destination for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The Council for the 
Development of Cambodia was set up in 1994 as a ‘one stop shop’ for 
investors wishing to get approval to operate. Cambodia, in fact, has one of 
the most open economies in Southeast Asia. Companies can be fully foreign 
owned in almost all sectors, there is a low corporate tax rate, and profits can 
be freely repatriated. Nonetheless, issues of corruption, unnecessary 
bureaucracy, lack of intellectual property rights law and high electricity costs 
commonly crop up as factors discouraging potential investors (World Bank, 
2004). According to recent data from the Korean Trade-Investment 
Promotion Agency (KOTRA), China is the largest source of FDI to 
Cambodia, with investments worth US$893 million in 2009, although 
Korea was the largest foreign investor in Cambodia in 2006 and 2008, with 
figures of US$1.009 billion and US$1.237 billion respectively (see Table 5.1) 
(KOTRA, 2010). Between 2000 and 2006, foreign investment increased 
tenfold from $270 million to $2.63 billion (Hughes, 2009). Figure 5.2 and 
Table 5.1 highlights the trend of increasing FDI into Cambodia over the last 
decade.  
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Figure 5.2 Total FDI to Cambodia (US$ million)  
(Source: CDC) 
 
 
Table 5.1 Foreign investment in Cambodia by country (US$ million)  
(Source: CDC) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20107 
Malaysia 5 33 26 28 241 3 7 152 
China 34 83 452 717 180 4,371 893 675 
Korea 2 6 56 1,009 148 1,237 121 36 
Japan 0 2 0 2 113 8 5 0 
Taiwan 1 14 10 48 35 21 27 53 
Thailand 7 1 81 100 108 74 178 2 
Hong Kong 6 0 1 4 26 0 7 22 
Singapore 4 5 2 12 2 52 272 19 
Vietnam 0 0 0 31 156 21 210 114 
USA 0 2 4 62 3 672 1 35 
UK 0 2 6 4 26 6 0 8 
Others 7 6 44 317 307 491 385 86 
Total 66 154 682 2,334 1,345 6,956 2,106 1,202 
  
In terms of real estate and urban development capital, South Korea is 
the leading investor, the reasons for which will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Real estate and construction accounted for 71% of the total South Korean 
investment during 2010 (KOTRA, 2010). During the mid-2000s Cambodia 
                                                
7 Data up to August 2010. 
0  
100  
200  
300  
400  
500  
600  
700  
800  
900  
1,000  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
FD
I 
($
 m
ill
io
n)
 
Year 
105 
 
 
began to be known as an ‘emerging market’ within property investment 
circles. This was down to the potential for large profits to be made. 
Cambodia was termed “the next big thing in Southeast Asia” (Property 
Report Asia, 2010), and “an Asian mouse … ready to roar” (Kinetz, 2007).  
As well as foreign investment, local capital has a played key role in 
reshaping the urban landscape. For similar reasons to foreign investors, 
many wealthy Cambodians too decided to invest their money in real estate 
in and around Phnom Penh in the mid-2000s. Because of the history of 
political and economic instability, many Cambodians deposited their money 
in overseas bank accounts, later deciding to repatriate it (Shaw & Chan, 
2005). Yet the perception of an unreliable banking system lingers, thus 
making buying land and property seem the most secure and productive 
method of investment. It is also more than likely that many people do not 
put their money in bank accounts in order to conceal their wealth. There 
were also few other investment opportunities given the undeveloped state of 
the economy and lack of a domestic market during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Much of the manufacturing is controlled by Taiwanese, Chinese and 
Koreans with considerably more experience in that sector, and is for the 
most part export-oriented rather than producing goods for the domestic 
market. The ruling elites are not generally using their money in productive 
ventures, often in land speculation. Business ventures that have some 
potential to generate jobs and benefits for the wider population are normally 
done in collaboration with a foreign partner (Cock, 2010).  
Local companies have been involved in some of Phnom Penh's 
‘flagship’ projects such as Canadia Tower and the Koh Pich Diamond 
Island development. However, the developer behind these projects, 
Overseas Cambodian Investment Corporation (OCIC), is a mainly a vehicle 
for bringing in Chinese investment (Export Promotion Department, 
Ministry of Commerce, 2008). According to a promotional piece in the 
China Daily newspaper, most Chinese investors in Cambodia are clients of 
Canadia Bank (Kan, 2008). The bank openly states that it is willing to lend 
to investors who wish to develop land that is occupied by squatters: 
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“Developers and middlemen need funds to purchase the land, 
negotiating financial agreement and relocation with the 
squatters and then develop the area. Canadia was the first 
and only bank to lend to developers who had to deal with this 
unique situation, in spite of it being a high-risk step” (Kan, 
2008). 
 
Equally importantly, smaller local companies have built a large 
amount of housing units and commercial space, particularly in suburban 
areas (see Chapter 6). From my field observations, it was clear that local 
developers tend to focus on housing which is affordable to the majority of 
middle and lower-middle class people. Their housing projects were not 
affected by the global financial crisis so badly, as the demand remained 
strong and buyers generally pay in cash up front, avoiding the need for bank 
loans.  
In terms of commercial and office development, market research has 
suggested that there is a definite demand (CBRE, 2010). Many organisations 
are located in converted villas and apartments that are unsuitable for the 
demands of modern business. Developers therefore realise that there is a 
market for quality office space if the price is at the right level. Additionally, 
as Cambodia's economy grows and the number of consumers increases, 
global and regional companies are beginning to establish branch offices in 
Cambodia. On the supply side, it is predicted that by 2013 there will be 
200,000 square meters of office space, approximately double the figure from 
2010 (CBRE, 2010).  
In 2008 the global economic crisis began to impact Cambodia’s 
urban development. Real estate prices fell, economic growth declined, and 
banks began to restrict loans for developers and customers as global capital 
markets slowed down. The value of approved building projects peaked at 
$3.2 billion in 2008, falling a third during 2009, and dropping down to 2005 
levels of $840 million in 2010 (Soeun, 2011a). As Figure 5.3 highlights, the 
total surface area of construction permits approved grew rapidly from 2003 
until a decline in 2008. In 2010, there were no large construction projects 
107 
 
 
such as skyscrapers, which explains the decrease in value. The number of 
approved projects remained relatively stable, however, at 2149 projects in 
2010 compared to 2230 projects in the previous year. The slowdown 
primarily affected projects financed by foreign investors, as in 2010 all 
investments in construction projects were made by domestic investors 
(Soeun, 2011a).  
 
Figure 5.3 Total surface area of construction permits approved in Phnom 
Penh, 1998-2008 
(Source: Data obtained from Bureau of Urban Affairs (BAU), MPP) 
 
 
 
Many of the projects announced in the boom period were either cancelled 
(for example, the International Financial Centre by GS E+C), put on hold 
(POSCO E+C’s Star River condominiums) or paused mid-way through 
construction (Gold Tower 42). All of these three were South Korean 
developments. South Korean projects were hit the hardest because they 
purchased land at the height of the boom, thus resulting in prices for 
finished developments that were too high for the market (Galliano, 2008). 
Financing from Korean banks also began to diminish. Some local real estate 
experts saw the crisis as a corrective measure, as it is likely that if all the 
projects proposed during the late 2000s had come on to the market, there 
would have been a huge problem of oversupply (interview 8, country 
manager, international real estate agency).  
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In a bid to boost the property market, in 2010 the government 
passed a law that permitted foreigners to own property in Cambodia. This 
was limited to units above the first floor in co-owned condominium 
developments not within 30 kilometres of the country’s borders (Phnom 
Penh Post, 2011a). There is a limit that only up to 70% of the total units in a 
development can be sold to foreign nationals (Phnom Penh Post, 2010). 
Within the first year of the new law, the Ministry of Land Management, 
Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) reported that foreigners had 
purchased 83 units in De Castle Tuol Kork, 35 in De Castle Diamond, 38 in 
Camko City and 46 in Mekong View Apartments (Phnom Penh Post, 
2011a). In 2011 the market had begun to rebound, with government 
statistics stating that construction approvals in the first four months of 2011 
were worth US$482 million, compared to $184 million of projects in the 
corresponding period a year earlier (Phnom Penh Post, 2011b).         
Land speculation has become commonplace and is encouraged by 
the lack of system for taxing unused land (Thiel, 2010a). Inequality in land 
ownership has risen sharply since 1989. In 2008 the wealthiest one per cent 
of the population had ownership of an estimated 30% of Cambodia’s land, 
while the top tenth owned 64% (United Nations Capital Development Fund 
(UNCDF), 2010). At the same time, a quarter of households were declared 
landless (Bridges Across Borders Cambodia, 2010), while 40% owned less 
than 0.5 hectares (GTZ, 2009 in Heder, 2011). As part of the transition 
from a planned to a free market economy, private property rights were 
reinstated and there were no limits on the ownership of land and property. 
The 1992 land law stated that all land belonged to the state, but people had 
the right of possession (Russell, 1997). A second land law was passed in 2001 
that classified land into three categories: state property, private property and 
collective property (MLMUPC, 2002). State property is further divided into 
state public property and state private property. State public property is that 
which belongs to the state and is available for public use (e.g., forests and 
lakes) or is a public service (e.g., schools and hospitals). State public land 
accounts for 80% of Cambodia’s land area, although most of this figure 
consists of the Tonle Sap lake and remote forest areas (World Food 
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Program, 2012). This land should not be sold to people or companies, but 
can be leased for up to 15 years as long as the land use remains a public 
function. In reality, however, during the transition period in the 1990s, 
many state properties were sold and relocated to cheaper areas, and the 
remaining money pocketed (Sik, 2000). 
State private property can be leased and sold by the state to a private 
individual or company through the use of a Sub-Decree (Thiel, 2010b) (see 
Chapter 7). This mechanism is used for developments planned on land 
previously owned by the state, for example the Boeung Kak project. Land 
designated as private property can be used or transferred by the owner 
freely, as long as it is within the law. It is possible for the state to expropriate 
private property if the designated change is in the public interest, although 
adequate compensation must be given to the landowner and access to 
alternative land or housing provided. In many cases, private land is legally 
possessed, but owners do not have an official title. In this situation, they still 
have rights to that land and it is possible to transfer possession into legal 
ownership. Collective property is owned by a community rather than an 
individual, and is either monastery property or indigenous community 
property.   
People who settled on land prior to August 30th 2001 (the date the 
new law was passed) in theory have the legal right to stay and live on the 
land they are occupying so long as it is not already private property, state 
public property or collective property. They must meet the additional 
conditions that possession must have been continuous and gained peacefully 
and honestly. Those who have possession rights can apply for ownership 
rights and a land title. A land title officially proves land ownership and gives 
the owner more rights to compensation if the government wishes to take 
his/her land (Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions, 2009). The process 
of legally designating property rights is being administered under the Land 
Management and Administration Program (LMAP), which started in 2002 
with international aid from the World Bank and other foreign governments 
(Bridges Across Borders Southeast Asia, 2009). However, Springer 
(forthcoming) argues that the legal system for governing land is in 
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disagreement with local conceptions of ‘possession’, which rest upon ideas of 
community consensus, ‘acquisition by the plough’, and in the case of the 
minority hill tribes, semi-nomadic lifestyles. Thus, the concept of private 
property rights and land titles are only vaguely understood, leaving people 
open to exploitation by powerful investors and speculators.           
Land in rural areas has been leased to private companies through 
the mechanism of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs). ELCs are supposed 
to be a maximum of 10,000 hectares, and are granted on 99 year leases. By 
2010, Economic Land Concessions (ELC) totalling 1.4 million hectares were 
granted, which represents 19% of land suitable for agriculture (Thiel, 
2010b). Approximately one third of the total land designated as an ELC was 
granted to foreign companies. Many of the local companies awarded 
concessions are politically well-connected. These companies include LYP 
Group, Pheapimex, and Mong Reththy, all owned by CPP senators or those 
with close connections with high-ranking politicians. However, it is rare that 
a piece of land awarded as a concession is not used in some way by other 
people, and land conflicts are occurring with alarming frequency. Often, 
people in rural areas have possession rights but not a formal land title, and 
thus have little say against powerful local and global companies who have 
been awarded a concession that encompasses the land they live and farm on. 
State land delineation is also unclear in some cases (Sar, 2002).  
    
5.3 New urban forms  
The result of increasing domestic investment and the opening of the 
economy to foreign capital has been a profound spatial restructuring of the 
city. This can be seen in both the development of peri-urban areas and the 
city centre. The built-up area of Phnom Penh has expanded rapidly in the 
last decade, and now extends 20-30 km from the historic central point at 
Wat Phnom. Land that has previously used for rice farming has been bought 
for the development of a number of urban forms including industrial and 
residential land uses. As the city expands, there are considerable challenges 
to effective spatial planning, as is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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In terms of population growth, the outer khan all experienced huge 
growth in the decade from 1998, as highlighted in Table 5.2. Dangkor 
almost trebled in population size, while Meanchey more than doubled. 
Meanwhile, all of the central districts except Tuol Kork saw a small decline 
in population. In-migration has occurred in two waves. In the early 1990s 
migrants to Phnom Penh arrived from the refugee camps, and more 
recently, labour migrants on a permanent and seasonal basis are moving to 
the city looking for opportunities to make a living. They generally work in 
garment factories, restaurants, and on construction sites (CDRI, 2007a).  
 
Table 5.2 Population change by district8, 1998-2008 
(Source: Municipality of Phnom Penh, 2011) 
 
Khan 
(District) 
Population 
(1998) 
Population 
(2008) 
% 
change 
In
ne
r 
Chamkarmorn 187,082 182,004 -3 
Daun Penh 131,913 126,550 -4 
Prampi Makara 96,192 91,895 -4 
Tuol Kork 154,968 171,200 +10 
O
ut
er
 Dangkor/ Por Senchey 92,461 257,724 +179 
Meanchey 157,112 327,801 +109 
Russei Keo/ Sensok 180,076 344,551 +91 
 
As the former rice fields around Phnom Penh have been sold for 
development, the government has expanded the boundary of the 
municipality to encompass districts of Kandal province, in order to improve 
future urban planning (O’Toole, 2010). Land prices in peri-urban areas 
peaked in 2006-2008 at approximately $200-250 per square metre, while in 
2011 the price had fallen to around half that figure (Phnom Penh Post, 
2011c). Although this is still a big increase from a decade ago when land 
values were just a few dollars per square meter. The drivers of peri-
urbanisation in Phnom Penh are clearly not dissimilar from other primary 
cities in the East Asian region: abundant land, unclear and weak spatial 
                                                
8 Por Senchey district was created in 2012 from land formerly under Dangkor 
jurisdiction; Sensok district was created in 2009 from land formerly under Russei 
Keo jurisdiction. 
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planning policies, and lower land prices (Hudalah et al., 2007; D Webster, 
2002).  
 Peri-urban development in Phnom Penh encompasses a number of 
urban forms. Firstly, peri-urban areas are the location for FDI in 
manufacturing, especially those producing garments and footwear. Garment 
manufacturing accounted for 16% of national GDP in 2007 (World Bank, 
2009), and around a third of Phnom Penh’s economic output (ADB, 2006). 
The majority of factories are situated in the south west of the city along the 
road to Kampong Saom deep-sea port, but close enough to Phnom Penh to 
draw on the concentration of related business services. In 2010 there were 
236 garment factories (J J Lee, 2011), employing approximately 320,000 
(largely female) workers (People’s Daily, 2010). Although many workers 
commute from nearby rural villages, for migrant workers from further afield 
there has been a growth in cheap rental accommodation surrounding the 
factories (Derks, 2008). A Special Economic Zone has also been established, 
and hosts a variety of factories for food production and motorbike assembly, 
among others. The periphery of the city now resembles a typical desakota 
situation, where globally oriented manufacturing is interspersed with 
agricultural rice-growing land (McGee, 1991) (Image 5.1). More 
manufacturing is likely in the future as the sector diversifies from garment 
manufacturing. Several types of large-scale residential development are also 
apparent. These include gated communities, shophouse developments, land 
sub-division projects, and satellite cities. These will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter (Chapter 6).  
 
There have been significant changes too in the urban fabric of the 
central city. The most prominent of these is the emergence of high-rise 
commercial and residential buildings. Whereas less than a decade ago the 
tallest building was the eight storeys Soriya shopping mall, there are 
currently at least seven buildings over 20 storeys completed or currently 
under construction (Table 5.3 and Map 5.3). Roughly half of these are 
commercial office buildings. High-rise commercial buildings are appearing 
along Monivong Boulevard, the main commercial road running north to 
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south through the city centre, particularly at the junction of Russian 
Boulevard, which is becoming an emergent central business district. For 
example, two buildings that have been completed at the time of writing are 
both commercial: Canadia Tower – Cambodia’s first skyscraper and ‘Grade 
A’ office building – built by OCIC and Phnom Penh Tower by Korean 
developer Hyundai Amco. Another, Vattanac Tower, is due to be 
completed in 2013. High-rise condominium apartments are being erected in 
popular residential districts, particularly in the districts of Tuol Kork and 
Boeung Keng Kang, and along the Bassac riverside in Chamkarmon.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.3 Major urban development projects proposed, completed, and 
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abandoned in the central city  
(Source: various, including newspapers and project websites) 
 
Project Timeframe Developer(s) Other information 
Canadia Tower 2010 OCIC 
(Cambodia) 
Cambodia’s first high-rise 
building; 32 storey office 
building with shopping 
mall. 
International 
Financial 
Centre 
Proposed in 
2007; 
cancelled 
GS Engineering 
& Construction 
(South Korea) 
$1 billion project; 1 x 52 
storey building and 5 x 
32 storey buildings; 
mixed-use with offices, 
residential, international 
school, shopping and 
leisure  
Gold Tower 42 Commenced 
2008; 
postponed 
mid-way 
Yon Woo  
(South Korea) 
$240 million project; 42 
storey luxury apartment 
building 
Star River Cancelled  Posco 
Engineering & 
Construction 
(South Korea) 
$300 million project; 1 x 
50 storey building and 2 
x 45 storey buildings 
De Castle 
Royale 
2012 (under 
construction) 
Nuri 
Development & 
Construction 
(South Korea) 
392 luxury apartments; 
32 floors 
Boeung Kak Land 
reclamation 
started in 
2008 
Shukaku Inc. 
(Cambodia) & 
Inner Mongolia 
Erdos Hongjun 
Investment 
Corp. (China) 
   
Planned to be a mixed-
use development; 133 
hectares 
Olympic 
Stadium 
Complex 
Commenced 
2011 
OCIC 
(Cambodia) 
Mixed-use development 
with hotel, shopping and 
leisure, residential 
Riviera Commenced 
2012 
OCIC 
(Cambodia) 
Apartments 
Phnom Penh 
Tower 
2011 Hyundai AMCO 
(South Korea) 
22 storey office building  
Vattanac 
Tower 
Commenced 
2008 
Vattanac 
Properties 
(Cambodia) 
39 storey building; 
shopping, office, and 
residential 
Rose 
Condominiums 
2012 (under 
construction) 
OCIC 
(Cambodia) 
$70 million project; 4 x 
29 storey apartment 
buildings 
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It is debatable whether many of these developments are suitable for 
Cambodia, both socially and environmentally. The soil in Phnom Penh is 
alluvial, making the foundations of tall buildings time-consuming and 
expensive to prepare. The high electricity demands of air-conditioning 
hermetically sealed buildings with large amounts of glazing in a tropical 
climate is very costly and energy inefficient. It is also questionable whether a 
true market exists for many of the residential projects. The prices are 
considerably higher than the vast majority of Cambodians can afford. They 
are aimed at the wealthiest one or two per cent of Cambodians, as well as 
for foreigners. City centre condominiums sell for at least $150,000 and in 
many cases considerably more. In comparison, a middle-class university 
educated Cambodian working in the private sector earns approximately 
$300-400 per month, a mid-level civil servant can earn around $150-250 
per month while 34% of the population lives under the poverty line 
(Khemro, 2006). Many properties are purchased for speculative purposes, 
which has made a few people very rich whilst pushing up prices to the point 
where housing is no longer affordable to the majority. Chapter 6 will look at 
the demand for satellite cities in more detail.    
Another problem exacerbated by the recent boom in urban 
development is flooding during the rainy season, which spans July to 
November. Phnom Penh is situated on a natural flood plain. The banks of 
the river are built high, and behind were a series of low-lying rice fields and 
lakes (boeung). The city was created by filling in the lakes and building a series 
of dykes in concentric semi-circles to protect the city from being inundated 
with water (Ly & Muan, 2001). Despite attempts to improve the situation 
through drainage improvements, the underlying problem is that many of the 
original dykes in the city centre have been turned into major roads, and 
lakes have been filled in to create land for development. In peri-urban areas, 
land that was previously rice fields, and was therefore designed to flood 
during the rainy season, has been raised using sand dredged from the 
Mekong River. This has the effect of exacerbating flooding in surrounding 
areas.  
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According to Vann Molyvann, a prominent Cambodian architect 
and urbanist who served as Minister of Town Planning in the government of 
Norodom Sihanouk during the 1950s and 1960s, urban planners in 
Cambodia should learn from ancient Khmer civilisation (Vann, 2005). This 
means respecting the hydraulic system of land management where flood 
plains were managed through a system of dikes, lakes and canals. 
Nonetheless, he argues that Phnom Penh cannot continue to expand by 
building further concentric dykes because the high public costs involved, and 
should respect the natural environment by retaining large bodies of water. 
Unfortunately his insights are not readily taken on board by the current 
government because of his political association with what is now the 
opposition party.  
 
5.4 Displacement and the urban poor 
While peri-urbanisation in Phnom Penh has been characterised 
mainly by housing developments for wealthier people and growing export-
oriented industrial activity, there has also been a marked shift in the location 
of urban poor communities from the inner to outer khan. In 2009, 72% of 
urban poor families were living in the four outer khans, while approximately 
half lived in outer khans in 1997 (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2009). Although 
a small minority of city centre communities have been improved and some 
of the growth is due to new migrants arriving from the countryside, the main 
driver of this process is the government’s strategy of resettling ‘slum’ 
inhabitants from valuable land in the city centre to peri-urban relocation 
sites 15-25 kilometres from the city centre. It is estimated by a local Non-
governmental Organisation (NGO) that 100,000 people have been displaced 
between 2000 and 2009 (Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, 2009).  
 In the centre of the city, urban poor communities are situated along 
railway lines, rivers and around lakes, and inside abandoned buildings. 
There are also many urban poor communities situated on the rooftops of the 
three or four storey apartment buildings in central areas. After 1979 people 
lived in upper floors of buildings to escape the security services. As the 
economy liberalised it was the Chinese and Vietnamese who had the 
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connections and money to move to the lower floors and open shops and 
businesses, which left the poorer Khmers inhabiting the rooftops (Simone, 
2009). Entire villages have sprung up on rooftops and these hidden 
settlements are in many cases technically illegal but supply much of the city’s 
labour (Image 5.2). This explains the high population density of 19,806 
people per square kilometre9. Although the city appears low rise, the density 
remains high as every available space is occupied and extended families 
often live in a small apartment.  
As highlighted earlier, the increase in speculative investment activity 
from countries such as South Korea and China, in addition to local actors, 
has pushed up the price of land in the city. The price of land is said to have 
increased by between 30% and 50% per year between 2002 and 2005 
(Simone, 2008). Thus, those urban poor communities located on newly 
valuable land have found themselves being evicted to make way for more 
profitable uses of the land. These have included the communities living 
around Boeung Kak and in the Tonle Bassac area. Technically, many of 
these communities would qualify for a hard land title under the 2001 land 
law, but it seems that the law has only been applied in rural areas, and is 
unsuitable for the urban context. Powerful companies working with 
government officials can thus expropriate the land by declaring that the 
previous residents are living there illegally.      
 Evicted communities generally receive a small amount of 
compensation, and the compensation is not equal for all citizens affected. It 
has been common practice to offer a small plot of land (usually 
approximately 7 by 17 metres) with a land title, plus a payment of between a 
few hundred and a few thousand dollars. It has been reported that many 
people have sold their relocation site plots and moved back to the city 
(Payne, 2005). There is no government housing agency to assist low income 
people to find housing. Local and international NGO’s working with 
affected communities have aided people to negotiate better compensation 
arrangements, arguing that compensation payments are grossly below the 
value of the land. The companies and local government have argued that 
                                                
9 Author’s calculation from MPP data (MPP, 2011a). 
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they cannot afford to pay the market price of the land. Research conducted 
by consultants Geoffrey Payne and Associates in 2003 concluded that land 
titles for people living on state public or private land should be given only 
incrementally. They argued that if land titles were given too quickly, people 
would sell their land and invade other state land in an attempt to repeat the 
process (Payne, 2005). Regularising urban poor settlements is in many cases 
much more complicated than it originally appears, given that the residents 
are usually not the original illegal occupiers, but have bought property from 
previous owners (without formal documents as proof). Furthermore, some 
residents own several properties and rent them out to others.  
As an alternative to evictions, a ‘land sharing’ project was pioneered 
in the Borei Keila community. Borei Keila means ‘sports village’ and the 
site, near to the Olympic Stadium, was originally built in the 1960s as a 
place for athletes to live. However, by the early 2000s there were over a 
thousand families living in poor conditions around the site. The land is 
owned by the Ministry of Sport and Youth and they had been trying to 
claim back the land for many years (ACHR, 2004). In 2003 the ministry 
reached an agreement with residents that they could stay on site and be 
housed in new apartment blocks. Phanimex, a local construction company, 
entered into an agreement with the government to build housing for all the 
families, in exchange for having sole rights to develop the remaining 2.6 
hectares of prime land for commercial use. What at first was hailed a 
ground-breaking move away from evictions was soon to change. In early 
2012, it became apparent that the company had not built enough housing 
and the remaining 300 families were evicted (Khouth, 2012).       
According to a legal consultant who had worked with several NGOs 
and human rights organisations, the situation for many of the urban poor 
communities was rather better prior to the boom in the real estate market 
(interview 30, freelance housing/ land rights consultant). Between 2001 and 
2003, a City Development Strategy was developed through cooperation 
between the Municipality of Phnom Penh, UN-Habitat and the Asian 
Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR). The aim was to bring together the 
various stakeholders in the urban development process in order to make 
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urban management more efficient and equitable (ACHR, 2004). Building 
upon this, in 2003 the Prime Minister announced a new policy of securing 
land tenure for urban poor communities in Phnom Penh. This was to be 
achieved through a slum upgrading policy that targeted 100 settlements per 
year for five years (UN-HABITAT, 2003). This plan followed a campaign 
by local NGOs including the Urban Fund Development Fund, as well as the 
ACHR. The planned outcomes failed to materialise in practice, because of a 
lack of administrative capacity in the government (Payne, 2005), and the 
increasing pressure from land developers. Only 20 settlements were 
upgraded in the first two years of the program. During the land market 
boom in 2006, huge forced evictions returned with the clearance of the 
Sambok Chap (more than 1,000 families) and Dey Krahorm communities 
(estimated 1,400 families) in 2009. Both these communities were located in 
the Bassac neighbourhood in the central city, where land is valued at more 
than $1,500 per square metre making it some of the most expensive in the 
city (CBRE, 2011). A recent flashpoint between the state and civil society 
was the suspension of a local NGO working with urban poor communities, 
Sahmakum Teang Tnaut, by the Ministry of Interior (MacIsaac, 2011). The 
NGO was accused of inciting people affected by a railway rehabilitation 
project in the city to oppose the project. Despite the many issues associated 
with the rapid urban development that has occurred in the last decade, there 
exists a legal and policy framework to manage urban development. The next 
section will go on to discuss this.  
 
5.5 Urban governance: formal institutional and legal context  
In Cambodia there are three levels of administration below the 
national level: the provincial level, the district level, and the commune level. 
Municipalities are equal to provinces, and Phnom Penh is the only 
municipality since Kep, Sihanoukville and Pailin municipalities were 
changed to provinces in 2008. The Municipality of Phnom Penh is 
surrounded by the province of Kandal and is divided into nine khan 
(districts), of which four are urban (Daun Penh, Prampi Makara, Chamkar 
Mon and Tuol Kork) and five currently show rural/ peri-urban 
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characteristics (Meanchey, Dangkor, Russei Keo, Sensok and Porsenchey) 
(Map 5.5). Below the district level, there are 76 sangkat (communes), which 
are further divided into 637 villages. Sangkat remain the lowest tier of 
government because villages are not defined as a legal unit in the 
constitution. The municipality is managed by a governor who is appointed 
by the national government on a five year term. The governor has 
responsibility for assigning governors for each of the eight khan. The khan 
assists the municipality on administration and urban management within 
their territory. Leaders of each of the sangkat are decided through commune 
elections, under Cambodia’s decentralisation program.   
The main department responsible for urban planning in Phnom Penh 
is the Office of Urbanization (formerly known as the Bureau des Affaires 
Urbaines, Office of Urban Affairs [BAU]). The department was originally 
created in the early 2000s with financial and technical assistance from the 
French government, although that mission has now ended. At present, the 
Office of Urbanization is tasked with advising the governor of Phnom Penh 
on general spatial planning and urban management issues, designing public 
spaces, and checking technical proposals for construction permissions. At the 
national level, the Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and 
Construction (MLMUPC) provides the overall legal framework and policy 
guidelines for urban development. The ministry is also tasked with providing 
appraisals for proposed construction projects over 3000 square metres. 
Construction projects below this size are approved at the municipal level.  
These institutions work within a legal and policy framework, as 
summarised in Table 5.4. Currently the most significant piece of urban 
planning legislation is Sub-Decree No. 86, which details the criteria 
necessary to receive a construction permit. Individual developments should 
then correspond to the overall directives at the municipality or provincial 
scale as set out in the Sub-Decree on Municipal, Provincial Town and 
Urban Urbanization. At the time of writing this law remains in draft form 
during the process of stakeholder consultation. This Sub-Decree specifies 
that municipalities should prepare both current land use plans and 
masterplans with development visions for 20 years ahead. The National 
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Policy on Spatial Planning (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2011a) 
specifies that municipalities should prepare 20-year vision masterplans and 
land use plans, to be revised every five years. This is something that is also 
mentioned in the 1994 Law on Land Management, Urban Planning and 
Constructions (Ministry of Land Management, Urban Planning and 
Construction, 1994).  
 
Table 5.4 Relevant legal and policy framework for urban planning in 
Cambodia  
(Source: various) 
Title Year Key Points 
Draft Sub-Decree 
on  
Municipal, Provincial Town 
and Urban Urbanization 
2011 Specifies the creation of urban 
masterplans at sub-national levels 
Details construction regulations (e.g. 
space between buildings, number of 
car parking spaces) 
National Policy of Spatial 
Planning of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia 
2011 Consolidates relevant laws on urban 
planning and proposes future legal 
framework 
Sub-Decree No. 118 on 
State Land Management 
2005 Clarify procedures on identification, 
registration, maintenance, 
management and reallocation of state 
land 
Land Law of Cambodia 2001 Defines categories of land 
Specifies lease rights/ terms of land 
concessions for investors 
Details measures for land dispute 
resolution 
Sub-Decree No. 86 on 
Construction Permit 
1997 Specifies the procedure for obtaining a 
construction permit and the 
construction regulations 
Law on Land Management, 
Urban Planning and 
Constructions 
1994 Overall aim is to promote the 
organisation of urban areas 
 
A strategic orientation masterplan for Phnom Penh has been under 
development since 1996. This is the first attempt at an overall vision plan for 
the city since the 1950s. The funding required to undertake research for the 
formulation of the masterplan has been mainly provided by various French 
government departments. Studies for the masterplan were originally 
developed through a funding and technical assistance package to the 
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Municipality of Phnom Penh (MPP) from the City Hall of Paris and the City 
of Venice. The BAU was founded predominantly to undertake these studies 
as part of the formulation of the Phnom Penh 2020 strategic orientation. 
After this programme finished, funding was continued from the European 
Union through its ‘Asia Urbs’ program in 2002. A further assistance 
package from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked towards the 
creation of a ‘White Paper of the Development and Management of Phnom 
Penh’ (Bureau des Affaires Urbaines, 2007) and revisions to the masterplan 
have been undertaken in 2008-2009 with funding from the French Embassy 
in Cambodia. Since then there has been no further assistance from France, 
although members of the former team have made official visits. The 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have more recently 
provided assistance to the MPP. JICA installed an urban development 
expert to work in the Office of Urbanisation, and part of their mission has 
involved working on translating the masterplan from French to English. 
There was no citizen participation in the development of the masterplan. 
 The masterplan proposes a vision for Phnom Penh’s development up 
until the year 2020 (Map 5.4). A map was developed which specifies future 
land uses, including industrial zones, high, medium and low urban densities, 
lakes and canals, green space and transportation infrastructure. According 
to the land use plan, much of the peri-urban areas of the northwest and 
southwest of the city should be preserved as low-density habitation and 
agricultural land. Industrial zones are supposed to be limited to the vicinity 
of the airport (Chaom Chao and Phnom Penh Thmei) and the northern 
part of Chrouy Changvar (the area of LYP Garden City, as detailed in 
Chapter 6). Although not specified in the land use plan, a respondent from 
the MPP mentioned that their vision is to expand the city across to the 
eastern side of the Mekong River (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). Therefore, the city will be situated surrounding a cross 
formed by the intersection of the Mekong, Sap and Bassac rivers. This 
intersection is known as Chaktomuk – four faces – and the concept holds 
cultural significance because of the iconic four faces of the Prasat Bayon 
temple at Angkor.  
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Despite the length of time since the masterplan was first finished by 
the French, it is still awaiting ratification from the prime minister and 
Council of Ministers. According to interviews with a number of government 
officers, delays have been attributed to ministers wanting more detail in the 
plan, such as the exact location of proposed new roads, and a less technical 
version of the document being developed before submission to central 
government. Also, there is a need to develop new laws so that the 
masterplan is adhered to, and include the recently added districts of Phnom 
Penh in the masterplan (interview 22, director, Office of Urbanisation, 
MPP). Chapter 6 deals in more detail with the question of whether the 
development of satellite cities is considered within the masterplan.  
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has analysed the context for urban planning and 
development in Phnom Penh. It commenced by briefly discussing the 
historical development of the city from its establishment in the 15th century 
up until the early 2000s. The second part discussed the development of a 
real estate market in the city from the mid-2000s. At this point, the 
perception of political stability led to a rapid rise in investment in the city. 
Much of this investment was from the East Asian region, particularly China 
and South Korea, and Cambodia became increasingly bound up in regional 
flows. The third part then moved on to examine the new urban forms that 
are changing the morphology of the urban landscape, both in the central 
city and peri-urban areas. The final section described the legal and policy 
framework that is designed to govern urban development in Cambodia. 
Although a masterplan for the city has been under development with foreign 
assistance for almost a decade, it has yet to be ratified by the central 
government. Given the rapid changes that Phnom Penh is witnessing, it is 
hard for any policy to keep pace.    
 As this chapter highlighted, many of the new urban developments, 
particularly those by foreign companies, have been oriented towards wealthy 
clientele. The next chapter will go on to look in detail at the large-scale 
private satellite cities under construction.   
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6. Private Urbanism in Phnom Penh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although in most market-oriented economies the private sector is the main 
builder of the city, constructions are generally at the scale of individual 
structures, or at most, complexes. However, what is now becoming 
commonplace in cities of the global South is large private sector 
developments at the scale of the urban district – from hundreds to thousands 
of hectares. In Phnom Penh, the first satellite cities were developed by 
foreigners with the capital and expertise to realise such projects. The 
business model involves acquiring farmland in peri-urban areas cheaply and 
developing middle- and high-class housing and commercial space. At 
present there are at least six satellite cities on the outskirts of Phnom Penh, 
alongside around 75 smaller gated communities and other housing projects. 
As this chapter critically discusses, the cost of housing in these projects is out 
of reach from all but the top few per cent of Cambodians, thus the level of 
demand is restricted. Additionally, these projects cause huge changes to the 
morphology of the city and have considerable impacts on local people. 
Developers focus on short-term profits over the long-term effects on the city 
and its inhabitants. However, as I will discuss, not all of the peri-urban 
housing developments are gated and elite, and there are some that are 
within reach of less wealthy people. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. Firstly, the chapter 
describes the extent of satellite city development and other forms of large-
scale private urbanism with a particular focus on Camko City and GPPIC. 
The second section analyses the impacts of these developments on local 
communities, based on data gathered through interviews with residents 
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living near to Camko City. Thirdly, the effects of satellite cities on urban 
form and their integration with the wider urban environment is examined. 
The final section analyses the origin of the demand for living in satellite 
cities from both local and foreign buyers.  
 
6.1 Satellite cities in Phnom Penh  
As outlined in the preceding chapter, the peri-urban zone of Phnom 
Penh is the location of several types of large-scale residential and 
commercial developments. These include satellite cities, gated communities, 
shophouse developments and land sub-division projects. These private 
residential developments are in the majority being built in the northern parts 
of the city. This is because the west and the south are industrial areas, as 
these sites give easier road access to Sihanoukville port and the international 
airport. Of particular relevance to this thesis are the large developments of 
hundreds or thousands of hectares with residential, commercial and leisure 
spaces claiming to be ‘satellite cities’. There are six satellite cities currently 
under construction or announced. Four of of these are fronted by local 
companies: Koh Pich and Chrouy Changvar City of the Future are being 
built by OCIC, AZ City by ING Group, and LYP Garden City by the LYP 
Group. Although local companies front these projects much of the capital is 
from abroad. In the case of OCIC’s projects, the capital is largely Chinese, 
as mentioned in Chapter 5. A further two are developed by foreign 
companies: Camko City by Korean company World City Co., and Grand 
Phnom Penh International City operated as a joint venture between Ciputra 
of Indonesia and local Cambodian company YLP Group. Table 6.1 
summarises some basic descriptive information for each of these projects, 
and Map 6.1 displays their location.  
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Table 6.1 Description of Phnom Penh’s satellite cities  
(Source: various; Phnom Penh Post, 2010) 
Project 
Name Developer 
Projected 
Cost 
Size 
(ha.) Location 
Start 
Date 
Estimated 
Completion 
Date 
Camko City World City 
Co. Ltd. 
(South 
Korea) 
 
$2 b.  119 Russei Keo 2006 2018 
Grand 
Phnom Penh 
International 
City 
 
Ciputra 
(Indonesia); 
YLP Group 
(Cambodia) 
$600 m.  260 Russei Keo 2006 2018 
Koh Pich 
(Diamond 
Island) 
 
OCIC 
(Cambodia) 
$300 m.  100 Chamkar-
mon 
 2016 
Chrouy 
Changvar 
City of the 
Future10 
 
OCIC 
(Cambodia) 
$3 b.  
 
387 Chrouy 
Changvar 
2011 Unknown 
AZ City 
 
 
ING Group 
(Cambodia) 
Unknown 2,600 Meanchey 2011 Unknown 
LYP11 
Garden City 
LYP Group 
(Cambodia) 
$200 m. 1,292 Russei Keo 2011 Unknown 
 
The two projects discussed in detail in this thesis are Camko City 
and GPPIC. In the following pages, I discuss the development of these 
projects, while Chapter 8 will extend the analysis to consider the way they 
are produced through intra-Asian urban networks. Both Camko City and 
GPPIC are located to the north of Phnom Penh, in Russei Keo and Sensok 
districts. Previously the land in this district was used for rice farming, but 
within the last decade agriculture has all but disappeared. Land has either 
started to be developed or is held for speculation. A ubiquitous sight in peri-
urban districts is a land parcel enclosed within a wall that is spray-painted 
with a telephone number and the words “for sale” (Image 6.1). This land is 
                                                
10 Chrouy Changvar City of the Future is to be built on land previously acquired 
by Malaysian company Sunway, to develop a satellite city called Sunway City.  
11 LYP Group is not to be confused with YLP Group, the local partner in the 
development of GPPIC. They are entirely different companies.  
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generally owned by former farmers or speculators. Larger plots of land for 
sale are often fronted with a billboard in Chinese and Korean language, a 
visual marker of the intra-Asian connections. Peri-urban land was bought at 
$0.3-1 per square metre in the early 2000s and some sold it a few years later 
at more than $25 per square metre (Tep, 2008). In Indonesia, the amount of 
infertile land increased by 1678% between 1980 and 1994, a figure which is 
attributed to speculation (Winarso, 1999). No accurate figures are available 
in Cambodia, but by visual examination it is unmistakable that much of the 
peri-urban land is no longer under cultivation.  
Roads that were once dirt tracks have been widened and resurfaced 
to facilitate access. Camko City and GPPIC were the first large 
developments in this area, but since construction began, the district has 
become the location of a growing number of gated communities. These 
include Sensok Town, Borei Vimean Phnom Penh, and Borei Angkor 
Phnom Penh. The area is also home to a number of government 
departments who have likely sold their city centre buildings and relocated to 
a cheaper location. Although this part of the city is mainly residential, there 
are some garment factories and other industrial buildings.    
Camko City 
Camko City is a $2 billion satellite city project, planned to cover 120 
hectares if all phases are constructed as originally intended. The concept 
originated from a visit by several Korean businesspeople to Cambodia in the 
mid-2000s. They felt that there was no suitable office space for global 
businesses. At the time, most companies were located in converted villas or 
small office buildings, and they were often subject to electricity cuts and 
monsoon season flooding. Investment was mobilised from Busan Savings 
Bank for the construction of a modern office district with high quality 
infrastructure located outside of the congested city centre. Hence the 
company’s name – ‘World City Company’ – and the slogan branding 
Camko City as “the first global city in Phnom Penh”. Commercial space is 
the primary objective, but related to this is the construction of luxury houses 
and apartments, as well as leisure facilities, an international school and a 
hospital. Camko City was designated by the government as a ‘Financial 
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Development District’, a type of special economic zone with incentives from 
the Ministry of Commerce to attract financial industries, especially those 
from Korea. Cambodia’s new stock exchange, developed with financial and 
technical assistance from South Korea, was originally planned for Camko 
City but is now operating in Canadia Tower, the first high-rise office 
building in central Phnom Penh, because of delays in Camko City’s 
construction.  
The Korean company behind the project is Landmark Worldwide 
Co. Ltd., the website of which lists Camko City as the sole project. World 
City Co. Ltd., the locally registered company of the developer, submitted an 
application to the CDC to become a ‘Qualified Investment Project’ (QIP) in 
January 2006 and approval was given four months later. By obtaining QIP 
status, World City Co. Ltd. were able to obtain a tax holiday of nine years, a 
low tax rate of 20% after the nine years, and duty free imports of 
construction materials and equipment (interview 11, officer, CDC). At the 
time of application, World City Company Co. Ltd. declared registered 
capital of $1 million and fixed assets of just over $2 billion. It was mentioned 
in the application that the Camko City project would create around 4,500 
jobs, most of which would comprise of construction labourers (statistics 
obtained from the CDC). The developer hired AECOM, the international 
engineering and architecture consultancy company, to conduct a market 
assessment and positioning study. Camko City is the first project of this type 
by the company and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Mr LEE Sang Ho, 
whose previous job was a position on the board of directors for the Incheon 
international airport construction authority.   
The land for the project was originally part lake and part marshland 
that flooded in the wet season (compare Images 6.2 and 6.3). The process of 
acquiring and developing the land is a rather opaque process, as I discuss 
later in the next chapter (Chapter 7). The land was initially acquired by two 
local investors, who filled in the lake and backfilled the remainder of the 
land to reduce the likelihood of it flooding. In order to do this, it is likely that 
the status of the land was changed from state-public to state-private by a 
Sub-Decree, through being designated as a ‘development zone’. The site of 
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Camko City is sometimes referred to as the ‘Pong Peay Lake Development 
Zone’, which was authorised in February 2003 by the MPP. According to 
staff at Camko City, the Cambodian investors did not have the money or 
expertise to develop the land, and thus looked to sell the land at a profit 
(interview 29, manager, Camko City). They eventually sold it to World City 
Co. Ltd., the CEO of which had acquired a Cambodian passport and 
therefore could legally purchase land (interview 17, salesperson, Camko 
City). A contract for construction of the first phase was agreed with Hanil 
Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd., a Korean firm, in August 2006, and 
the ground-breaking ceremony was held in May 2007. The ceremony was 
attended by many senior government figures, including one of the deputy 
Prime Ministers, SOK An, which highlights its significance to national 
urban development. The first customers moved in to their properties in 
April 2009, two years after construction began.  
The development consists of several phases. The first phase cost 
$109 million and consists of residential with a small number of retail units, 
while the second and third phases include commercial, public, and more 
residential space. The general public is free to drive and enter perimeter 
zones, but the public cannot enter the residential zones. These residential 
zones are gated communities and can only be accessed with a card or by 
getting permission from a resident. The different types of residential zones 
are also separate, divided into high-rise, mid-rise, townhouse and villa 
sectors. Each of these areas has separate facilities and is accessed from a 
different entrance. The company undertook market research in order to 
cater the development to local tastes and found that Cambodians prefer 
large houses and large rooms (interview 29, manager, Camko City) 
 According to the masterplan, approximately a quarter of the space 
is planned to be offices and commercial, 27.5% residential, 9% public, and 
around 5% green space (Image 6.4). Camko City is marketed through an 
emphasis on modern and world-class infrastructure. The project website 
prominently states that the new city contains “4-6 lane paved roads”, “water 
supply and sewerage system”, “high speed information and 
telecommunication systems”, “electronic security”, as well as “the first 
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introduction of modern high-rise condominiums in Cambodia” (World City 
Co. Ltd., undated). These ‘premium network spaces’, to use Graham’s 
(2000) term include a private electricity supply, provided by a 6.5-megawatt 
power plant built by the company. This avoids relying on the public supply 
from Électricité du Cambodge, which encounters regular supply problems 
during the hot season due to a lack of generation capacity.  
At the time of writing (March 2012), the first phase, consisting of 
villas (18 units), townhouses (164 units) and several high- and mid-rise 
condominiums (668 and 159 units respectively), has been completed (Image 
6.5). Despite the fact that there are over 1000 units completed and they are 
90% sold out, it is apparent that these sales have been mainly speculative as 
only 150 families are living there (interview 29, manager, Camko City). In 
mid 2010 the government passed a new law to deregulate the property 
market by allowing foreigners to own property above the first floor of a 
building, up to a maximum limit of 70% foreign ownership in one particular 
development (Phnom Penh Post, 2010). Since then, approximately 30% of 
the high-rise units in Camko City have been sold to foreigners, mainly from 
Korea and Singapore. Villas and townhouses are bought principally by 
wealthy, high-ranking government officials and business people. The cost of 
condominiums ranges from $150,000 to $300,000, while landed properties 
range from $200,000 to well over $500,000 for the larger villas. Most of the 
condominiums are bought as investments to rent, and are advertised at 
around $550-800 per month. The rental price has fallen to less than the 
$1000 or so that the developers had originally intended. The foreign 
ownership law increased condominium sales at Camko City. As of early 
2011 it was reported that 45 units at Camko City had been sold to 
foreigners. These buyers were predominately from South Korea, Australia, 
Singapore and China (Phnom Penh Post, 2011a). The Australian buyers are 
most likely to be overseas Cambodians. One of the mid-rise condominium 
towers was purchased in its entirety by a Korean pension fund in order to 
offer for rent (interview 8, country manager, international real estate 
agency).   
131 
 
 
World City Co. was unable to continue the project after October 
2010 due to a lack of funding. It was reported that the construction 
contractors, Hanil, had not been paid in full for work completed so had 
suspended construction activities at the site (O’Toole & Weinland, 2011). In 
June 2011 Camko City was embroiled in a corruption scandal in which it 
was alleged that senior executives at Busan Savings Bank, which put up 
US$459 million and is the primary financial backer of the project, had 
misappropriated funds. The assets of Busan Savings Bank were frozen by 
the South Korean government in February 2011 because of a liquidity crisis, 
but it was later revealed that shareholders of the bank had previously 
illegally used the bank’s deposits to fund other projects through companies 
in which they held ownership. This included Camko City, where funding 
was directed via nine separate companies. There were also allegations that 
Busan Savings Bank's executives had bribed government officials to turn a 
blind eye to financial irregularities, leading to the arrest of the number two 
shareholder Park Hyeong Seon and government officials including Eun Jin 
Soo, a senior aide to President Lee Myung Bak (O’Toole & Weinland, 
2011). The scandal in Korea led the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) to 
investigate Camko Bank, which provides loans for the purchase of property 
at Camko City, and of which Busan Savings Bank is a major shareholder. 
The NBC reportedly did not find any irregularities with Busan Savings 
Bank's activities in Cambodia (O’Toole, 2011).  
As the scandal broke, the chairman of the Korean Chamber of 
Commerce in Cambodia was quoted as saying that the only way Camko 
City could continue past the first phase would be for the Korean 
government to get involved as it would be difficult for smaller private 
companies to make up for the shortfall created by the exit of Busan Savings 
Bank (O’Toole & Weinland, 2011). It was later revealed that the Korea 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) – a government owned company 
which guarantees depositors' funds in South Korea – had taken over Busan 
Savings Bank. According to Camko Bank, there was a high chance that the 
KDIC would take over Busan Savings Bank's shares in Camko City too, 
ensuring that the project would continue as planned. In 2012, the CEO of 
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World City Co. Ltd. was sentenced to five years in prison for obtaining 
illegal loans (Lewis, 2012). The CEO of a planned $1 billion new airport in 
Siem Reap, the chairman of Busan Savings Bank, and an aide of South 
Korean President Lee also received sentences. It was reported that other 
investors from China, Japan, and Vietnam are interested in taking over the 
project.  
Camko City is satellite city that is similar in form and function to 
other satellite cities in Southeast Asia, as described in Chapter 2. It 
represents a form of privately built and managed urban development that is 
becoming increasingly common in Southeast Asia and indeed in many other 
poorer parts of the world. The development of Camko City is reflects the 
connections between elite actors in the public and private sectors. These 
connections are often informal in nature and thus present a challenge to 
comprehensive urban planning (see Chapter 7). As I will advance in Chapter 
8, these connections are also transnational and contingent on the political 
and diplomatic relations between Cambodia and South Korea.    
Grand Phnom Penh International City 
Located six kilometres further north than Camko City is another 
satellite city, Grand Phnom Penh International City. This project is a 260-
hectare development undertaken via a joint venture between Ciputra Group 
of Indonesia and the YLP Group of Cambodia. The development costs are 
purported to be in the region of $600 million (Nguon & Kimsong, 2008). 
Within the joint venture, YLP Group initially owned and prepared the land, 
while Ciputra is responsible for the design, planning and construction. The 
YLP Group lists Grand Phnom Penh International City as its only project. 
The company is owned by the wife of former four-star military general and 
current Deputy Prime Minister, Ke Kim Yan.  
Ciputra is an Indonesian company with a large portfolio of real 
estate development projects throughout Indonesia, including satellite cities, 
hotels, shopping malls, and condominium developments. The Ciputra 
Group is named after its founder, Ir. Ciputra, whose original Chinese name 
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was Tjie Tjin Hoan12. Ciputra was born in 1931 to a poor ethnic Chinese 
merchant family in Sulawesi. He later moved to study architecture at the 
Institute of Technology Bandung. After graduating, and having gained 
experience through operating his own consulting company to fund his 
studies, Ciputra managed to convince the then governor of Jakarta of his 
visions for the city. He firstly gained approval to redevelop the market 
district of Senen into Indonesia’s first shopping mall (Dieleman, 2011). After 
this project, Ciputra and the Jakarta government set up a joint company 
named PT Pembangunan Jaya (also known as the Jaya Group), which under 
Ciputra’s leadership undertook a number of significant urban developments 
that changed the face of Jakarta, including the Ancol recreational park and 
residential area along Jakarta’s seafront. Ciputra’s success was built upon 
close connections with the state in both formal and informal ways (see 
Chapter 7). Through his close connections to the government, Ciputra 
established the Metropolitan Group, which in collaboration with the Salim 
Group, developed Pondok Indah. This was the first privately built satellite 
city in Jakarta, and construction began in 1973 (Winarso, 1999). Ciputra, in 
collaboration with the Salim Group and Sinar Mas Group (the latter two 
companies providing the finance), also developed the 6,000-hectare BSD 
City from 1989 onwards (Cybriwsky & Ford, 2001).  
 Rather than exclusively working with other business partners, 
Ciputra decided to go it alone and established the Ciputra Group in 1981 
(Dieleman, 2009). The company became a family business as Ciputra’s four 
children and some of his sons- and daughters-in-law, who had just returned 
from university studies overseas, all took up – and continue to hold to this 
day – influential positions on the board of directors of the Ciputra Group 
and its subsidiaries. During the 1980s and 1990s, the company was 
extremely successful and became the leading property developer in 
Indonesia (Dick, 2009). Unlike most Indonesian conglomerates, Ciputra 
stuck to its core business of property development rather than diversifying 
into other sectors. This proved to be the factor that almost bankrupted the 
company with the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, as property is 
                                                
12 Indonesian Chinese were forced to change their names from Chinese to 
Indonesian-sounding. One-word names are common in Indonesia.  
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one of the most volatile economic sectors. Ciputra took out foreign currency 
loans without proper hedging, which were vulnerable to currency 
depreciation when the Indonesian rupiah collapsed (Dick, 2009). The 
currency drop also caused the property market to stall and Ciputra’s assets 
plummeted in value.    
After almost going under during the Asian financial crisis, the group 
gradually recovered and regained a prominent position in the urban 
development industry. It also seemed to ride out the more recent global 
economic crisis. Between 2007 and 2011, the gross profit of Ciputra’s urban 
development activities increased from $61 million to $111 million (PT 
Ciputra Development TBK, 2011). As of 2012, the company has developed 
42 residential projects in 26 Indonesian cities. Most of the residential 
projects are satellite cities, but there are also a number of smaller gated 
communities in Indonesia’s provincial cities (PT Ciputra Development 
TBK, 2011). Ciputra’s satellite city developments in Indonesia are branded 
with the Indonesian word Citra, which means ‘image’. Examples include 
CitraGarden, CitraGrand City, CitraLand, CitraIndah (‘beautiful image’) 
and CitraRaya (‘great image’). Besides these, the group has developed eight 
commercial property projects, including shopping malls, hotels, and a 
business park. Ciputra has also been a pioneer in the development of 
‘superblocks’ in Jakarta city centre. Superblocks are high-density mixed-use 
developments of approximately five to 10 hectares normally consisting of a 
shopping mall, office space, hotel, and several high-rise (30-40 storey) 
apartment blocks (Abe, 2009). Ciputra World, for example, is designed to be 
an integrated development, in effect a ‘satellite city within the city’. The 
company also operates a private hospital, a university, and several schools. 
These facilities are located within the company’s satellite city projects. 
The Ciputra Group is one of the big Indonesian property 
conglomerates and pioneered the satellite city model. Another large 
developer is the Lippo Group, founded by Mochtar Riady (Lee Mo Tie), 
which has also built satellite cities in Jakarta during the 1990s (Lippo 
Karawaci and Lippo Cikarang). The Lippo Group began as a bank, and 
thus had access to the massive amounts of capital which were needed to 
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build all infrastructures (not just housing, but shopping malls, leisure 
facilities etc.) from the start of the project (Dick, 2009). In contrast, other 
developers such as Ciputra were only able to develop satellite cities in 
phases, and had to promise further facilities to initial buyers. The Salim 
Group, established by Sudono Salim (also known by his Chinese name, 
Liem Sioe Liong) is also involved in urban development, although it 
generally sticks to financing projects. The Salim Group is the largest of the 
Indonesian conglomerates, operating a vast array of businesses (Dieleman & 
W Sachs, 2008; Dieleman, 2008). There exists a considerable web of 
connections and networks between these companies. The Salim Group has 
worked with Ciputra through the financing of several of their projects in the 
early days, and more recently with respect to the Kolkata West International 
City in India, as the next section will elaborate upon. The Lippo Group is 
also close to the Salim Group, as Riady used to direct one of the Salim 
Group’s banks.  
Ciputra is now exploring opportunities outside of Indonesia by 
collaborating with local companies overseas in Cambodia, China, Vietnam, 
India, and Poland (as I will elaborate upon in Chapter 8) (Townland, 
undated). In Cambodia, the land for GPPIC was previously lake and 
marshland (compare Images 6.6 and 6.7), and was purchased by YLP 
Group in 2004 (interview 1, sales consultant, GPPIC). The company then 
began to fill in the lake and raise the level of the land to prevent further 
flooding. According to satellite imagery, by 2005 the lake had been almost 
entirely filled in. The master plan for the project was approved by the MPP 
in August 2006, and a year later was endorsed as an investment project by 
the CDC (Touch, 2008). The project was thus eligible for tax incentives and 
exemption of import taxes on construction materials. After the project was 
approved, Ciputra’s in-house architects and planners began to design the 
masterplan for presentation to the national and local government. In 
January 2007, the managing director of Ciputra, Mr Budiasa Sastrawinata, 
attended a high-level meeting with YLP Group representatives and Prime 
Minister Hun Sen. Hun Sen pledged his support for the project and 
encouraged the developers to work closely with relevant government 
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departments to ensure that the project went ahead (BBC Monitoring Asia 
Pacific, 2007). The Governor of Phnom Penh, Kep Chuktema, has also 
given full support, and is quoted saying that the project is helping to 
modernise the capital (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 2007). 
Construction began in 2007, beginning with the building of show 
units. This development is more consumption-oriented than Camko City, 
and is built around a large golf course designed by Nicklaus Design, a global 
golf course design firm. In comparison to Camko City, it is noticeable that 
Ciputra place greater emphasis on urban design and green space. A planner 
from the company stated that they have done extensive landscaping and 
planted many trees in order to create a pleasant living environment 
(interview 28, urban planner and architect, GPPIC) (see Image 6.8). 
According to the master plan (Image 6.9), it will house 4000 families upon 
completion and contain facilities such as schools, a hospital, water 
amusement park, hotel, shopping mall and office buildings. GPPIC uses the 
public electricity supply and it is up to property owners if they wish to 
purchase a generator for their house to use in the event of power shortages. 
At the ground-breaking ceremony the president and founder of Ciputra 
company, Ir. Ciputra, commented that this project is designed for those with 
“international lifestyles” (Touch, 2008). As of 2012, three of the seven 
phases have been completed. This equates to approximately 200 houses (a 
mixture of villa and shophouses) and the golf course (interview 28, urban 
planner and architect, GPPIC). In addition, a Singapore international 
school has opened in two converted villas. Ciputra do not anticipate 
completing the project until at least 2020. The initial price list ranges from 
$100,000 for the smallest houses (‘Sicily’) to more than $600,000 for the 
largest property (‘Chateau 3’).  
Of the 200 houses built, 90% have been already sold. This high 
number is due to the company’s strategy of constructing houses only after 
they are sold. Only Cambodian citizens can purchase property here as the 
properties are landed. However, according to staff at GPPIC there only 
around 20 families are actually living there (interview 28, urban planner and 
architect, GPPIC). Therefore the properties are either bought for 
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speculation or the owners are waiting until the area becomes more 
developed and with more services before moving in. Due to the high prices, 
buyers have been mainly businesspeople and high-ranking government 
officials (interview 28, urban planner and architect, GPPIC). After having 
gained some local market experience, the company are looking to build 
cheaper housing (less than $100,000) that will be affordable to middle class 
people.  
GPPIC, like Camko City, is not an entirely gated development. To 
enable only residents to enter would not make commercial sense, as Ciputra 
later plan to construct shopping malls and other facilities that can be used by 
members of the general public. Each of the residential clusters is gated, 
giving access only to residents or authorised guests. Nonetheless, the 
imposing entrance archway adorned with prancing horses (Image 6.10) 
represents a symbolic barrier to less wealthy people. Security guards are 
present at the entrance archway, who can stop cars and motorbikes from 
entering. Indeed, a planner at Ciputra asserted that “sometimes the 
customers are asking about the security, and we are differing from other 
projects because we only have one gate, so everybody will pass the gate first 
before coming to your house” (interview 28, urban planner and architect, 
GPPIC).   
In this section I have identified a number of differences between 
Camko City and GPPIC. However, they do exhibit certain commonalities. 
In a similar sense to Camko City, the development of GPPIC has proceeded 
through informal connections. As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the local 
company working with Ciputra is politically well connected. GPPIC is also 
produced through intra-Asian networks of capital and urban development 
concepts, and in Chapter 8 I will go on to discuss the networks through 
which GPPIC is produced. In contrast to South Korea, Indonesia does not 
have such dense connections with Cambodia, and GPPIC is more driven by 
the activities of the Ciputra company itself.       
Other forms of large-scale private urbanism 
Besides satellite cities, as of 2011 there were also 77 smaller urban 
development projects in peri-urban areas mainly built by local property 
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development companies (MPP, 2012). In Cambodia these new 
developments are referred to as borei13, which literally translated into English 
means ‘house’ or ‘village’, but has come to signify a gated community or 
other type of privately built housing estate (Royal Government of 
Cambodia, 2011b). Most of these projects are located in the peri-urban 
districts of Dangkor, Sensok and Russei Keo (MPP, 2012). Three different 
types of development are locally referred to as borei: gated communities, 
shophouse developments, and land sub-division projects. Each of these will 
now be discussed.   
The number of gated communities catering to more high-end buyers 
has increased rapidly. These projects are generally solely residential 
although some provide recreation facilities for residents, such as gyms, 
swimming pools and children’s play areas. The types of housing in these 
developments are mainly detached villas although some have smaller 
shophouses and apartments. The vast majority of these projects are 
developed by local Khmer Chinese companies. For example, Borei Vimean 
Phnom Penh is an 18-hectare project developed by the Ly Hour Group, 
founded by Okhna Ly Hour. The Ly Hour group began as small money 
changing business after the Khmer Rouge and has grown into the leading 
moneychanger in Cambodia. It collaborates closely with the government 
and is involved in international currency exchange transactions (pers. 
comm.). Given this success, the company has now begun investing in other 
businesses and venturing into land and real estate development. The price of 
properties in these developments is generally lower than in the satellite cities. 
For example, the Peng Hourt company has built four gated communities 
around Phnom Penh (Image 6.11) and prices start from around $90,000 for 
flats and $150,000 for larger villas. Most offer finance plans for buyers. 
These developments are affordable to most middle class urbanites and sales 
are reported to be brisk (CBRE, 2012). The cost of these properties is 
considerably less than the price of equivalent sized properties in the central 
city. Other examples of these gated communities include Happiness City 
and Sensok Town. However, these are not the first gated communities in the 
                                                
13 This word is sometimes alternatively spelled ‘borey’, as there are no formally 
adopted conventions for writing Khmer language in the Latin alphabet.   
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city. In the central city, particularly in the southern parts of Chamkarmon 
district, there are several gated communities catering to government officials 
and foreign diplomatic staff. These include Bassac Garden City, Jardins du 
Bassac, and Borei Chamkarmon.  
The second type, shophouse developments, are large housing 
developments consisting of rows of three to five storey shophouses (Image 
6.12). The rows of housing are almost identical, and consist of an open plan 
ground floor (used for parking or to operate a small shop/ restaurant) below 
two or three storeys that are either used as offices or apartments. In Phnom 
Penh, these projects are located on greenfield land particularly around the 
airport and along major roads leading out of the city. The first projects of 
this type were built between 2006-8, and continue to be constructed to this 
day. These shophouses are priced in the region of $50,000, which is still 
unaffordable for the vast majority of Cambodians. These projects are not 
gated communities and are open for anyone to enter freely. Due to the sheer 
number of shophouses built and the lack of demand, many of these 
developments have been left empty. It is likely that people bought them for 
speculation, hoping to sell for a profit before the property slump after 2008. 
Thus they are inhabited by few people and are far from being vibrant 
communities. It seems that developers are unwilling to lower the price that 
would bring these properties into the reach of many of the city’s inhabitants 
(Sturrock & Hul, 2011). Examples of these projects include Borei 
Ataingmeas and Borei Lim Chheang Hak.  
The third type of peri-urban urban development is known as the 
‘land sub-division project’. The major distinction between this and the 
previous type is that generally in this case, buyers purchase plots of land and 
build the houses themselves. According to research by Tep (2008), the 
majority of land sub-division projects are located in Sensok and Russei Keo 
districts to the north of the city centre, and there are at least 40 in the city. 
They range in size from tens to hundreds of hectares: for example Boeung 
Snau, developed by Sokimex in Meanchey district, is 235 hectares. These 
projects are developed by companies or individuals who buy land from 
small-scale farmers or landowners, backfill or level land, build a grid of 
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roads and then divide the land into plots to sell. Properties are then 
constructed by buyers, or in some cases developers also build small 
properties on the land plots. One example is Kang Meng City in Meanchey 
district (Image 6.13). This project was developed by Siev Sophal, in 
collaboration with a Chinese investor, after whom the development is 
named. Siev originally worked as an accountant and later quit his job to 
become a property developer. After a number of small property deals he 
found an investor to put up the money for the Kang Meng City project. 
This development consists of subdividing the land into 4,000 plots of 600 
square metres. These projects are in general the cheapest type of peri-urban 
housing development. In a survey of buyers in land sub-division projects, it 
was reported that approximately half were low level civil servants, while the 
other half were self-employed, of which 50% were mototaxi drivers (Tep, 
2008). Approximately half of the residents reported household incomes of 
more than $110 per month and all of the residents were above the urban 
poverty line (Tep, 2008). Some companies offer finance plans for low 
income people, as the 7NG company has done with its three projects named 
Borei Santepheap (‘Peace City)’. 
 
6.2 Impacts on local communities  
Large urban development projects such as satellite cities have a host 
of impacts on local communities. Some of these are clearly negative -- social 
segregation, displacement, access to public space and the relationship to 
local culture and climate. The huge discrepancies in income and lifestyle 
between the residents of the satellite cities and most of the local people will 
at best cause an acute cultural disjuncture even as it provides employment 
opportunities in construction and passing trade. Although there were no 
forced evictions in preparing land for the construction of Camko City and 
GPPIC, projects of this size in a country as poor as Cambodia are part of a 
process of urban change that disadvantages the poor in urban and peri-
urban areas, as has been shown in the not dissimilar case of Hanoi 
(Monthéard, 2010). There are few people living in the vicinity of GPPIC 
because it was previously a flooded area, and although Camko City is 
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located in a more populated area, it too is built on a former lake. The 
developers of Camko City purchased land from existing property owners in 
order to construct a new road through the project. A number of properties 
were demolished and residents were offered a non-negotiable price of $35 
per square metre for land (interview 36, female, food seller). The 
development of other satellite cities by local companies, such as Koh Pich 
and Chrouy Changvar City, have resulted in the compulsory purchase of 
people’s land and houses with the assistance of the state. The processes by 
which this occurs will be discussed in the next chapter (Chapter 7).  
The land on which peri-urban development occurs is generally 
agricultural or former agricultural land. Because of the proximity of Phnom 
Penh as a concentration of employment opportunities, few families living in 
peri-urban areas still rely solely on agriculture for their livelihood. It is often 
the case that people live in the city and thus own the land but no longer 
farm it, preferring to wait for somebody to buy it from them. Some poor 
people sell their land as a way to pay off debts or to fund healthcare costs, or 
just to make some money from land that they do not use (interview 6, 
researcher, local NGO).  
Looking specifically at Camko City and GPPIC, the filling in of lakes 
and marshland to provide the land on which the projects were constructed 
has meant that local communities initially felt the impact in terms of 
increased flooding. As Map 6.2 shows, a large amount of land that would 
previously absorb rainwater has been backfilled for urban development. 
During interviews with local residents, a number of residents living in the 
vicinity of Camko City reported that as the lake was filled in, their properties 
flooded. In order to rectify this, they had to raise the level of their houses, 
during which time they could not operate their businesses. GPPIC have 
taken a more careful approach, by studying how to manage the water 
system. The company created several lakes, including one some 30 metres 
deep, to compensate for filling in other lakes and marshland (interview 28, 
urban planner and architect, GPPIC). 
The majority of residents interviewed who are living and working 
near Camko City had incomes of between $5 and $10 per day. Most were 
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operating some sort of small business from the front of their house, such as 
selling cooked food, groceries or mobile phone accessories to the 
construction site and garment factory employees who work nearby. Some 
local people felt that Camko City was a private place and were intimidated 
by the presence of security guards. One respondent commented: “I used to 
drive motorbike and carry clothes from factory and I was stopped by 
security guard, they said ‘where you want to go? This place is not for 
public’” (interview 40, male, tailor). Another commented: “I’ve never been 
in Camko City area. I heard that security is so strict they don’t want other 
outsiders entry so that I don’t want go there I might be blamed by the 
security guard so feel ashamed if I enter there” (interview 38, male, 
mechanic). The developers of Camko City once reportedly blocked the 
access road to an apartment building where garment factory workers rent 
rooms, in contradiction to a previous agreement signed with the building’s 
owners (Pat, 2011). However, other locals actually appropriated the open 
space at Camko City to do their exercises in the early morning and 
evenings. The security guards permitted this practice on the condition that 
they didn’t try to enter the gated residential clusters. One lady commented 
that “I have chance to visit inside of the Camko City community freely and 
there are a big space for doing exercise” (interview 31, female, food seller). 
This is a similar situation to what Choplin and Frank (2010) found in their 
work on satellite cities in Africa.  
 A member of the urban planning team at MPP commented that the 
municipality wanted the satellite cities to be less exclusive. He suggested that 
this can be achieved by building housing which caters to different income 
groups or making contributions to nearby neighbourhoods, and including 
open space at 35% of the total area (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). However, these recommendations are not mentioned 
in official MPP documents, nor are they legal requirements for developers. 
The type of housing provided is left entirely to the whims of property 
developers, and both Camko City and GPPIC contain only high-end 
housing, even though there is currently a limited demand for such 
properties. 
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Communities around Camko City have the option to connect to 
Camko City’s private power supply. The price is slightly higher than the 
public supplier but it is more reliable, and thus good for local businesses who 
suffer fewer power disruptions. One respondent commented that “most of us 
make sewing clothes and need 24 hours electricity for operating sewing 
machine so that we need more electricity supply even we have to pay a little 
high cost more than public. It cost is 1000 riels per KWh [$0.25]. We 
cannot depend on only unstable public electricity connection” (interview 45, 
female, housewife). While this electricity network is not a universal, public 
service, it does represent a slight contrast to Graham and Marvin’s (2001) 
concept of ‘splintering urbanism’, which suggests that private infrastructures 
are only accessible by the wealthy.        
Up to now there is no evidence of organised resistance by local 
communities against these satellite city developments in Cambodia. In 
contrast, there has been considerable opposition to similar projects in India. 
For example, in 2006 the Dankuni Township was to be built on 2,000 
hectares of land near Kolkata. But despite the intentions of the government 
to acquire land, no land was acquired because both the state and local 
communities knew the effectiveness of previous community protests 
surrounding similar projects (Shatkin, 2011). The ruling party was worried 
that the displacement of the poor for these development projects may 
dissuade voters at the next election. In Vietnam too, large protests over the 
development of a satellite city called EcoPark on the outskirts of Hanoi 
made the international news (BBC News, 2012). A company was given a 
concession by the government to develop 500 hectares of land that is 
currently used by around 4000 farmers. Residents were offered a 
compensation package that many felt was inadequate. The government is 
working closely with the private sector, which has meant that compensation 
arrangements tend to favour the companies over the existing tenants (Sun & 
T V Kim, 2008). However, Kim (2011) has argued that compensation to 
those affected by urban development projects has increased in recent years. 
Cambodia has not witnessed such large-scale evictions as has been seen in 
Vietnam, China and India. The country is only a pseudo-democracy with 
144 
 
 
one party dominating the political scene. Protest is generally not tolerated 
and given the history of the country there is perhaps a fear of the 
government. The attention of the media and NGO community has focused 
on a number of large forced evictions that are occurring in the central city.  
 
6.3 Integration with the existing city 
The relationship between satellite cities and the existing city is one of 
dependence because the commercial, retail and cultural functions have been 
slower to develop than the housing component. Although the 3D rendered 
masterplans give the image of an expeditiously developed city rising from 
the rice fields, the reality is that even these master-planned cities generally 
need to evolve and develop gradually. Housing is needed to create a market 
for the commercial activities, and vice versa. The so-called ‘ghost cities’ of 
China, however, represent an exception to this (Day, 2012). An urban 
planner at the MLMUPC acknowledged: “we have to make sure that the 
connectivity of these large urban development projects has been studied, 
and is in a sustainable way. You don’t want to create a new urban centre 
and then kill the old centre… It should complement not compete” (interview 
12, deputy director, MLMUPC). The commercial and residential space is to 
cater to the high-end market. That market equates to only the top few 
percent of the population and so is unlikely to affect the viability of the 
existing city. However, this highlights the trend towards planning being 
driven by elite priorities (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). Research on Jakarta has 
shown that satellite cities are little more than dormitory towns because they 
contain many fewer jobs than residents (Firman, 2009). This increase in 
commuting thus increases traffic congestion and its related environmental 
problems. In Phnom Penh, there is no public transport and as satellite cities 
become more populous, traffic congestion will without doubt escalate.  
At the urban scale, the construction of large privately built satellite 
cities has a considerable impact on the morphology of the city and its 
potential patterns of future growth. Referring to Ho Chi Minh City, 
Douglass and Huang (2007, p. 3) suggest that satellite city projects act as a 
‘reverse moat’. This is because they prevent lower income urban dwellers 
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from moving out of the central area, as the city is “steadily becoming a 
donut of mega-projects surrounding the existing city that will effectively 
occupy the city’s potential paths”. This situation is not as extreme in Phnom 
Penh at present. Nonetheless, large areas of land around Phnom Penh have 
been acquired by developers. These companies are waiting for more 
favourable market conditions to develop or sell the land, particularly as the 
outer boundaries of the city expand.  
Below the city scale, however, the effect of peri-urban development 
being dominated by large private development projects such as satellite cities 
and gated communities is that public infrastructure development has not 
kept pace. A French urban planning team assisting the MPP undertook 
research and determined that the infrastructure of Tuol Sangkhe and Russei 
Keo sangkat near Camko City was designed for a population of 
approximately 30,000, yet at present there are estimated to be more than 
double that figure living in the area. Their recommendations were that the 
area requires at least two more health centres, two more primary schools, 
one more high school, and a greater amount of public space (Blancot et al., 
2008). Additionally, the French team suggested that although private 
developers build wide and high-quality roads, they are within gated 
communities or satellite cities and so not usable by the public. In non-gated 
borei developments, there is usually only one road that connects to a main 
road, rather than being integrated with the wider urban environment (Map 
6.3).    
 
6.4 Demand for satellite cities 
From the perspective of satellite city developers interviewed as part 
of this research, the reasons why people choose to live in satellite cities were 
similar to the factors mentioned in Chapter 2. These include better 
infrastructure and facilities than the existing city, higher levels of security, 
and cleaner more peaceful surroundings. In the first section of this chapter it 
was mentioned that the price of property in both Camko City and GPPIC is 
relatively expensive, with villas on the market for up to $1 million. It is thus 
only a viable option for all but the most wealthy of Cambodian society, in a 
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country where the GDP per capita was $739 in 2009 (GTZ, 2009). The 
Korean developer of the (now cancelled) Star River Apartment complex, 
Posco E&C, stated that the development is targeted towards the wealthiest 
one per cent of Cambodians and Koreans working in Phnom Penh (Green, 
2009). Land was bought at the peak of the land price boom, and this cost is 
thus passed on to property buyers. This section will discuss the demand for 
satellite city living in more detail. There are two categories of demand for 
property in satellite cities: firstly, whether buyers are local or foreign, and 
secondly, whether buyers are purchasing property for living, or buying 
speculatively as an investment to earn rental income.  
The demand from local people can be broadly separated into two 
categories: political elites and the urban middle class. The first group 
consists of members of the ruling party within government, the police, or the 
military. These people have become wealthy through their business 
connections and access to insider information. My own interviews with 
developers suggested that high-level government officials were big customers 
of the large villas in Camko City and GPPIC. The second group, the urban 
middle class, is generally made up of Khmers of Chinese ancestry. They live 
in the city centre, particularly along main boulevards or near markets, and 
use their ground floor as a shop or business (interview 7, ex-director, UN-
Habitat). Many of these businesses are engaged in importing and selling 
products such as construction materials, and have been able to use their 
diaspora connections to do business with ethnic Chinese in other Southeast 
Asian countries as well as in China. These businesses were set up as the 
economy liberalised in the late 1980s and now some have matured into 
profitable enterprises. However, while in the Indonesian case satellite cities 
are said to be in demand from the ethnic Chinese (Leisch, 2002), in 
Cambodia there is no evidence of segregation by ethnic Chinese 
Cambodians. I believe that this is because Cambodia is geographically 
nearer to China and thus has had a larger influence in terms of culture and 
migration for thousands of years. Indeed, the vast majority of Cambodians, 
especially those from the towns and cities, have some Chinese heritage. In 
Indonesia, a majority Muslim country, the Chinese are much more 
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discernible as an ethnic group. Many Cambodians also celebrate Chinese 
New Year and mix local Khmer Buddhist practices and ceremonies with 
traditional Chinese customs such as the burning of paper money and other 
luxury goods for ancestors on holidays and special occasions. For those who 
are salaried workers rather than owners of their own business, a wage of 
more than $380 per month would put them within the middle class bracket. 
This group accounted for 17% of the urban population in 2007, and that 
figure was estimated to have doubled by 2011 (Lodish, 2007).  
This group of the population may in some cases be able to afford to 
live in satellite cities but they would need to retain their business premises in 
the city centre. One government urban policy expert believed that when 
wealthy middle class business owners want a larger property, they often 
cannot buy a detached house in central Phnom Penh because the price is 
too high. An equivalent sized property in a satellite city is less expensive. He 
also believed that the new services provided in the satellite cities make living 
out of the city centre attractive: “normally the wealthy family cannot move 
to the suburbs because [of] the level of public infrastructure and 
services…but the private company cover all of that” (interview 12, deputy 
director, MLMUPC). Changing cultures and traditions also drive the 
demand for new housing. In particular, the marketing of apartment 
complexes and satellite cities is being targeted towards a younger generation 
of educated and upwardly mobile Cambodians (Khimm, 2008). This 
parallels a change in the culture of two or three generations of a family 
cohabiting. It is now becoming increasingly common for younger married 
couples that were born after the Khmer Rouge to live independently from 
their parents.  
In the first phase of Camko City, there are just over one thousand 
high-rise condominium units. Condominiums are a relatively new concept 
in Cambodia, and thus local people are not yet accustomed to live in them, 
both for both price and socio-cultural reasons. Out of the thousand units, 
only 100 remained unsold (as of January 2011), but the sales staff estimate 
that only 150 families or approximately 500 people are living at Camko City 
(interview 17, salesperson, Camko City). According to a local property 
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market expert, even if a Cambodian can afford a condominium in Camko 
City they would normally prefer to spend the money on a shophouse. 
Shophouses are built by local companies and initially consist of one or two 
stories and a mezzanine level, but have the possibility to have extra floors 
added if more space is needed (interview 4, country manager, international 
real estate agency). They are generally affordable for the majority 
(approximately $40,000 for a shop house) and usually come with 10 to 15 
year payment plans.  
Cultural factors are also an important determinant of demand. 
Architect and one time Minister of Town Planning Vann Molyvann stated 
that Cambodians are not used to high-rise living (Ly & Muan, 2001). He 
designed the Front du Bassac neighbourhood in the 1960s in a way that 
tried to replicate traditional living styles in a multistory context. Vann 
himself stated in an interview that “Cambodians don’t really know how to 
live in city buildings” (Ly & Muan, 2001, p. 11). The Khmer Rouge regime 
abolished private property, creating insecurity and resulting in people 
preferring to own land rather than a ‘space in the sky’ (interview 4, country 
manager, international real estate agency). One lady living near Camko City 
commented that “most of people living in the Camko City condos are 
Korean, rich Khmer prefer villas. I don’t like to live in the high building like 
Camko City condos. I think it might fall down some day, because they put 
soil into lake to construct high buildings. I don’t trust the construction, or 
who knows, in the future Phnom Penh might have earthquake” (interview 
41, female, food seller). On the other hand, interviews with local property 
market actors suggested that there was considerable support for the idea that 
condominiums would someday become an accepted housing type. Vietnam 
in particular was cited as model for how Cambodia might develop: “Soon 
they [Cambodian people] will change their habit. [It’s] linked to Vietnam, 
as I remember in the last 15 years…they don’t like to stay in the 
condominium, but recently they are familiar…It’s the same trend” 
(interview 9, manager, local real estate agency).  
 As was just mentioned, despite Camko City being mostly sold there 
are few occupants. Similarly, at GPPIC, there are only 20 families living 
149 
 
 
there out of the 190 properties sold (July 2011) (interview 28, urban planner 
and architect, GPPIC). The property in these satellite cities, along with 
other new urban development projects, is priced at a level attainable to only 
a minority of the population, and the number of these properties likely 
exceeds the number of people who can afford to buy (interview 8, country 
manager, international real estate agency). It is therefore likely to be in 
oversupply, although as one government official pointed out, there is no 
official housing data to prove this (interview 12, deputy director, 
MLMUPC). In relation to Camko City and GPPIC, exact figures for the 
number of properties bought speculatively could not be obtained. However, 
a real estate agent working with Camko City commented that most 
Cambodians who had purchased condominiums were wealthy parents 
buying investment properties for their children (interview 4, country 
manager, international real estate agency). These local investors believed 
that many foreign business people would come to Cambodia, therefore 
creating a demand for the rental of high-class apartments. The manager of a 
Korean construction association believed that “they invest in that kind of 
property for rent. So if Cambodia’s economy goes well…they expect many 
foreign business people to come to Cambodia, this is the kind of 
accommodation they like” (interview 24, country director, Korea Global 
Construction Office). A former member of the marketing team at GPPIC 
commented that locals buy many of the houses as second homes (interview 
23, marketing manager, GPPIC). This is not something that Ciputra view 
favourably or encourage, as they want the city to feel “alive” (interview 28, 
urban planner and architect, GPPIC). 
 As well as local demand, foreigners too have purchased property in 
satellite cities. Land and property is legally only permitted to be bought by 
locals. There are, however, a number of ways foreigners can buy property in 
Cambodia: either by obtaining a Cambodian passport, or by using a local 
business partner or spouse. The one exception to this is the purchase of units 
in multiple storey condominium developments, which since the foreign 
ownership law was passed in 2010 have been open to purchase by 
foreigners. In Camko City, approximately 30% of units were sold to 
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foreigners. The buyers are mainly South Korean, Singaporean and 
Taiwanese (interview 17, salesperson, Camko City). Koreans are attracted to 
Camko City because of the links with their country (interview 9, manager, 
local real estate agency). In GPPIC, approximately 10% of buyers are from 
overseas. The number of foreign buyers is less than Camko City because 
GPPIC at this stage consists only of landed houses. Therefore, foreigners can 
only buy with a local partner or if married to a Cambodian. A third 
category, somewhere in-between local and foreign, are overseas 
Cambodians. This group are Cambodians who fled the country during the 
1970s and 1980s war period and settled predominately in the USA, France, 
and Australia. Because of the time spent overseas, traditional cultural 
sensibilities are less prominent, and thus this group may be more attracted to 
living in satellite cities. Overseas Cambodians from the USA and France 
bought properties in GPPIC (interview 1, sales consultant, GPPIC). In 
India, luxury peri-urban developments are marketed towards members of 
the Indian diaspora (Bose, 2008) and it has been reported that the major 
purchasers of high-class residential developments in the Philippines are 
Filipinos working overseas (Shatkin, 2008).   
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter began by outlining the extent of large-scale private 
urban developments in Phnom Penh, paying particular attention to Camko 
City and GPPIC. These two foreign developed projects were the first 
satellite cities to be announced back in 2006, but since then a further four 
satellite cities are under construction by local companies. Besides satellite 
cities, there are many more smaller gated communities and housing projects 
on the outskirts of the city. The second section went on to analyse the 
impacts of these projects on local communities. Although the two case study 
projects did not involve evictions, some of the other urban development 
projects by local companies given land concessions by the government have 
involved compulsory resettlement. Primary research with local communities 
living around Camko City discovered that there are mixed impacts. While 
the development increased passing trade for businesses and created 
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employment in construction, since the development has stalled, there are no 
longer many jobs available. The major impact felt by local people was 
flooding, caused by a lake being filled in by the developers. The third part 
discussed the effects on the city. Residents commute into the city, increasing 
traffic congestion and its associated environmental problems. Public 
infrastructure in peri-urban areas has not kept pace with private 
developments: there is no public transport, and public facilities such as 
schools and hospitals are not developing in parallel with the increase in 
population. The fourth and final section critically considered the level of 
demand for these projects. The price is obviously higher than the majority of 
people in a country as poor as Cambodia can afford. Although there is a 
growing urban middle class and political and business elite, it appears that at 
present the demand has been mainly speculative. This is encouraged by a 
law recently passed that permits foreign ownership of property.  
Having considered the extent of satellite city development in Phnom 
Penh, the next chapter will go further and critically analyse the planning 
process for satellite cities. On the one hand, the state has a role in planning 
for satellite cities through investment attraction and allowing land 
acquisitions. On the other hand, the next chapter also examines the 
challenges to urban planning in Cambodia, and the extent to which these 
potential weaknesses in public planning encourage large-scale private sector 
developments. 
  
152 
 
 
 
7. Satellite Cities (Un)planned  
 
 
 
 
 
 
At first glance it may seem logical that large-scale private urban 
developments, such as satellite cities, are simply the result of a lack of state 
capacity in urban planning. This could be because of insufficient state 
finances, rapid and seemingly unmanageable urban development, and a 
legal framework that is not suitable for the type and scale of contemporary 
urbanisation. However, while this is certainly true in some respects, the state 
also has a central role in the production of private urbanism. As will be 
explained later, this role may include working closely with developers to 
enable them to acquire low cost land, promoting cities and countries as 
favourable destinations for foreign investors, and discursively rationalising 
satellite cities in terms of perceived benefits such as job and housing 
creation. In a comparative study of satellite city development in China and 
India, Chen et al. (2009) suggest that the state is actively enmeshed in the 
production of satellite cities.  
For reasons that I will detail later in this chapter, the Cambodian 
state is rather dysfunctional, from top political elites right down to low level 
civil servants. In a review of Cambodia’s post-conflict economic 
development in the 2000s, Hughes and Un (2011) conclude that economic 
growth has not been part of a rational developmental policy, because there 
is very little separation between the CPP and the regulatory state, the latter 
having a rather insignificant influence. In many cases, the ways in which the 
state assists developers to obtain land occurs in an informal way, and in this 
chapter I relate the situation in Cambodia to Ananya Roy’s (Roy, 2009b) 
ideas about the ‘informal’ nature of planning. This parallels debates in 
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urban theory which question the role of the state in urban governance under 
intensifying neoliberalism. On the one hand, some suggest that 
neoliberalism has weakened states as they have become co-opted by the 
‘peculiaristic demands’ of business (Springer, 2009b), while on the other 
hand, the state harnesses private capital in order to achieve development 
goals (Hall & Hubbard, 1998). By considering these two opposing 
statements, I discuss how neoliberal urbanism plays out in the Cambodian 
case.  
This chapter considers the issue of how satellite cities are 
(un)planned. In using the idea of ‘(un)planning’ I take inspiration from Roy 
(2003), who refers to ‘unmapping’ as the system of informality through 
which the state maintains flexibility in altering land use and acquiring land. 
There is not a clear boundary between planned and/or unplanned, and 
here I examine the ways in which the process is coincident and contested. In 
doing so, the chapter critically analyses the role of the state in urban 
planning and the state’s contradictory relationship with private developers. 
The chapter is divided into two major sections. Firstly, the chapter considers 
the various ways that the state plays a role in the development of satellite 
cities. The second section considers the opposing assertion that satellite city 
development is in some ways affected by weaknesses of the state.  
 
7.1 Role of the state 
Investment attraction 
Cambodia made the transition from a communist to a capitalist 
economy in the late 1980s. As part of this transition, the government created 
a new law on investment in 1994 that sought to encourage inward 
investment with the intention of developing the economy. This is in line with 
how governments worldwide are taking an increasingly proactive approach 
to attracting investment and assisting investors (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). 
The new law in Cambodia guaranteed that the country would remain a 
market-oriented economy and private land and industries would not be 
nationalised. Because of the years of war and upheaval, the state did not 
have the resources to develop every sector, thus private investment was 
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needed (interview 16, deputy director, Department of PR and Investment 
Promotion, CDC). Foreign investors have exactly the same rights as local 
companies, with the one exception of being unable to purchase land. The 
law specifies that companies can be fully foreign owned in almost all sectors 
of the economy, the corporate tax rate is low (20%), and profits can be freely 
repatriated (Royal Government of Cambodia, 1994).  
In effect, the government creates a ‘state of exception’ (Ong, 2006) 
through ‘geobribes’ (Harvey, 1989), which produce a more favourable 
environment for global capital. In terms of economic openness in Southeast 
Asia, Cambodia is second only to Singapore. The Council for Development 
of Cambodia (CDC) was established in 1994 as the ‘one stop shop’ for 
investors wishing to operate in Cambodia. The CDC brings together 
different government ministries and departments in order to accelerate 
investment approvals. Investment projects over $2 million are required to 
obtain a licence from the CDC, but for those projects involving capital of 
less than $2 million, investors can deal directly with the provincial or 
municipal level government. For projects worth more than $50 million, 
which are normally road building or hydroelectric schemes, investors must 
go directly to the Council of Ministers.     
In addition, the CDC works to promote Cambodia to potential 
investors overseas. Officials from the CDC – along with other government 
officials and business leaders – regularly travel abroad in an attempt to 
convince foreign investors to do business in Cambodia. Promotional trips 
are made most frequently to Korea, Japan and China. As well as money, 
foreign investment is viewed as a means of ‘technology transfer’, through 
which Cambodian companies can learn from their foreign counterparts: 
“the local business community also needs to learn, to get the technology 
transfer from the foreign investor” (interview 16, deputy director, 
Department of PR and Investment Promotion, CDC). This can help to 
“change the culture from agriculture to industry… When they have some 
industrial mindset, sometimes if they are smart enough they can start their 
own business” (interview 11, officer, CDC). But by giving investors the 
freedom to operate in all sectors, it is likely that local Cambodian companies 
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will lose business. Also, by freely repatriating profits, capital can exit 
Cambodia as easily as it entered. The government recognises this, but given 
that the Cambodian private sector was relatively undeveloped during the 
1990s when the investment law was formulated, they felt it was the best way 
to develop the economy. A senior member of staff from the CDC felt that 
Cambodians should not be worried by foreign investors because only they 
know how to do business in Cambodia, who to trust, and have a native 
knowledge of the local culture (interview 16, deputy director, Department of 
PR and Investment Promotion, CDC). 
Only a small number of construction investment projects register 
officially with the CDC. As Table 7.1 details, between one and five projects 
per year are recorded, because these figures only includes projects that are 
worth more than $2 million. Both Camko City and GPPIC applied for an 
investment licence from the CDC, which accounts for the large figure of 
over $2 billion in 2006. GPPIC and Camko City were granted incentives 
such as duty-free imports of construction materials and machinery. At 
Camko City, virtually everything from construction machinery to electrical 
appliances was imported from South Korea. Interior design products were 
initially imported from Indonesia for GPPIC, although construction 
materials are sourced locally or from Vietnam and Thailand to reduce 
transportation costs.  
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Table 7.1 Investment projects in the construction sector registered 
with the CDC  
(Source: CDC data) 
Year Number of 
Projects 
Registered 
Capital ($) Fixed Assets ($) 
1994 2 140,000 392,973,000 
1995 1 80,000,000 80,000,000 
1996 5 22,480,000 27,595,000 
1997 1 1,000,000 870,000 
1998 4 65,200,000 238,050,000 
1999 1 13,912,472 13,912,472 
2000 - - - 
2001 1 - 6,973,198 
2002-3 2 12,300,000 28,942,600 
2004 1 1,000,000 14,020,100 
2005 3 32,000,000 48,385,697 
2006 3 4,000,000 2,079,576,936 
2007 1 3,500,000 20,728,510 
2008 1 1,000,000 98,175,171 
 
Luring mobile capital also occurs at the municipal level. An earlier 
draft Masterplan of Phnom Penh14 from 2007, written by the Municipality 
in collaboration with a team of French urban planners stated that:  
“The rapid development of East Asia creates new 
concentrations of wealth that can be mobilized for the 
implementation of major urban development projects, major 
infrastructure or the establishment of management structures 
of large scale spaces. Phnom Penh needs to find ways to 
attract these funds to implement the projects most useful to its 
development without being guided by the whims of local and 
foreign investors and the uncertainties of circumstances” 
(Bureau des Affaires Urbaines, 2007).  
According to an official at the MPP, the masterplan is a tool to attract and 
control investment because it establishes a map of potential sites for 
development by investors (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). The masterplanning process will be critically discussed 
in more detail in the next section. In Shanghai, the government used two 
strategies to attract FDI to Lujiazui Free Trade Zone. Commentators used 
                                                
14 This version has now been taken from the website. I downloaded it in 2007. 
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the terms ‘building nests to attract birds’ and ‘alluring birds to build nests’ to 
describe these strategies. The first of these is where state development 
corporations build the infrastructure and office facilities to attract investors, 
whereas the second alludes to the situation where state development 
corporations transfer the rights to use large pieces of land to investors and let 
them develop the land (J P Wu & Barnes, 2008). It is the second strategy that 
has been used in the context of satellite city development in Phnom Penh.  
Facilitating large land acquisitions  
 In order to build a satellite city, large areas of greenfield peri-urban 
land must be acquired. In the Cambodian case this can occur in two ways. 
Firstly, developers can purchase land in the normal way through an 
exchange transaction with a seller. Secondly, they can be granted state land 
for development through a concession from the government. As was 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, the land for Camko City was purchased 
from a Cambodian who had prepared the land, and GPPIC is being built 
on land that was acquired and prepared by Ciputra’s local partner, YLP 
Group. Because these land deals happened almost a decade ago, 
information is difficult to find and developers were unwilling to divulge such 
potentially sensitive material. As the later parts of this chapter discuss, the 
lack of transparency of these deals represents one of the major challenges to 
effective urban planning.  
In the case of more recently developed satellite cities, more 
information can be gathered. Land has been granted as a concession to 
particular local companies for large urban development projects. For 
example, the government granted OCIC the right to develop Koh Pich, a 
100-hectare island in the Bassac River and a 387-hectare piece of land in 
Chruoy Changvar, to the north east of the city. In 2011, LYP Group was 
granted the entitlement to develop LYP Garden City on 1,300 hectares of 
land in Russei Keo district of Phnom Penh and Mok Kampoul district of 
Kandal province (Kuch, 2011). The way in which this is implemented is not 
normally influenced by any planning policy as will be discussed in the next 
section. Land is granted to these companies at very low prices because the 
government believes that the country will benefit in other ways. Indirectly, 
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the new developments benefit Cambodia through contributing to economic 
growth because they may attract foreign companies and create jobs. The 
increase in corporation tax revenue from the development companies, as 
well as new property taxes created from occupants, can be used by the state 
to fund other services.  
The national government attaches several stipulations to land 
concessions. These stipulations normally specify that developers should build 
urban infrastructure such as flyovers, roads, and bridges. This is a way for 
the infrastructure of the city to be improved despite the insufficient public 
budget. In return for the lease to develop Koh Pich, developer OCIC built 
the ‘7 January’ flyover on Russian Boulevard and new bridge and flyover at 
Kbal Thnol in the south of the city (Cambodia New Vision, 2012). In order 
to obtain the right to develop the Chruoy Changvar satellite city, OCIC are 
required to build the Stung Meanchey flyover and tunnel, and a bridge 
across the Tonle Sap river at an estimated total cost of $45 million. This 
equates to approximately $11 per square metre of land acquired, compared 
to a market price of several hundred dollars. The LYP Group built Preak 
Pnov bridge and a 7.3 kilometre road, which together form part of the 
planned outer Phnom Penh ring road. The road and bridge are operated as 
a ‘Build Operate Transfer’ agreement, whereby the LYP Group funds the 
construction of the road and bridge, and operates it for a certain period of 
time (whilst profiting from the tolls collected) before transferring it back to 
the government. At the inauguration of the ‘7 January’ flyover, the Prime 
Minister compared this financing arrangement, whereby developers money 
is used to finance Phnom Penh’s infrastructure projects, to the traditional 
Cambodian way of ‘packing palm sugar with palm leaves’ (Cambodia New 
Vision, 2012). Through this analogy the Prime Minister is alluding to the 
palm sugar being the city, supported by the palm leaf, which represents the 
infrastructures funded by developers. In contrast, satellite city developers in 
Indonesia have built roads without being forced to by the government, as 
they want to increase the accessibility of their projects (Winarso, 1999). In 
Manila too, large land development companies have funded highway and 
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light rail projects in order to increase accessibility in land that they own and 
wish to develop (Shatkin, 2008).  
For state land to be granted to a developer, the status of the land 
must be changed to state-private property. State-public land can be 
transformed to state-private land by the government through a Sub-Decree. 
According to Cambodian law, the requesting government body should file 
an application for land classification transfer with the State Land 
Management Committee. The committee then reviews the application and 
makes the proposal public so that comments can be submitted. After public 
consultation the committee drafts the Sub-Decree and submits it to the 
Council of Ministers for ratification (Royal Government of Cambodia, 
2005). When the reclassification of land has been authorised, this state 
private land can then be leased to a private company. Leases can last for 
terms of up to 99 years, which is more or less equivalent to private 
ownership. If the private company builds housing and sells to private buyers, 
parts of the land become private property (Thiel, 2010b). Through this 
process, the status of land ultimately is transformed from state land to 
private land (see Figure 7.1). As I will discuss later in this chapter, the 
arrangements for land concessions are often not decided in a publicly 
accountable manner, and the types of companies who are awarded state 
land for development are often in some way connected to high-ranking 
politicians.  
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Figure 7.1 From public to private property  
(Source: adapted from Thiel, 2010b) 
 
 
 
The situation in Cambodia from 2005-2006 onwards shares some 
similarities with the process of urban development in Indonesia during the 
1990s. In Indonesia, extensive areas of land on the fringe of large cities have 
been granted to private developers for the development of residential and 
commercial projects (Firman, 2000). In order to acquire land, developers are 
required to obtain a land development permit (ijin lokasi). Once a permit is 
issued, existing landowners and farmers are forced to sell their land to that 
developer at a fixed price. As a result of the land permit system, land on the 
fringe of Jakarta was largely controlled by private developers by the mid-
1990s. Between 1993 and 1998, 72,000 hectares of land were issued to 
developers, which is enough to house 8.5 million people if a density of 200 
people per hectare is assumed (Firman, 2000). Obviously, this supply of land 
is much more than the market demands. Although land development 
permits are supposed to discourage speculation by being renewed annually if 
at least 25% of the land has been developed, they have been widely abused 
for speculative land trading (Firman, 2000).    
Private property 
Private purchase contract between developer and buyer 
Leasing contract between municipality and developer 
State private land 
Sub-Decree 
State public land 
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Through this process the state works closely with the private sector to 
provide businesses with land to develop. But is the government acting in the 
public interest? The Cambodian government argues that these new projects 
will attract investment, create jobs and provide housing, as I will elaborate 
upon in the next section. Nonetheless, it is rare that a tract of land given to a 
developer is not used, owned, or inhabited by someone. Those people who 
live on, own, or farm the land have to be relocated. As has happened in 
Indonesia and Vietnam, local people are relatively powerless against the 
development corporations. There is a weak civil society because of 
government repression and surveillance at the village level, and citizens are 
more passive and less trusting of others because of the memory of the 
Khmer Rouge (Kerbo, 2011). According to the director of an NGO working 
with urban poor communities, whereas during the 1990s the government 
was more sensitive to people’s concerns, the views of civil society are no 
longer as respected:  
“Before the government had a plan, not just partnership 
between the government and the private sector, but everyone 
was a partner – like government, private sector, civil society, 
UN. They used to work together to develop the country. 
After this they changed the direction and the government 
began to work with the private sector as partner” (interview 
5, director, local NGO).  
 
For example, the land for the Chrouy Changvar City of the Future 
project was actually sold in 1994/5 by Prince Ranariddh, the former leader 
of FUNCINPEC, when they were part of the coalition government. 
Although close to the city centre, the land remained undeveloped because 
the bridge across the river was destroyed for much of the 1970s to 1990s. 
Although the land was sold, people continued to live on or cultivate the 
land, and this is technically illegal and thus they required relocating. In 
return, they have been offered a compensation package by the government 
of 500,000 riels (approximately $125) per month for a period of two years, 
or ownership of a shop unit in a nearby market (Cambodia New Vision, 
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2012). From speaking with government officers, there is a general 
acceptance that in order to develop the national economy, some people 
have to move to make way for development (interview 22, director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). The bigger picture of economic growth or wealth 
generation is valued more highly than certain individuals’ right to live where 
they desire. The former director of UN-HABITAT asserted that “the 
government does not care about the micro, only how to attract investors. 
They look at the bigger picture. So they see that this project will create how 
many jobs. Like Koh Pich was just farmland, now there is an exhibition 
centre, so a lot of jobs and economic activity” (interview 7, ex-director, UN-
Habitat).   
Rationalising satellite city development  
When Camko City was first announced it was one of the biggest 
single foreign investments in Cambodia’s history. Given the size and high-
profile nature of satellite city projects, they gain considerable government 
support. Developers often have private meetings with high-level politicians 
during the planning stage, and senior government figures regularly attend 
the groundbreaking and opening ceremonies of these projects. The 
construction and real estate sector is one of the government’s four economic 
priority areas – it represents around 13% of GDP (Ear, 2008). Taken 
together, the construction and real estate sectors contributed $886 million 
value added to the economy in 2006 (Guimbert, 2010). This was confirmed 
by a department director from the CDC who stated: “It can create a lot of 
jobs. This is the thing, that local people can benefit from the real estate, they 
can use their labour” (interview 16, deputy director, Department of PR and 
Investment Promotion, CDC). An urban planner at the MLMUPC also 
argued that despite many projects being aimed at the high-end market, “it is 
still good for Cambodia because that project provides a larger number of 
employment” (interview 12, deputy director, MLMUPC). Although the 
incentives given to the private sector cause the government to lose revenue 
via taxation, the wider benefits through new employment generation are 
that the “culture can be changed from agriculture to industry. And when 
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they have some industrial mindset, sometimes if they are smart enough they 
can start their own business” (interview 11, officer, CDC).  
In 2008 – at the peak of the real estate boom – it was estimated that 
the construction sector employed 45-55,000 workers (Soeun, 2008). This 
equates to around 3% of total employment (Guimbert, 2010). However, as 
the financial crisis mounted it was estimated that at least one third of these 
jobs disappeared (Slocomb, 2010). The Prime Minister has lauded the 
construction industry for its job creation potential: “This sector makes a 
significant contribution to poverty reduction by employing a large amount 
of people either as technicians, personnel, skilled and unskilled workers in 
construction sites across the country” (Cambodia New Vision, 2008). In 
2011, pay levels varied from around $4 per day for unskilled labouring 
work, to $150-$400 per month for skilled and technical workers, rising 
higher for some specialist engineers and architects. The unskilled jobs are 
generally casual and paid on a daily or weekly basis. This suits the workers 
who migrate from the countryside and return to their villages to assist with 
the main rice harvest in December. Money that construction workers remit 
to their families in rural areas is one way in which the rate of rural poverty 
can be reduced. The concentration of construction workers, who often build 
their own housing on-site, creates further demand for services. At the 
entrance of construction sites, temporary markets are built selling food, 
clothes and other goods to the workers.  
 A second way in which the development of satellite cities is justified 
is through potential creation of housing stock. The Governor of Phnom 
Penh, Kep Chuktema, said of the Chrouy Changvar City project: “Our city 
has about 10,000 new families moving here every year, so it’s a very good 
housing project investment” (Soeun, 2011b). An advisor to the MPP also 
stated that there is a need to “reduce the number of people who come to live 
in the [central] city” (interview 2, UNDP advisor, MPP). However, as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the housing in satellite cities is out of reach 
for the vast majority of Cambodians due to the prohibitively high cost. It 
was admitted by the MPP advisor that “the satellite cities that they build are 
for high class people. But the first objective is to reduce crowding in the 
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central city” (interview 2, UNDP advisor, MPP). Another scenario is that 
wealthier people will move to new satellite cities thereby creating an 
availability of housing for lower income groups. That is relying on the fact 
that those moving sell or rent their old house, which may not always be the 
case.  
There remains no housing policy in Cambodia that plans for low-
income housing provision. The government does not have the funds to 
subsidise housing production for low-income people. The National Housing 
Policy has been circulated as various drafts since 2004 although it has not 
yet been formalised (General Secretariat of Council for Land Policy, 2010). 
The policy proposes a number of alternative strategies to increase the 
production of low-cost housing for the poor, including government built 
housing for sale or rent and better cooperation with development partners 
and NGOs. The policy also suggested that the government could work with 
the private sector to construct housing developments where part of the 
building was sold at market rates while a proportion of the housing was sold 
at affordable prices. In China, the state still has a role in subsidising housing, 
and has implemented a system inspired by Singapore’s (Stephens, 2010). 
The state also maintains social housing for the very poor, although much of 
the public rental housing stock has been privatised during the 1980s and 
1990s and rural migrant workers do not enjoy the same privileges as the 
permanent urban population. Recently, the state has begun to put priority 
on social housing, and is planning to build 36 million subsidised apartments 
as a way to support low-income workers and boost economic growth 
(Areddy & B Davis, 2011). 
Satellite cities are also rationalised through the discourse that they 
will somehow improve the image of Phnom Penh. In the opening speech of 
a construction industry exhibition I attended, the Minister of Urban 
Planning, Land Management and Construction stated that “projects such as 
Camko City project, Grand Phnom Penh project, etc., shall boost the status 
of Phnom Penh Capital City into another advanced status” (Im, 2010). This 
process of image boosting is a central strategy of neoliberal urbanism, where 
cities are rebranded and repackaged in order to attract fickle mobile 
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investment (Harvey, 1989). Flyovers (elevated roads) have also been much 
praised by the local and national government in Cambodia, because of their 
perceived ‘modern’ image. At the opening of Cambodia’s first flyover, the 
Prime Minister commented that projects such as flyovers and tall buildings 
are a way to confer international status on the country so that it can become 
a ‘small dragon in Asia’ (Cambodia New Vision, 2010 in Paling, 
forthcoming). Flyovers are used as way to forge the global aspirations of 
cities by emphasising predictability and efficiency (Harris, 2011). The 
website of the MPP even proudly displays a 3D rendering of the Russian 
Boulevard flyover at the top of the homepage 
(http://www.phnompenh.gov.kh, last viewed 29/06/12).   
 
7.2 Challenges to urban planning 
Comprehensive urban planning is affected by a number of factors 
that widen the disjuncture between market-led urban development and the 
institutional and administrative capacity of the state. These include the 
absence of an adequate budget for urban development and planning, a 
shortage of suitable education and thus local expertise, the lack of laws 
directing urban development, and laws and policies not being implemented. 
More broadly, the weakness of the Cambodian state can be attributed to a 
number of reasons, as Hughes and Un (2011) recount. The awkward truce 
between the CPP and FUNCINPEC during the 1990s meant that 
government ministries were filled with supporters in a way that did not lead 
to an efficient administration. There is therefore very little separation 
between the state and the CPP (Kerbo, 2011). The weak rule of law resulted 
in the institutionalisation of corruption, only exacerbated by the short-term 
mentality of bureaucrats who wanted to hoard as much money as possible 
while they could, in case the country slipped back into conflict again. In 
addition, most educated elites were killed or fled during the 1970s, and 
nowadays many students going to study overseas find better prospects 
abroad, contributing to a brain drain.    
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Financial constraints 
In most countries the state funds roads and other public 
infrastructure. However, in Cambodia, the state does not have sufficient 
budget to finance these projects. As a result, most urban infrastructure 
projects are funded through foreign donor grants and loans. For example, 
many of the national roads have been financed through Chinese loans, and 
in Phnom Penh, the drainage and sewer system is being rehabilitated 
through a grant from JICA. In terms of urban research and policy 
formulation, the majority has been foreign funded. For example, the ADB 
recently completed an urban sector ‘assessment, strategy, roadmap’ 
document and the research leading up to the drafting of the Phnom Penh 
masterplan was funded by France (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Paris City 
Hall). However, this research is rarely translated into the Khmer language 
for the majority of people to understand. The extent to which this research 
influences urban policy is highly questionable.  
The budget of the MPP is controlled by national level ministries, and 
is therefore not autonomous. The Ministry of Interior approves the budget 
and the National Assembly must ratify it (Crosbie, 2004). Money raised 
locally by the MPP is transferred to an account at the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance, and the MPP later applies to the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance (MEF) when there are projects to fund. In 2003 the local revenue 
was $7.7 million, raised through six local taxes (alcohol sales, patents, vehicle 
registrations, slaughterhouses, vacant land, and vehicles) (Crosbie, 2004). A 
more recent urban sector report by the ABD struggled to find reliable data 
on municipal finances (ADB, 2010). The ADB reported that the most recent 
data suggests that the budget of the MPP equates to around $40 per capita 
per year, which has risen from only $2-4 per capita per year in 2000. There 
is no financing system for municipalities apart from central government 
grants (ADB, 2010). The funding system is also further complicated by the 
fact that municipal departments are accountable to their respective national 
level ministries (e.g. the MPP Department of Public Works is accountable to 
the Ministry of Public Works). The organization is therefore not well 
coordinated horizontally, which affects the delivery of inter-sectoral projects.  
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The low budget of the MPP means that civil servants in the MPP are 
paid extremely low salaries. In 2001, the maximum salary for a civil servant 
at the MPP was 165,000 riels ($41) per month while the minimum was a 
mere $7.50 per month (Etienne, 2005), although it is now $100-400 per 
month (pers. comm.). This salary is obviously insufficient to live in Phnom 
Penh. Thus almost all civil servants take time out to engage in other 
employment or do business of their own. For example, one member of staff 
interviewed at the MPP had a part-time job as an architecture lecturer. 
Some are also left to supplement their incomes through petty corruption and 
imposing unofficial charges for government services.  
 The lack of money available can be partially explained by the fact 
that the national priority is rural development. This is because Cambodia is 
still a predominately agricultural economy where approximately 80% of 
people reside in rural areas. Phnom Penh is the wealthiest area of the 
country and has significantly lower levels of poverty than rural areas. The 
poverty rate in Phnom Penh is 15%, compared to 36% nationwide (2001) 
(ADB, 2010). The child mortality rate in Cambodia is 14015, by far the 
highest in the region, given the poor access to healthcare facilities in rural 
areas (Ear, 2007). In addition, the majority of foreign investment is 
concentrated in and around the city. It therefore receives less funding from 
the national government and fewer aid loans and aid projects. One former 
urban NGO director commented that: 
“I worked very hard but no one paid much attention to urban 
development issues… Urban is not the real agenda here. 
Many development partners, they don’t want to do this work. 
They just see that 80% of people live in rural areas, but every 
day people move to the city. Many people do not understand 
the phenomena, and those who do are out of the system” 
(interview 7, ex-director, UN-Habitat).  
 
A related reason is that because of Cambodia’s history of war and genocide, 
the government has been weakened and is unable to collect sufficient 
                                                
15 Meaning 140 out of 1000 children born are likely to die before reaching five 
years of age.  
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revenue. During the conflict period, limited government funds were directed 
away from typical government functions and towards the military. Even in 
the present time, few people or companies pay the correct tax on their 
income or profits. Embezzlement of public funds is a serious problem 
(Hughes & Un, 2011). Cambodia is generally dubbed an ‘aid dependent’ 
country (Ear, 2007). In 2001, between 65% and 90% of the total public 
spending in the health, agriculture, transport and rural development sectors 
was accounted for by overseas development aid (World Bank, 2004).  
The ability of the MPP to generate revenue is limited, but it is 
beginning to change with the introduction of a property tax. The notion of 
introducing this tax in Phnom Penh was first floated in 2009, and the tax a 
property owner pays per year is equivalent to 0.1% of the property’s value. 
The tax is applicable in eight districts of Phnom Penh as well as 26 other 
towns, and does not apply to agricultural land or properties valued at less 
than 100 million riels (approximately US$25,000) (Phnom Penh Post, 
2011d). Properties are due to be registered by September 2011 with the first 
tax being collected in 2012. It has been predicted that the tax will bring in 
revenues of up to US$12 million in the first year for the MPP. In addition to 
the revenue created, the government intends this to be an exercise in the 
creation of a ‘tax culture’ that would facilitate the collection of more tax 
revenue in the future. The property tax is a progressive step since it avoids 
discriminating against the poor. Nonetheless, questions remain around the 
extent to which market prices can be determined at a time when values have 
been flat for a number of years, and the fact that possessors of land without 
legal land titles are not exempted even though they may be subject to land-
grabbing (Finch, 2011). The property tax is in addition to the property 
transaction tax which brought in US$20 million to the Municipality of 
Phnom Penh in 2010 (Phnom Penh Post, 2011e). 
The budget of the MPP is used to pay staff costs and provide basic 
services, as well as city beautification in order to attract investment. The 
mayor stated that there is a need to have a larger budget for projects 
because of the “need to compete with other cities in Asia” (Phnom Penh 
Post, 2011e). This is part of a global trend originally identified by David 
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Harvey (1989), who theorised the effects of neoliberalism on the city by 
illustrating how cities had moved from a ‘managerial’ to an ‘entrepreneurial’ 
mode of urban governance. He argued that in the period of advanced 
capitalism, urban governments began collaborating with a broader coalition 
of actors in order to advance the economic position of the city, especially 
through reimaging and place marketing to lure wealthy investors, residents 
and tourists. Although the concept was developed with European and North 
American cities in mind, it also holds considerable sway in Asia (Jessop & 
Sum, 2000; Pow, 2002). 
As mentioned earlier, large infrastructure projects have been funded 
by the private sector in return for obtaining land concessions. For smaller 
projects, such as road resurfacing, the MPP still does not have sufficient 
budget to do these works solely with state funds. Residents and businesses 
located along the street fund half the cost of the project, while the MPP 
collaborates with residents and funds the remaining half. Zhu (2010) found a 
similar situation in Jakarta, where limited government revenues have been 
spent on so-called beautification schemes, the development of certain key 
areas in the central business district, and new highways. 
Urban planning education and human resources 
While the shortage of public money is critical, the lack of planning 
skills and education is an equally serious issue. There are few institutions 
teaching urban planning, and even when it is taught, the subject tends to be 
adjoined to courses specialising in architecture or engineering. There are no 
programs that focus specifically on urban planning at Cambodia’s 
universities (interview 21, architect and lecturer, Royal University of Fine 
Arts (RUFA)). However, at the government-run RUFA, urban planning is 
taught in certain modules that form part of a degree in architecture. The 
same can be said for private universities, such as Lim Kok Wing University 
and Norton University. A number of Cambodians travel overseas for their 
studies. In particular, there are several funding programs available to study 
in Japan and France. There are various staff within the MPP and 
MLMUPC whom have studied abroad in the UK, USA, and France. Some 
had completed doctoral programs and other Masters degrees in urban 
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planning. Several other people interviewed over the course of this project 
had studied at the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok, which teaches 
urban planning at postgraduate level.   
The Khmer Rouge decimated the country’s education system and 
destroyed universities. Many of the most educated citizens were killed or fled 
the country. Vann Molyvann has tried to encourage engineering and 
architecture professionals who moved overseas to return Cambodia and pass 
their skills on to the next generation of students (Khouth, 2009). From my 
own experience of speaking with qualified students, even those who have 
advanced qualifications rarely want to work with the government. This can 
occur for several reasons. Firstly, because salaries are much lower than their 
expectations, and secondly, because they do not support the actions of the 
current political party in power and do not want to become absorbed within 
the system of patronage and corruption. These people tend to work in the 
NGO sector where salaries are higher because they are funded from 
international institutions or donor countries. Some have argued that the 
NGO sector has in fact distorted the Cambodian economy by attracting 
many highly qualified people and thus denying the private sector and the 
government (Godfrey et al., 2002). The private sector is a growing 
alternative for qualified workers, but salaries generally remain lower than in 
the NGO sector.  
 The lack of trained staff means that during the process of 
construction, checks on construction sites are not done adequately. One 
interviewee, for instance, commented that:  
“during the construction no one comes to control it, if it 
according to the plan or something like that. There are few 
architects, few engineers in the district office or cadastral 
office. So you can imagine one district very big with hundreds 
of construction sites. So they have around 30 staff, but among 
them, only a few of them are technical people. They don’t 
understand the problems and we have few resources” 
(interview 7, ex-director, UN-Habitat). 
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At the level of urban planning, there are too few people with experience and 
qualifications. For example, one respondent commented on the 
masterplanning process:  
“I think it needs more serious study and analysis... It costs a 
lot of money to do proper analysis. You can see in Singapore 
and Thailand the urban planning teams are very big. But 
here you go to the urban planning office there’s just a few 
French, a few Khmer... We don’t have the resource. So if the 
real estate want some place they just go by themselves” 
(interview 7, ex-director, UN-Habitat).  
 
This leads to a situation where private actors are the ones that have 
the necessary skills, as well as capital, for urban development. The same 
interviewee cited above directly correlated the lack of expertise and funding 
in urban development issues to the extent of large-scale private urban 
development on Phnom Penh’s urban fringe. He argued that “mostly 
growth occurred because the government did not have the ability to control 
this kind of thing… So the urban development are influenced by the private 
sector. They just develop where they can find a site” (interview 7, ex-
director, UN-Habitat). This view was corroborated by the manager of 
foreign property company which had purchased several pieces of land in 
Phnom Penh. He stated that “it feels as if we are leading the government, 
not the other way around” (interview 26, country manager, property 
development company). According to one respondent, the futuristic three-
dimensional renderings of projects such as Camko City amaze government 
officials, and they are accepted without adequate consideration of the 
impacts (interview 22, director, Office of Urbanisation, MPP).  
Lack of suitable legal and policy framework 
Earlier in the thesis (see Chapter 5), it was mentioned that the most 
significant piece of legislation governing urban development is the Sub-
Decree No. 86 on construction permits (Royal Government of Cambodia, 
1997). However, according to an MPP officer, this law is outdated and not 
suitable for large projects (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
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Urbanisation, MPP). Another respondent, a real estate legal advisor, 
perceived the laws and regulations relating to urban development to be 
particularly “flexible”, able to be interpreted in different ways for different 
purposes (interview 13, deputy managing director, legal firm). When the 
Sub-Decree was written, it was before the real estate boom period and thus 
there were no large urban development projects in the city. Since it was 
ratified, the type and pace of urbanisation has changed tremendously. As a 
result, a number of recently built large developments, for example Canadia 
Tower and Vattanac Tower, voluntarily follow American building standards 
in order to give a sense of security to potential clients.  
One respondent was concerned that the impacts of satellite cities on 
surrounding areas was going unmanaged because of the lack of legal 
framework. They commented that “so far there is no regulation for satellite 
city construction, for housing development that requires developers to make 
sure that they build the necessary infrastructure and make sure that there 
are no water problems” (interview 3, freelance urban planning consultant). 
The French team assisting the MPP proposed that for the Sub-Decree to be 
effective in regulating current urban development, further policies must be 
created. They suggested that these should include development plans that 
define where private transactions can take place, in order to ensure that that 
the city can benefit from projects to improve the urban structure (Blancot et 
al., 2008).  
Nonetheless, the legal framework is beginning to catch up. Sub-
Decree Number 39 on the organization and management of borei (gated 
communities and housing complexes) was approved in 2011. The goal of the 
Sub-Decree is to determine the organization and management of borei as 
well as to establish principles, mechanisms and procedures for the 
registration of land lots, residential lots, and other construction lands located 
within the premises of borei. The law is particularly designed to give a 
framework for the division of land parcels and property rights within a borei. 
The Sub-Decree differentiates a borei from traditional housing or apartment 
developments by affirming that the public spaces of a borei such as entrance 
and exit roads are to classified as ‘individual properties of the co-owners’. 
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This is in contrast to traditional housing or apartment developments which 
public spaces are ‘state public’ property (BNG Legal, 2011). Representatives 
from borei development companies were invited to a meeting at the MPP to 
inform them about the requirements of the new law. As a result, Camko 
City began creating official land titles for property owners (interview 29, 
manager, Camko City). The MPP pays occasional visits to borei 
developments in order to check their compliance with the new law, which 
involves checking the water supply, access routes and wastewater treatment 
facilities (MPP, 2011b).   
 
Sub-Decree Number 39  
on the Organisation and Management of Borei  
(dated 10 March 2011) 
 
Objectives:  
(i) To protect the lawful ownership rights of the lot owners and 
other lot owners having residential construction and other 
constructions, and the owner of the private part of the co-
owned building located within the borei premises;  
(ii) To facilitate the management works of borei and the 
management of lots, residential lot and other construction 
lands within the borei premises;  
(iii) Facilitate the owners of residences/houses and other 
constructions located within the borei premises in sale, 
exchange, donation, sanction, perpetual lease, creation of 
mortgage of his/her ownership in accordance with the law;  
(iv) To preserve all public spaces and to maintain the beauty of 
and social order within borei’s compound, and;  
(v) To enable and facilitate investors in the construction of 
borei for sale or rent within the Kingdom of Cambodia.   
 
(Source: DFDL Mekong, 2011) 
 
At the scale of Phnom Penh urban area, there currently exists no 
legally binding plan or policy for the future development of the city. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 5, a ‘strategic orientation’ masterplan for Phnom 
Penh has been under development with French assistance for approximately 
a decade. Yet the masterplan remains unapproved at the highest level, the 
Council of Ministers16. During this time, much has changed in Phnom Penh. 
                                                
16 I obtained maps and other parts of the masterplan from the MPP and in various 
reports and presentations, but the full up-to-date version is not published.  
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Most significantly, with the increasing value of land and the boom in 
property development a large amount of peri-urban land has been acquired 
by developers and investors from small-scale farmers and landowners.  
When land is almost entirely controlled by private companies and 
individuals, the role of the government becomes limited. One interviewee 
argued that inadequate urban planning was not directly caused by a 
weakness in governance by state. Rather it is because “the land in Phnom 
Penh does not belong to the government. If the government has land then 
they can plan or sell it to investors based on the masterplan. But here, the 
government does not have control” (interview 2, UNDP advisor, MPP). The 
government in Cambodia does not have a ‘land bank’ system, as some other 
countries do (Thiel, 2010a), and given the limited budget of the government 
they do not have enough money to acquire land. When private companies 
and individuals own large plots of land, it is difficult to build new public 
infrastructure such as roads.   
In a rapidly developing city such as Phnom Penh, there is a 
possibility to make huge profits through converting land from rural to urban 
use. Thus, speculation based upon the masterplan has become a problem. It 
has been reported that some individuals with insider information on the 
masterplan due to their high positions in the government are those whom 
are driving speculation in areas designated as having potential for future 
development (CDRI, 2007b). Companies have also purchased land in areas 
of future development potential. For example, in anticipation of better 
connections across the Mekong river, local company 7NG have bought 
large areas of land in the Aray Krasat area in order to profit from the huge 
jump in land value should that land gain better transport connections and 
become part of Phnom Penh (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). Land for sale can be marketed as being in a favourable 
location based on the masterplan. For example, the following text was taken 
from an advertisement from CBRE:   
“Moha Borei is a strategic satellite development opportunity. 
An important part of the Phnom Penh 2020 Master Plan, this 
149-hectare plot is uniquely positioned to benefit from new 
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bridge and road projects that will integrate Chruoy Changvar 
into the city. With direct access to National Road 6 and the 
Mekong and Tonle Sap rivers, the site stands to play a vital 
role in Phnom Penh’s future.”   
 
 The quote above illustrates how companies are using the masterplan 
as a way to find potential land to develop, but is the development of satellite 
cities specifically mentioned in the masterplan? According to an officer at 
the MPP, the overall vision for Phnom Penh is that the city should go from a 
monocentric to polycentric urban structure. There is a desire to spread 
development from the city centre to the suburbs (interview 10, vice director, 
Office of Urbanisation, MPP). The Phnom Penh masterplan identifies what 
are referred to as ‘secondary centres’ (Map 7.1). There are five of these, 
including industrial areas surrounding the planned new railway station in 
the west of the city (Samraong), leisure zones along the river, and a 
development pole around Ta Khmau in the south. However, although these 
‘secondary centres’ allude to development being spread out to the suburbs, 
they are not exactly ‘satellite cities’ of the kind which are now being built. 
Satellite cities appear regularly in MPP promotional material for 
conferences and exhibitions. One such government presentation refers to 
the satellite cities as ‘secondary centres’ (Map 7.2).  
One respondent who was working in the real estate industry bluntly 
argued that in reality developers ask the government for a suitable site for 
their project, and those sites are then included retrospectively in the strategic 
masterplan when construction permission has already been granted:  “I 
don’t think we can really say that there is a strategic plan in the true sense of 
the word. It’s as strategic as first come first served” (interview 4, country 
manager, international real estate agency). Various government 
departments have worked with GPPIC during their planning stage. The 
MLMUPC commented on the original plans, but an architect and planner 
from Ciputra remarked that “the MPP, I think they didn’t have any 
questions, as long as we follow their regulations. There we no significant 
comments at that time, so we just go ahead with it” (interview 28, urban 
176 
 
 
planner and architect, GPPIC). In June 2011 a development plan for 
northern Phnom Penh was approved, which specified road, drainage and 
public infrastructure in the area near to Camko City and GPPIC, although 
this is a reactive measure.  
In Indonesia too, the development of satellite cities has not always 
conformed to existing urban plans (Firman, 2004b). For example, the 
development of Bumi Serpong Damai satellite city in Jakarta was 
unchallenged despite the fact that the development contravened the Jakarta 
Metropolitan Development Plan of 1980 and the West Java Urban 
Development Project of 1985 (Winarso, 1999). A similar example is the 
development of Cikarang Baru satellite city, which was given development 
permission despite violating the spatial plans for the area and being built in a 
supposed conservation area (Firman, 2004b). Zhu (2010, p. 19) argues that 
“the state is explicitly absent from the implementation of township planning 
and management of township development. The development of private 
townships has not been directed by the government’s spatial planning 
strategy”. Without being guided by planning policy, private developers are 
driving the development of new urban areas such as satellite cities.  
There are many other examples where city masterplans have not 
been followed. In Vietnam, for instance, Ha and Wong (1999) have reported 
how FDI projects have frequently occurred in places that were not 
designated for development in the Ho Chi Minh City masterplan. In 
developing countries, masterplanning often remains from colonial times, 
when modernism and zoning policies were popular (Watson, 2009). Ansari 
(2004) writes that in India, masterplanning persists even though it is 
suffering from similar problems that led other countries, such as the UK, 
away from that approach. Overall, there has been a gradual shift in urban 
planning from ‘masterplanning’ towards ‘strategic planning’ and project-
based development, which focuses on smaller scale plans with shorter and 
more flexible timeframes, strategic levers of development (transport nodes, 
particular projects), and the incorporation of a wider range stakeholders 
(Beauregard & Marpillero-Colomina, 2011). This change came from the 
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importing of private sector strategic planning principles to the public sector 
(Bryson & Roering, 1987). 
Informal planning 
 The unsuitability and insufficient number of laws and policies to 
regulate urban development represent only part of the problem. A further 
challenge to urban planning is that laws and policies are often not 
implemented or ignored because property developers and individuals do not 
follow the stated procedures. As this section will explain, the problem is 
manifest throughout all levels of society. Given the sensitive nature of this 
matter, little information was gained from the formal interviews undertaken. 
However, data was acquired ethnographically during my time living in 
Cambodia through many informal conversations with contacts working in 
the private, public and NGO sectors.  
Small-scale constructions, for example new houses and property 
extensions, are widely built without obtaining the necessary construction 
permits and formal permissions. According to a survey conducted in 2004, it 
is estimated that around half (55%) of buildings in Phnom Penh were 
constructed without obtaining a construction permit (Crosbie, 2004). What 
often occurs is that someone who wants to construct a building goes directly 
to the commune or district office for authorisation in exchange for unofficial 
fees, rather than going through the correct procedures (pers. comm.). It 
should be noted here that small houses built by the poor from wood and 
other basic materials are exempt from requiring a construction permit. It is 
also commonplace for individuals to build or extend their property outside 
of the boundary of their land and for which they therefore do not have a 
legal title. In urban areas this occurs as properties encroach onto pavements 
or too close to roads. Through this process, attempts at zoning and 
masterplanning are gradually violated.  
At the other end of the scale, the developers of large urban 
development projects such as satellite cities generally meet with the Prime 
Minister and other high-level government officials before the project is made 
public. Thus projects already have the support of the most powerful actors 
and therefore any official planning evaluations or studies are either 
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undertaken reactively or not at all. For example, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 6, the managing director of Ciputra had a meeting with the Prime 
Minister of Cambodia, who then pledged his support for the project. When 
big projects are approved by the Prime Minister first, urban planners at the 
MPP are left only to facilitate. They are provided with the opportunity to 
comment on projects, but they have to be tactful and not overly critical 
(pers. comm.). Additionally, some property developers do not obtain the 
correct licenses. In 2011, the Ministry of Finance put out a public notice that 
several urban development projects had not applied for the necessary 
licenses to legally sell property (Hul, 2011).  
Although the project approvals may be already signed, some of the 
MPP staff interviewed highlighted their desire to influence projects and try 
to encourage developers to make their projects more open and less exclusive 
(interview 10, vice director, Office of Urbanisation, MPP). The MPP would 
like developers to include 35% open space and encourage affordable 
housing, but they have no legal powers and therefore they have been unable 
to enforce their proposals (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). They also try to encourage developers to include 
facilities, such as schools and hospitals (interview 10, vice director, Office of 
Urbanisation, MPP). Nonetheless, this policy is of questionable use because 
the experience of Indonesia exemplifies how policies such as this are rarely 
adhered to by developers (Dijkgraaf, 2000 in Firman, 2004a). According to 
the masterplan, the new road that passes through the centre of Camko City 
is designated at a major new thoroughfare leading out of the city. However 
an officer at the MPP was not confident that the developer would agree to 
the road being open to the public as it may disturb residents (interview 10, 
vice director, Office of Urbanisation, MPP). The new road (Angkor 
Boulevard) at present connects Camko City with Borei Angkor Phnom Penh 
and was funded by both developers (MPP, 2011c). 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the development of satellite 
cities is in some cases dependent on being granted land concessions, and in 
other cases, dependent on the developers being granted permission to build 
on land that is purchased. But who are the developers to whom concessions 
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and construction permissions are granted? They are often granted to 
companies owned by political elites, or at least those with close connections 
with the ruling party through patronage networks. According to a planner at 
GPPIC, the project began through high-level connections: “They have some 
relations...among persons, among friends. We knew one of the high-end 
[people] here, so from that we put it together” (interview 28, urban planner 
and architect, GPPIC). Ciputra’s local partner for developing GPPIC, YLP 
Group, is owned by the family of a Deputy Prime Minister and former 
military general. Similar sentiments were expressed by one interviewee 
pertaining to Korean companies: “they have the money, they have the 
connections with government” (interview 8, country manager, international 
real estate agency). This situation is even more pronounced with respect to 
the Boeung Kak development project in central Phnom Penh. In this 
instance, a company owned by a senator in collaboration with Chinese 
investors was given a 99 year lease concession to a 133-hectare lake for the 
below market value of $79 million (Bugalski & Pred, 2009). The lake was 
then almost entirely filled in, despite the fact that this is technically illegal 
under the 2001 land law. LYP Garden City is also owned by a senator. The 
company behind Koh Pich and Chrouy Changvar City, OCIC, is headed 
by Pung Kheav Se, who holds the honorific title of okhna17.  
Underneath the veneer of a formal legal framework, a complex and 
opaque network of informal relationships pervade Cambodia’s political 
economy at every level of society (Un & So, 2011). This is no less the case in 
urban development as any other sector of the economy. The political system 
has been described as one of ‘neo-patrimonialism’ (Cock, 2010). In this 
situation, the boundary between public and private is blurred and 
administration is “directed towards particularistic interests and personal 
benefits” (Cock, 2010, p. 245). The power of the prime minister is 
dependent on funding from his network of elites and business people, and 
the kinds of decisions made by the government therefore tend to favour 
either the decision makers themselves, or those with close access to them.  
                                                
17 Okhna is the title given to those who donate at least $100,000 to government 
development projects (Un, 2005).   
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The close relationship between property development companies 
and the state is something that occurs more broadly in a number of 
Southeast Asian urban contexts, and indeed in some respects worldwide. 
Two cities where the phenomenon is particularly pronounced are Jakarta 
and Manila. According to Shatkin’s (2008) research in Manila, large urban 
development projects rely on close alliances between public and private 
actors under a system of ‘booty capitalism’ (Hutchcroft, 1998 in Shatkin, 
2008). The private sector has filled the governance gap left by an incoherent 
state. In the Philippine case, a powerful family business called Ayala Land, is 
involved not only in property development but also in road and rail 
transport, electricity generation and water supply. Thus they have 
considerable influence on urban planning policy and the development 
direction of Metro Manila.  
The case of the Ciputra Group in Indonesia also demonstrates how 
personal and familial connections between developers and politicians have 
enabled companies to bypass planning regulations. Indonesia is generally 
termed a ‘crony capitalist’ state (P Evans, 1995). In Ciputra’s inception stage 
during the 1970s the company worked closely with Jakarta governors in 
order to acquire land at low cost. Later, under President Suharto developers 
became ever closer to the government. In effect they were “using their 
political leverage to bypass or manipulate regulations around land use and 
environmental protection” (Dieleman, 2011, p. 72). In some cases, relatives 
of Suharto were directly involved in the projects so they were able to operate 
in a relatively unrestricted environment. In the post-Suharto period 
cronyism was lessened but large urban development companies retained 
their powerful positions. Due to weak local government, developers still 
make the initiatives rather than follow government plans (Dieleman, 2011).  
This situation highlights the fact that informality is significant to 
planning in global South contexts. The concept of informal planning, 
central to Ananya Roy’s (2003, 2009b) work on Indian cities, suggests that 
the state is a “deeply informalised entity” (2009b, p. 81).  In the case of peri-
urban satellite city development, for instance, the state has the power to 
assign land concessions and to create ‘development zones’. In some cases, 
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these deals are not in line with the law. As I described earlier, projects such 
as GPPIC and Boeung Kak involved the filling in of lakes which defies the 
country’s land laws. Yet those actions, according to Roy (2009b), are not 
extra-legal because as undertakings of the state, they are a central part of the 
state’s power over territory. Writing of Europe, Swyngedouw et al. (2002) 
show how urban megaprojects proceed through ‘exceptionality’ measures in 
planning, such as bypassing statutory regulations and the creation of project 
agencies with special powers. However, in the case of Phnom Penh, I have 
shown that this occurs in a more informal way.   
 A related reason why laws and policies are not implemented is that 
the authorities are willing to speed up and bypass official practices and 
procedures in approving investment projects. An issue raised by several 
respondents is that Cambodia is so poor that it cannot afford to refuse 
inward investment. When urban development projects are proposed, few 
questions are asked. This attitude is encapsulated in the following comment 
from a senior government official, who stated that “I think we should 
welcome any kind of development at all” (interview 12, deputy director, 
MLMUPC). As mentioned earlier, the construction of Camko City has been 
stalled since the project financing was found to be illegitimate several years 
after the project broke ground. One interviewee argued that the first priority 
was to attract investment in order to create jobs and boost economic growth: 
“We were very closed and now people come to invest, so they 
said ‘come! I do not put pressure on you, I don’t know where 
the money come from. Because we need jobs, we need 
investment, we need to create economic opportunity for the 
people. So I don’t care about how much I screen you.’ So 
when we grow enough, when we have enough money, we 
could screen. But when we reach that time it is already too 
late” (interview 7, ex-director, UN-Habitat). 
A Korean trade and investment official also confirmed this, stating that 
“what makes Cambodia attractive is the government willingness, they are a 
poor country so they want to try their best to induce investment” (interview 
19, director general, KOTRA).   
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This is, however, not something limited to Cambodia. In India, 
Sivaramakrishnan (2011) has suggested that planning and the availability of 
money are in an inverse relationship. Urban planning occurs when there is 
little pressure from investment, while when there is more investment, 
development is prioritised over planning. In an entrepreneurial system of 
urban governance, private developers often demand looser planning 
regulations. This includes the deregulation of urban planning and 
development control regulations, as has occurred in Turkey (Osman, 2012). 
The situation is something that links neoliberal urbanism in different 
contexts worldwide. This includes developed countries, as Sandercock 
(1990) has discussed in relation to urban planning in Sydney.  
The lack of checks on inward investment means that the country can 
become known as a place to deposit illicit money. As one respondent 
commented: 
“I think there was even a correlation between the September 
11th bombings that led to increased oversight over places like 
Singapore as a source of money laundering. And under 
Cambodia’s relatively weak laws and relatively weak 
enforcement, quite a lot of money came in to Cambodia 
where it can be easily hidden… Without a stock exchange 
there is a limited number of asset classes for money to go into 
… and it went into land, buildings. The fact is that a lot of 
money has been moving around over the last 10 years trying 
to find a home, and a lot of it has moved towards Asia, 
especially those places which are least regulated” (interview 4, 
country manager, international real estate agency). 
 
Conclusions  
This chapter has argued that private sector satellite cities are not 
simply a response to the state’s incapacity to plan Phnom Penh’s 
development and provide infrastructure. Certainly, loose planning 
regulations mean that this kind of large-scale development can occur more 
easily than in places with more stringent planning regulations. Additionally, 
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the fact that the state does not have the budget to finance necessary urban 
infrastructure means that the private sector can take advantage of providing 
this to the growing middle class. However, I have argued that it is crucial to 
analyse the role of the state. Here it is the private sector who have mobilised 
the satellite city concept, the local or national government actors have not 
scanned the globe looking for best practice examples to ‘import’, as is the 
case in other research into the mobility of urban policies and concepts (Peck 
& Theodore, 2012). However, the state has a key role in other respects. The 
state rationalises the development of satellite cities through the promotion of 
discourses such as the provision of housing, the modernisation of the city, 
and the creation of jobs. The state also allows land acquisitions by certain 
development companies at below market prices, and attracts and 
incentivises investment. 
This research supports debates on the idea of urban informality in 
understanding urban processes (Roy & AlSayyad, 2004; Roy, 2009a, 
2009b). The production of satellite cities in Phnom Penh substantiates Roy’s 
(2009b) argument that informality is within, rather than outside, the 
operation of the state. The state also operates in informal ways. In this case, 
the peri-urbanisation of Phnom Penh through the construction of private 
satellite cities has proceeded without adhering to any masterplans or 
comprehensive planning processes. This informality is engendered through 
the interaction between regional capital and firms and the local state. This 
research also shows how within informal urbanism, the state and private are 
not clearly separate entities. Instead they operate together with a 
considerable overlap, often through personal friendship and professional 
networks. The next chapter will look in more detail at the regional networks 
through which satellite cities in Phnom Penh are produced.   
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8. Tracing the Production of Satellite Cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Camko City and GPPIC are two satellite cities that may on the 
surface appear similar, they are underpinned by varied and complex 
networks. In order to gain a fuller understanding of the development of 
these two satellite cities in Phnom Penh, this chapter takes a comparative 
focus and traces back these flows of expertise and investment to the 
respective origin countries of the companies – South Korea and Indonesia. 
This chapter also explores the political and economic factors that influence 
the companies’ opportunities to operate outside of their respective national 
economies. The companies behind each of these projects have different 
reasons for internationalisation and different relationships with the state in 
Cambodia and their respective countries of origin. This strategy resonates 
with McCann and Ward’s (2012) idea that research should present a critical 
analysis of the places where policies – or in this case, urban models, capital, 
and concepts – are assembled. I seek to expose the diverse connections 
between cities, not necessarily from the West but also intra-Asian in scope as 
a way to renounce binaries and hierarchies (Edensor & Jayne, 2012).  
Both Camko City and GPPIC were developed because the companies 
behind them possessed knowledge and experience in construction and/or 
satellite city development and had perceptions of Cambodia’s future 
potential. However, the development of GPPIC is driven more by the 
networks of the Ciputra company itself, and ultimately the company’s 
creator of the same name, Ir. Ciputra18, which has begun expanding its 
                                                
18 ‘Ir.’ is the title for an accredited professional engineer, from the Dutch word for 
engineer.  
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business activities from Indonesia to overseas places such as Phnom Penh, as 
well as a number of other cities in Asia. The scale of private sector satellite 
city development in Indonesia is much larger than it is in South Korea, and 
the Ciputra company pioneered this model of private urbanism. Camko 
City, on the other hand, is less dependent on the activities of one company, 
and more bound up with the close political and economic ties between 
Cambodia and South Korea. These close ties, along with the perception by 
South Korean investors that Cambodia would replicate their country’s 
success and rapid economic development, and the similarities of the business 
environment, have led to high levels of South Korean investment in 
Cambodia.   
While the two case study satellite cities are developed by South 
Korean and Indonesian companies, I am also mindful of Peck and 
Theodore’s (2012) assertion that researchers should maintain a ‘reflexive 
methodology’. In their words, mobility occurs across “distended networks of 
relationally connected sites” (Peck & Theodore, 2012, p. 29), and thus 
research strategies should be flexible to unexpected deviations in policy 
mobilities. The development of Camko City and GPPIC in Cambodia is 
greatly influenced by economic, political and cultural factors in Korea and 
Indonesia. But these are not the only poles of influence, and there are 
various other economic, political and sociocultural relations that stretch 
across space. China and Vietnam are another two countries where a large 
amount of Cambodia’s foreign investment originates. The role of French 
actors in the production of the Phnom Penh masterplan also highlights the 
persistence of colonial ties, where Parisian urbanism and expertise are used 
as a reference point. There is a long history of the mobility of French 
urbanism and planning knowhow as a colonial endeavour (Wright, 1991).  
At the same time, other transnational connections have a significant 
influence on Phnom Penh. Urban planners and high-level officials from the 
MPP have travelled to places including France, Sweden, South Korea, 
Singapore and the USA in order to attend summer schools, conferences, 
and study trips. These programmes are organised (and normally also 
funded) by foreign governments, NGOs, and other international 
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associations. Through these travels, international ‘best practices’ (Peck & 
Theodore, 2010) are absorbed and sometimes implemented in Phnom Penh. 
In the other direction, water supply in Phnom Penh is widely viewed as a 
model for developing cities, as the Phnom Penh Water Supply Authority has 
managed to rehabilitate the water supply system and provide affordable 
water to the vast majority of cities, even conforming to World Health 
Organisation (WHO) standards for safe drinking. This is just to name a few 
of the myriad and complex networks that link cities regionally and globally. 
The networks are for the most part intra-Asian in scope. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, I 
discuss the flows of capital from both South Korea and Indonesia to 
Cambodia. South Korea is one of the biggest investors in Cambodia, and 
the two countries have a strong relationship. Indonesia, however, is not a 
significant investor in Cambodia, and Ciputra’s GPPIC project is one of the 
major Indonesian investments. These differences are partly due to the 
varying roles of the state in Indonesia and South Korea. The second section 
analyses the reasons for investment between the two countries and 
Cambodia, particularly the role of future predictions for Cambodia’s 
development. Thirdly, the chapter goes on to consider the mobility of city-
building knowledge. This includes discussing the development of South 
Korean construction companies and Ciputra’s expertise in private satellite 
city development. The final section focuses specifically on the mobility of the 
satellite city concept. In the case of Camko City, the developers did not 
explicitly ‘copy’ any satellite city in Korea, nor had the company any prior 
experience of satellite city development. The Ciputra project, on the other 
hand, involved the clear transfer of the company’s concept developed in 
Indonesia to Cambodia.   
 
8.1 Flows of urban development capital 
 With the increasing liberalisation of the global economy, property 
markets have become ever more globalised (Haila, 2010). Yeung (2010) 
suggests that East Asian economies are now prioritising articulating 
themselves in the global economy as a way to promote economic growth, 
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rather than relying solely on domestic business operations. This section will 
discuss the flows of urban development capital driven by private companies, 
which are one of the dimensions of flow that influence the production of 
satellite cities.  
The ‘Korean construction wave’   
In October 1996, South Korea resumed diplomatic ties and 
established a permanent mission in Cambodia for the first time since they 
were severed in 1975. Before 1996, given Cambodia’s historical alignment 
with the communist bloc, the country in fact had a strong relationship with 
North Korea. This connection stems back to the 1960s, when King 
Sihanouk was a close friend and ally of Kim Il Sung. After Sihanouk was 
deposed in a military coup in 1970, he retreated to North Korea to live in a 
sprawling palace built as a gift by Kim (Snook, 2012). Although ties with 
South Korea were resumed in 1996, it was not until 2004 that Prime 
Minister Hun Sen convinced Sihanouk to give up his opposition to a 
relationship with Seoul.   
 Korean companies began to scope out investment opportunities after 
this point. As shown in Figure 8.1, the level of Korean investment began to 
pick up after 2004 and has been rather erratic since then. During 2006 and 
2008, the highest amounts of investment were reported, peaking at $1 
billion and $1.2 billion respectively. The surge in investment occurred after 
former president Roh Moo Hyun made the first state visit to Cambodia in 
November 2006, along with an entourage of investors and other business 
executives (Minder, 2008). After the onset of the global financial crisis in 
2008, levels of investment have been lower. As will be discussed later in the 
chapter, real estate and construction accounted for 71% of all Korean 
investment by 2010, while manufacturing represented another 10%. The 
remaining proportion was made up mostly of retailing, finance, hospitality 
and mining businesses (KOTRA, 2010). In 2008, Cambodia was the biggest 
recipient of South Korean investment after China (Minder, 2008). South 
Korea’s investment has been particularly high in Southeast Asia, which 
increases the inter-dependence between South East Asian countries and 
more wealthy nations of Northeast Asia (Song, 2003). 
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Figure 8.1 South Korean investment in Cambodia, 2000-2010  
(Source: KOTRA, 2010) 
 
 
 
Parallel to these investment flows has been the formation of 
significant South Korean business networks, with at least 550 South Korean 
companies operating in Cambodia (KOTRA, 2010). With respect to the 
urban development industry, South Korean capital has been brought in 
through South Korean banks; construction machinery and materials have 
been imported from South Korea (sometimes with generous import tax 
exemptions); and South Korean construction companies, architects, 
engineers, surveyors and property lawyers are working in partnership with 
developers. These networked enterprises provide the tangible support for the 
mobility of urban form (Guggenheim & Söderström, 2009). All this has 
resulted in a significant migration of South Korean professionals to 
Cambodia, and estimates range from 7,000 to 10,000 (Lindstrom, 2008). 
However, many of them have now departed given the post-2008 slowdown 
in the market; the number is said to have halved by 2011 (interview 18, 
chairman, Korean Chamber of Commerce). In addition, South Korean 
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tourists accounted for a larger proportion of visitors to Cambodia than any 
other nation, at 16% of total tourist arrivals (Chheang, 2008). 
 Besides investment, South Korea has a much broader influence on 
Cambodian life through the popularity of Korean soft culture. Korean 
dramas and films are regularly aired on television and Korean pop music is 
consumed via local music television channels. Korean content accounts for 
well over half of airtime on local entertainment channel MyTV. During the 
early evening in Phnom Penh’s parks, teenagers and young adults gather to 
perform synchronised dance exercises to the sound of Korean pop music. 
Shops in the capital display Korean inspired fashion for the middle class 
youth who desire to emulate the celebrities they idolize (Sok, 2011). In 
addition, Korean language lessons have become popular with motivated 
young Khmers looking to take advantage of job opportunities with Korean 
businesses (Neth, 2009). The Royal University of Phnom Penh launched a 
Korean language department in 2007.  
 Prime Minister Hun Sen is said to hold special regard for his 
country’s relations with South Korea. This was highlighted when he 
personally led the rescue mission for a plane carrying South Korean tourists 
that crashed on Bokor mountain in 2007 (Minder, 2008). One government 
official interviewed believed that the Korean president’s personal friendship 
with Hun Sen and affection for Cambodia is a large determinant of Korean 
investment flows. He said:  
“We have a strong relationship between the government of 
Cambodia and the government of Korea... There is a 
relationship between the Prime Minister of Cambodia and 
the Prime Minister of Korea. He used to be the economic 
advisor to Hun Sen. So he always goes to promote Cambodia 
to Korean investors in Korea. So I can tell you, most of the 
leaders in the region, they were not able to drive a car from 
Phnom Penh to Siem Riep. Only the Korean president! He is 
able to bring Boeing 747 to land in Cambodian territory, and 
he drives a car from Phnom Penh to Siem Reap. They 
[Koreans] are really confident in Cambodia! It’s just a feeling 
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that they are not afraid to do business or live in Cambodia. It 
leads from the president” (interview 16, deputy director, 
Department of PR and Investment Promotion, CDC). 
This highlights the importance of social connections and personal 
friendships in the formation of transnational networks (Bunnell et al., 2012).  
Considerable intra-Asian business networks are forged by companies 
investing between nations that have less developed governance institutions 
and higher levels of corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). It is in this 
way that the high level of Korean investment in Cambodia is in part due to 
the fact that Koreans claim to feel comfortable doing business in Cambodia. 
Therefore, in many cases, the largest investors in developing countries are 
companies that are also from within the East Asian region. Returning back 
to Cambodia and South Korea, South Korean companies are not so 
deterred by the corruption and ‘under the table’ deals sometimes required to 
obtain necessary permissions and support from the government. According 
to one respondent, “Korea and China, they understand the ways of 
working. Japanese prefer things to be clear and transparent, so they don’t 
like to come to Cambodia” (interview 7, ex-director, UN-Habitat). Similarly, 
an urban development consultant commented that “one thing that seems to 
be very difficult for Japanese companies is that they keep asking for 
guarantees, for law enforcement, they always start off with that. Whereas for 
some other companies like those from South Korea, it’s more 
straightforward” (interview 3, freelance urban planning consultant).  
The Korean economy is dominated by chaebol, business groups which 
are known for their close links with politicians and their family-controlled 
nature (Dent, 2002). The majority of chaebol were created between 1945 and 
1960 and financed mostly by the gains made from obtaining land from the 
state at below market rates. This allocation process is said to have nurtured 
rent-seeking and encouraged collusion between the chaebol and the state (C 
H Lee, 1995). More recently, it is argued that these conglomerates continue 
to be managed in a non-transparent way (Y-I Lee, 2003). The Korean 
chaebol consequently fit in rather well with the Cambodian system of patron-
client relations. The way in which Cambodian enterprises have obtained 
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state land (see Chapter 7) also bears similarity with the Korean system.  
Countries with stricter rules governing business activities, such as 
European nations and Japan, are reluctant to invest in Cambodia. British 
companies, for instance, may face difficulties doing business in Cambodia, 
given the Bribery Act of 2010, influenced by the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption, which criminalises the corrupt business practices of UK 
companies’ operations abroad. Despite the Cambodian governments’ 
official discourse of reducing corruption in response to pressure from 
international lending agencies and Western aid donor countries, it still 
remains central to the country’s political-economic culture (Hughes & Un, 
2011). This is the major rationale for why the most significant investors in 
Cambodia are from the East Asian region. 
Indonesian connections 
While South Korean companies dominate the field of foreign 
investment in urban development in Cambodia, they are by no means the 
only players. As was mentioned in Chapter 6, Grand Phnom Penh 
International City is a satellite city being developed by the Indonesian 
company Ciputra, in collaboration with a local Cambodian partner 
company. In comparison to South Korea, Indonesia does not have a 
particularly large presence in Cambodia in terms of investment, nor 
significant political and cultural ties. The development of GPPIC is more 
down to the strategy of the particular company behind the project.  
 Migration and business links between Cambodia and Indonesia are 
relatively weak. Indeed, at the time of writing there are no direct flights 
between the two countries, making it the only East and Southeast Asian 
country – excluding Brunei and Japan – without a direct air link to 
Cambodia, in spite of Indonesia’s geographical proximity and the fact it is 
home to almost a quarter of a billion people. Even so, a visa waiver 
agreement has been in place between the two nations since 2010 (G Q 
Wang, 2010). The Indonesian community in Phnom Penh is thus relatively 
small. Politically and economically, Indonesia and Cambodia are bound 
together through their membership of ASEAN, which Cambodia joined in 
1999 and is the chair of in 2012. The ASEAN Free Trade Area is designed 
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to facilitate trade in the region, and Cambodia views rice exports to 
Indonesia as an important future growth area (Weinland, 2012). Through 
ASEAN, Indonesia has also acted as an official mediator and observer of the 
Thai-Cambodia border conflict in 2011 (Y M Wang, 2011).  
 Foreign investment flows from Indonesia to Cambodia are relatively 
small. Up to now, most Indonesian investment has been in the agricultural 
industry, particularly rubber plantations (Sieam, 2012). Both countries 
would like to increase investment ties, as was highlighted when the 
Indonesian foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, made an official visit to 
Cambodia in 2012. The aim of the visit was to boost trade, investment and 
tourism. The minister pledged to promote Cambodia to investors back in 
Indonesia as a place to do business, particularly in the agro-industry, rice 
milling and telecommunications sectors (Hui, 2012). Ciputra is one of the 
most significant Indonesian investors in Cambodia up to date. 
 Although the Ciputra Group began developing projects in the large 
cities of Jakarta and Surabaya, the company has followed two strategies of 
expansion. Firstly, it has begun to operate in smaller and more provincial 
cities. Besides Jakarta, Ciputra has developed housing projects in 
Balikpapan, Samarinda, Makassar, Bandar Lampung, Yogyakarta, and 
Kendari, and several other cities. Most of these projects are smaller, at 
around 30 hectares (Bisnis Indonesia, 2008). Indonesia’s smaller cities have 
become more attractive given the shifting patterns of wealth, better 
transport links, and more regional autonomy under Indonesia’s 
decentralisation program (Bunnell & Miller, 2011; Dieleman, 2011). The 
second strategy, the focus here, has been to expand operations outside of 
Indonesia’s national borders.  
 Ciputra currently has three satellite cities under development 
overseas. Besides Grand Phnom Penh International City, which was 
described in detail in Chapter 6, the two other projects are located in Hanoi, 
Vietnam and Shenyang, China. Ciputra Hanoi International City was 
Ciputra’s first foray overseas in 2002, and Hanoi’s first large-scale urban 
development project. The project covers an area of 301 hectares on the edge 
of the city and is projected to cost US$2.1 billion (Douglass & Huang, 2007). 
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Grand Shenyang International City is the most recent of Ciputra’s regional 
projects, and was announced in 2009 (Wikrama, 2009). Shenyang is a 
secondary Chinese city with a population of around six million people, 
located in the northeastern province of Liaoning. Construction of this mega-
project commenced in 2010 and the first phase is nearing completion in 
2012. The development is modelled on one of Ciputra’s other projects in 
Indonesia, Citraland Surabaya (Nursyifani, 2012). Originally, Ciputra 
announced that it would build two additional satellite cities in China – in 
Nanjing and Jiashan – but these plans were later withdrawn (Asia Pulse, 
2009).  
 These three overseas projects are predicted to represent 
approximately 20% of Ciputra’s total sales in 2012 (Cahyafitri, 2012). At 
present, the company is aiming to remain focused on the three large-scale 
overseas projects in Hanoi, Phnom Penh and Shenyang rather than 
beginning any new developments in other Asian countries (Cahyafitri, 
2012). However, this statement was contradicted by a representative from 
Ciputra, who declared that the company is considering investing in a new 
project in Poland, and is scoping out possibilities in the Middle East 
(interview 28, urban planner and architect, GPPIC). It was also reported in 
2011 that Ciputra is looking to build two satellite cities in Malaysia, one in 
Kuala Lumpur and another in Johor Bharu (Latif, 2011), and was exploring 
possibilities in Myanmar and Laos (Dewi, 2011).  
 Not all of Ciputra’s overseas projects have been a success. Kolkata 
West International City was announced with much praise in 2004, as it was 
the first example of foreign direct investment in an urban development 
project in India (Saha, 2006). The development was a joint venture between 
Indonesian companies Salim Group and Ciputra, and Universal Success 
Enterprises (USE) based in Singapore. The founder of USE is a Non-
Resident Indian with close personal ties to Indonesia, as his first business 
was an oil company based in Jakarta (Univeral Success Enterprises (USE), 
undated). However, Ciputra have since pulled out of the project as the 
construction is stalled. It is said that the development could not go ahead 
because the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, which acquired 
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the 390 hectares of land required, transferred only part of it to the 
developers on a long-term lease (Basu, 2011). The developers could 
therefore not obtain adequate finance because they were unable to use land 
as a security. This was exacerbated because by the time the Indian 
authorities had completed an environmental impact assessment and issued 
the necessary permissions, the global economic crisis had begun.  
The networks of ideas and capital are complex, and not simply 
operating in a unidirectional sense between Indonesia and Cambodia. The 
Ciputra Group’s international projects are ‘filtered’ through Singapore, as 
those projects are operated through a holding company called International 
City Development Pte. Ltd., based in the city-state. Here, the company 
employs Singaporean staff, and a proportion of the capital required to 
develop the projects is raised there. The Ciputra Group holds majority 
ownership of the projects, while another proportion is owned by the project 
partners in China, Cambodia and Vietnam. These joint-venture agreements 
with local companies are organised such that the local company owns the 
land, provides part of the capital, alongside crucial local knowledge and 
connections, while Ciputra is the developer responsible for the concept, 
design, and implementation (interview 24, country director, Korea Global 
Construction Office). Local influences are also discernable. In the 
Vietnamese case, Ciputra works with a local state-owned company, while in 
China, they work in partnership with the local government who have the 
ultimate authority over land (Latif, 2011). The state has an important role, 
both in the local contexts where satellite cities are being developed (see 
Chapter 7), and in the countries where the investment originates from, as is 
discussed in the next section. On the other hand, networks extend out from 
Cambodia to Indonesia. A group of urban planners went on a study tour to 
Indonesia. According to one respondent this was “so that these senior staff 
can learn the experience from Indonesia. And then how we can adapt to the 
Cambodian context… They have the same kind of issues that Cambodia 
has. So it could be very useful lesson for Cambodia” (interview 12, deputy 
director, MLMUPC).   
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 Ciputra is not the only Indonesian company with regional urban 
development operations. The Lippo Group has also made smaller overseas 
investments in Singapore, including the Marina Square shopping mall and 
other residential developments in the city-state (Dick, 2009). The same 
company is even developing a satellite city called Midan City in South 
Korea, through its subsidiary, Lippo Incheon. The Lippo Group is involved 
in a vast range of business, from financial services to retailing, and operates 
throughout Asia; including China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore 
(Lippo Group, 2011). As pointed out above, the Indonesian conglomerate 
Salim Group was involved in Kolkata West International City alongside 
Ciputra. Dick (2009, p. 198), writing of several leading Asian property 
developers, states that Ciputra is in fact “the least sophisticated, least 
diversified and least globalised of the property conglomerates”. He suggests 
that Ciputra’s internationalisation has been limited by the group’s inability 
to raise finance.  
Local political and economic factors in Indonesia also influence the 
company’s regionalisation. Given the success of Ciputra’s projects, their 
ideas have been copied by many other developers. They are in fact no 
longer the leading urban development company, having lost their position to 
the Lippo Group (PT Lippo Karawaci Tbk., 2012). In addition, there are 
many other companies developing satellite cities. For example, Bakrieland 
Development, the largest landowner in Indonesia, announced in 2010 the 
development of a new satellite city that could one day extend to 35,000 
hectares and house national government buildings (Jakarta Post, 2010). With 
this stiff competition at home, the company anticipates that there are greater 
opportunities to be had abroad in places where satellite cities have hitherto 
been a less common form of urban development (Jakarta Post, 2011).  
 From the perspective of developers, Indonesia’s property market is 
more tightly regulated with respect to foreign ownership than other 
countries in the region and thus the potential for sales is limited to domestic 
buyers. In Indonesia, the government does not permit foreigners to purchase 
property easily; they can only obtain a 25-year lease, with the subsequent 
possibility to renew it after a further 20 and 25 years. In other countries, 
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such as Malaysia, foreigners can lease property on a 99-year basis (Asia 
Pulse, 2008). The company has also has reported experiencing difficulties 
acquiring land in Indonesia, in their view, because of a lack of business-
friendly regulations and incentives (Asia Pulse, 2008). As I have illustrated 
previously, in other countries, the government has given considerable 
support for property developers to obtain land for development. It has also 
been suggested that ethnic Chinese businesses in Indonesia have been 
encouraged to seek opportunities overseas because of discrimination and 
targeted violence against Chinese people in Indonesia (Carney & Dieleman, 
2011).   
Role of the state 
While it is private capital being invested, the role of the state is also 
important. The South Korean government has had a key role in supporting 
businesses who wish to operate overseas, and promoting overseas investment 
as way to increase economic development. In the period after the Korean 
War, inward investment and domestic growth were promoted over FDI. 
Nevertheless, as South Korea developed rapidly, local opportunities began 
to be exhausted and wage increases reduced the competitiveness of South 
Korean products compared to lower cost countries (Jae, 2007). Combined 
with state efforts to encourage internationalisation, this increased the 
number of South Korean businesses expanding overseas (Wad, 2002).  
 Overseas FDI by South Korean firms has been permitted since 1968, 
but it was not until the 1980s segyehwa (internationalisation) policy that it was 
actively state-supported (Dent, 2002). Overseas FDI was further liberalised 
during the 1990s under pressure from the WTO. In the early period during 
the 1970s most overseas investments were in the forestry industry. During 
the 1980s, small and medium size companies began to explore overseas 
opportunities, particularly in the manufacturing sector. Larger companies, 
especially the chaebol, started to venture overseas during the 1990s, because 
they were best placed to take advantage of the newly deregulated 
environment (E M Kim, 2007). Chaebol encompass a wide range of business 
areas and therefore diversified the economic sectors involved in 
internationalisation, particularly towards electronics and technology (Y C 
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Kim & Y-R Choi, 2004). The Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
(KOTRA) was established in 1962, and is a government agency under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy. The organisation is 
represented in 76 countries worldwide. KOTRA has an office in Phnom 
Penh and its major duty is to assist Korean companies operating in 
Cambodia, although offices in developed countries tend to focus more on 
directing investment from foreign countries to Korea (interview 19, director 
general, KOTRA). On a related note, Korean investment in Cambodia is 
part of a strategy to spread risk by avoiding having all their investments in 
China (Minder, 2008). This is especially the case for companies operating 
garment and footwear factories, who wish to take advantage of the lower 
labour costs in Cambodia compared to China. The construction and real 
estate development industry in particular is one of Korea’s key globalised 
industries, and this is analysed in section 8.3. 
The internationalisation of South Korean construction companies is 
institutionalised within a national state policy for globalisation. South 
Korea’s economic success is centred on close relationships between business 
and the state. This is similar to Singapore, another country with an explicit 
policy to expand its economy outside of national borders (Phelps, 2007). 
Although the South Korean developmental state has been gradually 
dissolved since the 1980s (Pirie, 2007), it was these neoliberal reforms that 
made possible outward FDI. The restructuring of the economy around 
neoliberal principles did not necessarily lead to a small state, and with this 
form of ‘developmental neoliberalism’ (B-D Choi, 2012) the state still 
intervenes in restructuring and regulating the economy. While I have 
suggested that the state supports the internationalisation of South Korean 
firms, others argue that the overseas operations of companies is reflective of 
how they are freeing themselves from state control (Y T Kim, 1999). 
However, in the Indonesian case there is no formalised state-led 
policy for the internationalisation of Indonesian businesses. Indonesia does 
not maintain a network of investment promotion offices in foreign countries; 
it only has a department within overseas embassies tasked with assisting 
potential foreign investors. The Indonesian state is likely to have neither the 
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budget nor the human resources to realise such a programme. While South 
Korea had a cohesive developmental state inherited from the Japanese 
colonialists, the Indonesian state has a different colonial legacy which led to 
a much less cohesive state without a developmental structure (Vu, 2007). 
Leadership was fragmented and dominated by unstable political factions.  
The ways in which Ciputra has developed a satellite city in Phnom 
Penh is therefore much less influenced by the Indonesian state. The 
relationship between the Ciputra Group and the Indonesian state was less 
formal and more a type of patronage. As was mentioned earlier, Ir. Ciputra 
used his close relationship with state in the early days of his career to 
advance his business interests. These patron-client relationships were 
hallmarks of the New Order period under President Suharto (1966-1998). In 
the post-Suharto years, Ciputra has operated more independently, as the 
country has become relatively less relationship-based and more market-
based (Dieleman & W M Sachs, 2008). These political-economic alliances 
have led to certain ethnic Chinese companies gaining privileged access to 
resources and markets. Yeung (1999) suggests that as companies 
internationalise, these alliances do not work, except in enabling the 
companies to accumulate enough capital at home to expand overseas. The 
Salim Group, for instance, used monopoly rents gained from Indonesian 
operations to purchase affiliates in Hong Kong and Singapore. However, as 
I explained in the previous chapter, these kinds of business practices and 
political-economic alliances persist with respect to Ciputra’s overseas 
activities in countries with weaker legal frameworks, such as Cambodia. 
 
8.2 Geographical imaginaries 
In the case of both satellite cities, the decision to invest in Cambodia 
was based upon imaginaries of Cambodia’s future development. South 
Korean businesses were one of the first to observe the potential in 
Cambodia as it emerged from almost three decades of war and political 
instability. The situation in Cambodia reminded them of what they had 
experienced in South Korea after the Korean War, when the country 
developed rapidly and property prices and land values increased 
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exponentially. In 1960, South Korea was one of poorest countries in the 
world, but four decades later, in what has been dubbed the ‘Korean 
miracle’, the economy had been transformed into world’s 15th largest (Pirie, 
2007). South Korea’s transition happened so rapidly that it occurred during 
the adult lifetime of the businesspeople investing in Cambodia. South 
Korean investors predicted that development as fast as Korea’s would 
happen in Cambodia. For example, it was mentioned by one respondent 
that “the background situation was very similar to nowadays Cambodia. So 
was the experience of rapid economic growth, and property development. 
They expected some good prospects in Cambodia as well” (interview 24, 
country director, Korea Global Construction Office). This led to Koreans 
being some of the first investors to come to Cambodia:  
“We can admit that Korea is the fast decision maker, more 
than the other investors. In business, the one who dares to 
take risks is the one who can get the market for their benefit... 
Cambodia was first come first serve” (interview 16, deputy 
director, Department of PR and Investment Promotion, 
CDC). 
Their prediction held true for only a few years, until the twin crises of the 
post-2008 global economic slowdown and the stalling of the speculation 
fuelled property market in Cambodia.  
However, investment has decreased dramatically since 2008. It seems 
that their belief in the East Asian/ Korean development model was 
misplaced, and led to an unsustainable rush by investors with the aim of 
making short-term profits. Cambodia cannot follow exactly the Korean 
developmental pathway, as local factors are critical. Korea’s initial period of 
rapid economic growth was based upon close state-corporate alliances of a 
developmental state. Industries were built up with considerable state 
promotion and protection from global competition (Pirie, 2007). The key 
structural relationship of South Korean government was the “state-chaebol 
nexus” (Dent, 2002, p. 135), particularly in terms of the state using control 
of finance through the Bank of Korea as a policy tool (Y-I Lee, 2003). Since 
the 1980s and the rise of neoliberal economic policies, the developmental 
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state began to be deconstructed. In contrast, the Cambodian state does not 
have the authority or the budget to enact this type of programme, as was 
discussed in relation to urban planning in the previous chapter (Chapter 7).   
Ciputra’s business model for satellite city development and its positive 
reception by the Indonesian middle-class is the most important factor as to 
why the company is expanding overseas. Ciputra decided to develop a 
satellite city in Cambodia because their exploratory research in 2005 and 
2006 showed that there were no such projects around Phnom Penh. In 
addition, they witnessed the rise in investment to Cambodia during that 
period, which gave the company confidence to invest:  
“Before that we were doing the master plan back in 2006... 
we were doing some feasibility studies. We chose Cambodia 
because we saw that there were no projects like this before, 
not like in Indonesia. At that time there were many investors 
coming to develop in Cambodia too. And we found that at 
that time there we could source the materials here [in 
Cambodia] no problem” (interview 28, urban planner and 
architect, GPPIC).  
 
Whereas Korean companies believed that Cambodia would follow 
Korea’s economic success, the Indonesian company behind GPPIC 
presumed that Phnom Penh would suffer from many the same problems 
that Jakarta has faced as its population has grown rapidly. The company 
believes that Phnom Penh is likely to follow a similar development pattern to 
Jakarta. It was stated by one respondent that:  
“The concept is from Indonesia itself. We tried to analyse 
that the capital city is always getting bigger and bigger, the 
population also becomes higher. We also saw that in Jakarta 
the infrastructure is not enough to support, so you get many 
problems and obstacles when you are going to go to the city. 
And we are trying to develop outside of the city, and in terms 
of price we are trying to be a lower cost than in the city. We 
are also offering other facilities, so we want to integrate inside 
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so people don’t have to go to the city centre to get some 
needs, they can find easily inside the development” (interview 
28, urban planner and architect, GPPIC).  
Ciputra has witnessed Jakarta’s rapid urbanisation and its associated 
problems such as traffic jams, pollution, poor public infrastructures, lack of 
green space, and the company created satellite cities as a solution to these 
problems for wealthy urban dwellers. As the above respondent stated, they 
saw that Phnom Penh is currently small, but rapidly growing, and in the 
future is likely to have many of the same issues that Jakarta and other 
Southeast Asian cities suffer from. Therefore, wealthier residents are likely to 
be attracted to living in satellite cities. In some ways, this is comparable to 
the South Korean company behind Camko City.  
 At the same time, Ciputra have witnessed the demographic changes 
that occur in rapidly developing Southeast Asian countries. The middle-class 
is a rapidly growing segment of the population in Indonesia with growing 
spending power (Gerke, 2000). Ciputra’s experience in Indonesia has given 
them knowledge of the new middle class and the type of living environment 
they desire. A Ciputra representative stated of the GPPIC project that: 
“We want them to think that when they are investing here, 
things are going to be higher. In terms of the price and [their 
social] status. So when you are living and the surrounding is 
good, with a new township development, it helps them to 
increase their class” (interview 28, urban planner and 
architect, GPPIC).  
In order to give a ‘sophisticated’ image, the entrance of GPPIC features 
Ciputra’s trademark grand archway adorned with prancing horses. The 
name, too, reiterates to buyers that they are buying into something 
‘international’, and different from what they are used to. Camko City was 
similarly branded “the first global city in Phnom Penh”. All three of 
Ciputra’s regional projects are called ‘international city’. Referring to 
Ciputra Hanoi International City, Ir. Ciputra remarked, “I recommended 
an international city for Vietnam. At the time the Vietnamese built only less 
than 10 hectares, but I built more than 100 hectares and I stretched to the 
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international community” (Ciputra in Dieleman, 2009). Both companies 
made the decision to build a satellite city in Phnom Penh based on the 
experience of economic and urban development in their home country, and 
translated this into future predictions for Phnom Penh’s development.  
Comparisons are often made to neighboring countries that have 
developed before Cambodia, such as Thailand and Vietnam. The regional 
manager of international real estate firm CBRE, for example, compared 
Phnom Penh in 2011 to Bangkok in the late 1980s: “I think Cambodia is 
one of the fastest growing economies and there are a lot of parallels to when 
I started in Bangkok in 1988” (Becker, 2011). Sung Bonna, the director of a 
large Cambodian property agency was a little more cautious, stating that:  
“Residential skyscrapers are a new concept in a country that 
not too long ago was still giving away property, not trying to 
market a 40th-floor condo for $1.6 million. I feel it’s a little 
bit early for that. They said it’s going to be a success. But…if 
it doesn’t happen, it is not good for us” (Overseas Property 
Mall, 2008). 
This highlights how knowledge generated through experiences is partly 
behind the inter-referencing of the satellite city concept.       
 
8.3 Mobilities of city-building knowledge 
Tracing the production of satellite cities also reveals the mobility of 
city-building knowledge. South Korea is the largest investor in real estate 
and construction projects in Cambodia (interview 11, officer, CDC) and the 
majority of Korean investments in Cambodia are in the real estate and 
construction sector (interview 19, director general, KOTRA). By 2010 there 
were 215 Korean real estate and construction business operating in 
Cambodia, with a combined investment of $1.2 billion (KOTRA, 2010). 
South Korean companies were among the first to open garment factories in 
the late 1990s, and later became pioneers in the real estate and urban 
development industries. It is said that South Koreans began investing in real 
estate projects in 2004-2005, when the South Korean domestic market was 
in a downturn (Postlewaite, 2008). This was in addition to the political and 
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economic factors in Cambodia discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Investment 
increased rapidly until 2008 and the onset of the global financial crisis. 
South Korean projects have predominately focused on high-rise 
condominium buildings, in addition to Camko City, the largest of the South 
Korean schemes.  
 Korea underwent a rapid period of urbanisation in the second half of 
the 20th century until the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and much of the 
growth was concentrated in Seoul. The population of the capital increased 
from 1.6 million in 1955 to over 10 million in the mid-2000s as the 
industrial structure of the economy turned towards high-tech manufacturing 
and services (H M Kim & Han, 2012). In Korea, 80% of the population live 
in cities, not least because most of Korea is mountainous and thus unsuitable 
for urban development. This rapid urban growth entailed construction 
companies building a vast amount of urban housing and the development of 
new housing solutions for the growing urban population. Between 1990 and 
1997, a yearly average of 650,000 housing units were built (S W Kim, 2010). 
Housing was built predominantly through domestic investment, as 
throughout Korea’s development, foreign capital played a negligible role in 
comparison to most Southeast Asian countries (J D Kim & Hwang, 2000).  
 The scale of new urban development necessitated the development 
of new technologies and construction techniques, especially for high-rise 
apartment buildings. In Seoul, with its high population and small amount of 
available land, the expensive land price dictates that high-rise apartments 
represent a large proportion of the housing stock (S-K Ha, 2010). For 
example, one interviewee in Cambodia commented that “foreign investors 
come in and they are already experienced. They know how to market, they 
know how to design inside. Koreans have learnt from their experiences” 
(interview 9, manager, local real estate agency). Similarly, a government 
official mentioned that “they have gone through many experiences of real 
estate development” (interview 16, deputy director, Department of PR and 
Investment Promotion, CDC). According to the director of ICAK, this was 
because of their business opportunities during the last 20 years in Korea: 
“Korean contractors enjoyed good times in the 1990s and early 2000s. They 
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expect a similar course of development” (interview 24, country director, 
Korea Global Construction Office). South Korean developers market 
themselves as offering a high-tech and modern living environment. GS 
E&C, for instance, builds apartments under their ‘XI’ (eXtra intelligent) 
brand name. In these apartments, a built-in computer and monitoring 
network connects many features of the property (heating, air-conditioning, 
security) to a central computer which is accessible remotely via the internet 
to a smartphone application. Furthermore, another respondent suggested 
that “Koreans think differently from Cambodians” (interview 7, ex-director, 
UN-Habitat). The Koreans, he argued, know how make money from land 
and property. In contrast, most Cambodians were not used to this concept, 
because the country has only emerged from a communist system within the 
last 20 years.  
These construction and real estate development companies also 
maintain extensive links with related companies in Korea through sub-
contracting arrangements. In the case of Camko City, as well as the main 
investment and project management company, Landmark Worldwide, the 
project involved a roll call of related South Korean companies in financing 
(Shinhan Bank and Busan Sangho Bank), construction (Hanil), construction 
management (Korea Power Engineering Company) and infrastructure 
planning (Yooshin). Urban design and architecture was in fact not 
undertaken by a South Korean firm, but a company called K2A from Hong 
Kong. The international consultancy company AECOM, which has offices 
in most large cities in the region, was employed to conduct a market 
assessment and positioning study in Phnom Penh. In addition, the vast 
majority of construction machinery and materials, and nearly all of the 
interior fixtures and fittings were imported from South Korea. Almost 
literally, parts of South Korea come to be assembled in Cambodia. The 
development is not rooted in local building technologies, knowledge, and 
materials. An up to now unproven link argued by the developer is that 
Camko City will attract further South Korean businesses to its office space 
and buyers to its residential property (interview 29, manager, Camko City).  
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 South Korean companies have extensive experience in overseas 
construction work. The first overseas project by a Korean construction firm 
was a highway construction contract in Thailand beginning in 1962 (S Kim, 
1988). Korean construction firms began to operate in the Middle East to 
capitalise on the growth of oil revenues in the 1970s (Y C Kim & Y-R Choi, 
2004). Between 1975 and 1986, 90% of overseas construction contracts were 
in the Middle East region, because of the many large infrastructure projects 
under development there. Korean companies originally used Korean 
construction workers for projects overseas, as their perceived competitive 
advantage was this low cost but hard working labour force (S Kim, 1988). 
However, in the present time, Korean companies focus on higher value 
added parts of the development process, such as feasibility studies, design 
and architecture, project management, engineering, and the advancement 
of innovative construction techniques and technologies.  
 By May 2012, Korean contractors had completed or agreed 
contracts worth $490 billion (ICAK, undated). These contracts are 
particularly concentrated in emerging markets, notably the Middle East, 
Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The Middle East accounted for 60% of 
contracts (particularly Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), while 
another third were in Asia, where Singapore is the most valuable market (see 
Figure 8.2). All other world regions made up just 10% of the total. The types 
of projects undertaken include housing, commercial developments and 
infrastructure projects. The majority of Korean companies such as Hyundai, 
Samsung, LG, and Daewoo, which are more commonly known in Europe 
for producing cars or electronic goods, also operate construction divisions. 
In addition, there are those who specialise in engineering and construction, 
such as Hanil and GS (formerly part of LG). POSCO Engineering & 
Construction (E&C) is another well-known company, and is a subsidiary of 
POSCO steelmaking.     
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Figure 8.2 Total value of Korean overseas construction contracts by 
region, up to May 2012 (US$ million)  
(Source: ICAK, undated) 
 
 An organisation called the International Contractors Association of 
Korea (ICAK), based in Seoul, established a Korea Global Construction 
Office in Cambodia in May 2010, and has other branches in Kazakhstan, 
Ghana, Mexico, and India. The aim of ICAK is to provide advice and 
market research for their member companies through helping to exploring 
overseas markets, developing projects, and settling contracts (ICAK, 
undated). The organisation was established in 1976 as part of the Overseas 
Construction Promotion Act. It is partly funded through membership fees, 
but is semi-governmental because it is affiliated with the Korean Ministry of 
Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs. 
In the case of Ciputra’s project, having developed their expertise in 
satellite city development, the company believed that their concept could be 
applied in other contexts. A planner from Ciputra asserted “we saw that the 
urban developments here [in Cambodia] were just very regular...so we tried 
to offer something special. We like the green here, so we try not to only 
touch the building, we also care with the environment as well. You can see 
there are many trees and a lot of landscaping, we try to have the good 
scenery” (interview 28, urban planner and architect, GPPIC).  
 Ciputra focuses its efforts in countries where there exists less 
technical capacity in the urban development industry compared to 
8,866 9,769 16,376 16,509 
145,958 
293,492 
0 
50000 
100000 
150000 
200000 
250000 
300000 
350000 
North 
America 
Europe Africa South/Latin 
America 
Asia Middle East 
V
al
ue
 (
U
S$
 m
ill
io
n)
 
Region 
207 
 
 
Indonesia (Dewi, 2011). The company has a long experience in Indonesia, 
and has developed knowledge designing, building, and marketing satellite 
city projects. While Ciputra has developed expertise in the design and 
planning of satellite cities, several interviewees working in the Phnom Penh 
property industry, in contrast, expressed their scepticism about the concept 
and design of Camko City. For example, one respondent questioned the 
location of 16 storey condominium buildings surrounding the periphery of 
the development, which consequentially reduce the privacy of villa and 
townhouse residents in the centre (interview 4, country manager, 
international real estate agency). Cambodian companies, too, had not 
developed large-scale urban development projects at that time. However, 
since GPPIC and Camko City were announced, numerous similar projects 
fronted by local companies have started to be developed (see Chapter 6). 
Another gated community by a Cambodian company even markets itself as 
being near to GPPIC because of its golf course and green space. The 
influence of regional companies on local companies, in particular an 
investigation into the knowledge transfer of urban development concepts, 
would make an interesting piece of further research to build upon the ideas 
introduced in this thesis. As Cochrane and Ward (2012) argue, there is a 
need to explore how policies are grounded in localised ways, and also how 
this influences additional circulation.    
 
8.4 Transplanting the private satellite city concept 
Ciputra pioneered the concept of the privately built satellite city, and 
the company was behind the first satellite city project in Indonesia. Its strong 
position is primarily due to the company’s ability to obtain large areas of 
cheap rural land and convert that land into urban usage. Unlike other 
satellite city developers, which focus on providing the necessary capital or 
acquiring land, Ciputra tends to do everything in-house, from the 
commercial aspects through to design and architecture. The company 
proclaims that it has an “aspiration to fulfil the need for better dwellings and 
better living environments” (PT Ciputra Surya TBK, 2005, p. n/a), at least 
for those who can afford it. In effect, Ciputra are specialists in the creation of 
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privatised urban spaces for the benefit of middle and upper class people who 
wish to escape the ‘public’ city. 
Ciputra’s overseas satellite city projects tend to share broadly similar 
architectural styles and urban forms, regardless of their location, particularly 
the residential architecture reminiscent of historical European styles. The 
exterior and interior design in GPPIC is European in appearance and each 
type of house is named after places in Italy and France. When questioned on 
the naming strategy, an architect from Ciputra argued that “we just put the 
name that people are easy to recognise, easy to know. We thought that 
Cambodians are close with French, so why not use the French name?” 
(interview 28, urban planner and architect, GPPIC). The same respondent 
also added that a classic European architectural style was employed because 
they believed customers would find it attractive, as it is different from the 
types of housing currently available in Cambodia. Research in other 
contexts has highlighted that the use of Western type architecture appeals to 
aspirations for the ‘good life’ by middle and upper class urban residents 
(Pow & Kong, 2007). Colonial style architectural language is used to 
symbolise an image of luxury, safety, and comfort (Gotsch, 2004). In the 
Indian context, King (2004) argues that Western imagery is used to 
compliment the cosmopolitan character of potential investors. Western style 
villas are considered ‘exotic’ symbols of modernity, with the potential to 
elevate the cultural capital of their inhabitants (Pow & Kong, 2007). 
However, Ciputra’s developments are modified to fit local cultural contexts. 
The properties feature open-air kitchens so that cooking smells do not enter 
the living space. In the Cambodian case, the design team undertook market 
research and ascertained that Cambodian buyers prefer larger houses than 
their Indonesian customers (interview 28, urban planner and architect, 
GPPIC). The style of housing is generally of a more European style in 
Ciputra’s overseas projects and older Indonesian developments, while the 
most recent projects in Indonesia tend to be more contemporary. 
The transfer of Ciputra’s model of urbanism is also mediated 
through an organisation called the International Urban Development 
Association (formerly known as the International New Town Association), as 
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one of the company’s directors, Budiarsa Sastrawinata, is currently the 
President (International Urban Development Association, 2011). This 
organisation consists of representatives from elite professional organisations 
in the urban development industry, including government policymakers and 
business leaders. The group holds conferences as well as promoting learning 
through study visits in various cities and international exchanges. The stated 
aims are to promote the “exchange of experiences and knowledge” and 
“cooperation between public and private sectors” (International Urban 
Development Association, 2011, p. n/a).   
Ir. Ciputra has transformed himself from the son of poor immigrant 
parents to one of the wealthiest people in Indonesia, and given this success 
he has become a renowned business personality. He has authored a book, 
and published another, on the subject of entrepreneurship. The title of the 
first book (translated from Indonesian language) is The Ciputra Way: Best 
Practices to Become a True Entrepreneur (Ciputra & Tanan, 2008), while the 
second is entitled Ciputra Quantum Leap: Entrepreneurship to Change You and Your 
Nation’s Future (Harefa & Siadari, 2006). Ir. Ciputra’s emphasis on education 
and promoting entrepreneurship is highlighted by the fact that he has 
founded a private university. The Ciputra University proclaims that it 
“traces its origins to the vision of one of the most famous successful 
entrepreneurs in Asia, Ir. Ciputra, who is convinced that the only passport 
to the future is through creating world class entrepreneurs” (Universitas 
Ciputra, undated). From the subject of his books, it can be seen that Ciputra 
is firm a free-market thinker. However, he was one of the few Chinese 
magnates not to move assets to Singapore during the anti-Chinese riots and 
1997 financial crisis. Ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs are often subject to 
popular criticism for investing abroad, as this is viewed as ‘unpatriotic’ and 
evidence of their lack of loyalty to Indonesia (Dieleman & W Sachs, 2008).  
We can see here that companies such as Ciputra are instrumental in 
the mobility of neoliberal urbanism across East Asia and beyond. However, 
as McCann (2008) has rightly argued, it is also important to critically analyse 
what is not mobilised. In this case, the negative externalities associated with 
satellite city development, such as the relocation of existing residents, 
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destruction of farmland, environmental impacts, and social segregation, are 
rarely mobilised. Academics, activists and NGOs have raised these issues in 
the Indonesian case (Hudalah, 2010). This highlights how the mobility of 
policies and concepts is dependent on the relative economic and political 
power of particular groups. The inherent unevenness of relational 
geometries produce these concrete outcomes (Yeung, 2005). 
While construction technologies and techniques are transferred 
through the globalising business practices of Korean urban development 
and construction companies, no evidence came through in interviews that 
satellite cities in South Korea had directly influenced the development of 
Camko City. On the periphery of Seoul, five satellite cities were built during 
the 1980s and a further 10 were announced during the 1990s (Y-S Lee & H 
Shin, 2012). The second wave had a larger role for private sector 
developers, for example the Suwon I’Park City, part of the larger 
GwangGyo new town, is being developed by Hyundai (UNStudio, 2012). 
The project also involves international architects introducing new and 
varied architectural styles, in comparison to the first generation new towns 
that were more functional. These projects were state-led with considerable 
input from various scales of government and the Korea Land Development 
Corporation with the overall aim of providing affordable housing.  
More recently, a privately built satellite city named New Songdo 
City has been under development since 2004 in Incheon, near Seoul 
(McNeill, 2009a). This project, aiming to be the ‘gateway to Northeast Asia’, 
is being built on 600 hectares of reclaimed land (C Kim, 2010). On 
completion, it is to be a fully functioning city focused on high-tech research 
and development industries. Respondents were aware of Seoul’s satellite 
cities, but asserted that they were developed by the government and thus 
different (interview 24, country director, Korea Global Construction Office). 
The developers of Camko City did not refer to other Korean satellite cities, 
viewing their own development as just a single investment project (interview 
29, manager, Camko City). However, a group of staff from Camko City did 
make a study visit Saigon South (Phu My Hung) (pers. comm.), a similar 
satellite city project in Ho Chi Minh City (see Chapter 2). 
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 Other Korean companies, however, have experience in satellite city 
development. POSCO E&C, one of the developers behind New Songdo 
City in Korea, is also developing An Khanh city in Hanoi, Vietnam, which 
it sees as the launch of the company’s vision to “expand its construction 
businesses to overseas markets” (POSCO E&C, 2011). POSCO’s role in 
directing the future of Vietnamese cities is further increased as the company 
was part of the team that formulated Hanoi’s masterplan (Soderstrom & 
Geertman, 2012). GS E&C is another developer that has built satellite city 
projects near Seoul, including one known as Midan City. The company is 
now expanding overseas and is constructing two projects called GS 
Metrocity on the edge of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. These projects are 
designed to be “future-oriented Korean-style new town[s]” that utilises 
“Korean new town development knowhow” (GS E&C, 2011). The company 
states that: 
“GS E&C, with the highest level of technology and expertise 
on urban mixed-use development projects, shows its 
capabilities to the world and extends beyond the national 
borders of Korea. GS E&C is putting no limits to its 
imagination in the design of the future city and is successfully 
carrying out urban mixed-use project, new city development 
project and overseas development projects” (GS E&C, 2011).  
 
 However, while the satellite cities in South Korea have been 
relatively successful – at least in so far as they have maintained financial 
backing and actually been constructed – those in Cambodia, particularly 
Camko City, have not fared quite as well. The director of ICAK argued that 
while Koreans knew how to build, they had failed to understand the local 
market (interview 24, country director, Korea Global Construction Office). 
As was discussed in Chapter 6, there is at present not a high demand for 
luxury properties in Cambodia. Similarly, a real estate agent commented 
that: 
“I don’t think they were particularly scientific in their 
approach – at either pre-entry, entry, or then construction. 
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But some of them are better than others... In general I find 
that the Koreans have come in with a lot of hot air and now 
are looking to exit the market... [But in the process] they’ve 
made a few Cambodians very rich by coming and buying 
their land. They’ve also put sites forward for development by 
buying several parcels of land, putting a fence around it 
getting permissions” (interview 4, country manager, 
international real estate agency). 
The same interviewee expressed concern that the CEO of the company 
behind Camko City has no personal experience in satellite city development, 
as his previous line of business was overseeing the building of Incheon 
international airport.  
 There are relatively few examples of successfully completed large-
scale Korean developments in Cambodia. Many of the projects once 
announced have been cancelled (such as the planned International Financial 
Centre by GS E&C and Star River by POSCO E&C) or stalled midway 
through construction (for example, Gold Tower 42) because financing had 
dried up. There are three condominium projects completed under the De 
Castle brand in residential areas of Phnom Penh by Nuri Development and 
Construction. Another recent Korean project to be announced is a 
residential development on the outskirts of Phnom Penh by Booyoung 
Khmer company.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that much of the investment in satellite city 
projects originates from within the East Asian region, in particular from 
South Korea and Indonesia. There are other satellite cities being built in 
Phnom Penh that also have considerable East Asian influence. Although the 
development companies are Cambodian, the capital invested is mostly from 
China. This therefore highlights the expediency of tracing the networks of 
urban development capital and concepts within the East Asian region.  
 This chapter discussed why South Korean investors are one of the 
largest sources of FDI to Cambodia, especially in the real estate and 
213 
 
 
construction industry. I suggested that this is reflective of the close political, 
diplomatic and cultural ties, as well as the commonalities in the business 
environment. It is also reflective of the prediction by South Korean investors 
that Cambodia would follow South Korea’s path of rapid economic 
development in the post-war period. In contrast, the links between 
Cambodia and Indonesia are relatively weak, and thus the development of 
GPPIC is more contingent upon the activities of the Ciputra Group itself. 
Although it is private capital being invested in these satellite cities, the role of 
the state is also important to consider. South Korea has a state-led 
internationalisation strategy that supports and encourages South Korean 
firms to operate overseas. The construction and real estate industry is one of 
the key globalised South Korean economic sectors, and Korea’s expertise in 
this industry is now being exported to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern 
countries in particular.  
However, the Indonesian government has no such 
internationalisation strategy. While the South Korean company behind 
Camko City had no previous experience in developing satellite cities, 
Ciputra has initiated the private satellite city concept in and around Jakarta. 
Satellite cities are a feature of the urban landscape in South Korea, but the 
developers of Camko City did not seem to use them directly as a model. 
Nonetheless, other South Korean developers, such as GS E+C, position 
themselves as exporters of South Korean satellite city expertise when 
developing overseas projects.      
The central argument of this chapter is that it is predominantly from 
regional firms that city-building capital and expertise originate. This 
therefore facilitates an understanding of urbanism as a phenomenon not 
oriented around Western networks. The chapter indicates the need for a re-
conceptualisation of Dick and Rimmer’s (1998) now rather dated assertion 
that satellite cities represent a convergence around American styles of 
urbanism. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is a tendency for new urban 
developments in East Asia to represent the globalisation of culture, generally 
– but not always – referencing neo-traditional European and American 
architectural motifs (F L Wu, 2004). These spaces are sometimes considered 
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part of a homogenised urban culture deprived of local context (Simone, 
2009). Yet in underlining the role of regional capital and expertise, this 
chapter has contributed to scholarly attempts to understand cities in East 
Asia on their own terms as part of regional trends and processes, and not 
simply through the lens of Western theory.  
 
 
 
 
 The final chapter now goes on to conclude the major themes of the 
thesis, and present some thoughts on potential directions for further 
research.  
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9. Privatising Planning, Regionalising Planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The title of this thesis, ‘Articulating intra-Asian Urbanism’, speaks to the ways in 
which I believe that the production of new urban forms in Asia is bound up 
with regional flows of capital, concepts and information. I have focused in 
this thesis specifically on the production of large, privately built satellite 
cities, advancing the argument that an enhanced understanding of the 
production such projects is contingent on research examining their 
relational geographies. At the same time, particularly in chapter 7, I have 
suggested that theorising city-building should examine the territorial factors 
(McCann & K Ward, 2011b). What this consideration of satellite city 
production highlights is the growing role of private sector actors in the 
urban development and planning of Southeast Asian cities, as well the 
increasingly regional flows that draw together urban development in East 
Asia. These commonalities lead to a concluding question: is there such thing 
as an identifiable kind of ‘East Asian urbanism’? 
 In the remainder of this closing chapter, I revisit the central premises 
of the research – the increasing privatisation of urban development and the 
intra-Asian mobility of urban development capital and concepts – drawing 
together and synthesising the arguments presented throughout the chapters. 
In doing so, I acknowledge the limitations of this project and outline some 
unresolved areas for further study.  
 
9.1 Privatised urban development and planning  
 The first key theme of this thesis involves the increasing role of the 
private sector in urban development and planning. In recent years there has 
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been a burgeoning interest in the influence of neoliberalism on cities 
(Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 2006; Theodore et al., 2011). The 
notion of neoliberalism is central to the development of satellite cities in a 
number of ways. They clearly reflect neoliberal principles of private 
financing, privatisation of land, marketised housing and service provision, 
and minimal state involvement in ensuring welfare goals are met for the 
wider urban public. They also reflect neoliberal ideas regarding the 
dismantling of barriers to the free flow of capital, as well as reduced 
regulation for certain industries. Camko City, for instance, was designated as 
a financial development zone, which allows businesses located within the 
new city to avoid typical regulations and taxes. The satellite cities of today 
represent what American economist Paul Romer has hypothetically called 
‘charter cities’ (Harford, 2011). Romer suggests that a ‘charter city’ is a 
 “new type of special reform zone. It extends the concept of a 
special economic zone by increasing its size and expanding 
the scope of its reforms. It must be large enough to 
accommodate a city with millions of workers and residents. 
Its reforms must extend to all the rules needed to support 
exchange in a modern market economy and structure 
interactions in a well-run city” (Charter Cities, 2012, p. n/a). 
He argues that the development of these secession cities requires three 
actors: a host to provide the land, a source of population, and a guarantor to 
ensure the charter is respected. These could be transnational arrangements 
whereby each of the roles is played by actors in different countries. His ideas 
are seemingly influenced by cities such as Shenzhen, which operate to a 
different, and more business friendly, suite of rules than the national 
territory within which they are embedded and have become in some 
respects more economically successful as a result. The satellite cities of the 
type discussed in this thesis differ markedly from earlier masterplanned cities 
and towns. Most significantly, these were initiated and build by the state, 
contained public and affordable housing and often formed part of regional 
spatial strategies to manage urban growth.  
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 This study of satellite city development in East Asia suggests that in 
some contexts within the region, the neoliberal nature of urban development 
seems to be at a more extreme scale than can be found in Europe and 
America. Building entire cities has in itself become a business. Referring to 
Northeast Asian countries, Hill et al. (2012, p. 22) contend that “steps in the 
neoliberal direction are typically incremental; they have neither the scale 
nor the scope of their Western counterparts”, but in Southeast Asia the 
situation is rather different. In the absence of strict laws and with free capital 
flows, private actors can build and manage bounded urban spaces at the city 
scale, covering areas of up to 6,000 hectares and housing millions of people. 
This confirms what Shatkin (2008) argued with respect to Manila: that 
private companies have taken advantage of an ineffective state by taking 
over urban planning. The two case studies discussed in this thesis are 
relatively small examples. Others, for example Saigon South in Vietnam or 
BSD City in Indonesia, are much larger at over 3,000 hectares. The 
company behind another similar development to the south of Phnom Penh 
called AZ City has authorisation to develop 2,600 hectares. This appears 
even more significant in Phnom Penh because the city is much smaller than 
other Southeast Asian capitals, with a population of approximately 1.5 
million.  
 Satellite cities are becoming an increasingly significant form of urban 
development in and around cities in developing countries. Although there is 
a relatively substantial amount of literature on satellite city development in 
Indonesia (Firman, 2004a; Winarso, 2002) and to some extent Vietnam 
(Waibel, 2004, 2006), India (Bhattacharya & Sanyal, 2011; Bose, 2008; 
Chen et al., 2009; Shatkin, 2011) and China (Chen et al., 2009; Hsing, 
2010), this thesis is a study of the process in Phnom Penh. However there 
remains much more research to be done in examining satellite cities in other 
contexts. It would be useful for researchers to undertake a comprehensive 
investigation to document the extent of corporate cities worldwide. From 
that starting point, it would thus be possible to investigate in more detail the 
social, political, economic and cultural contexts in which satellite cities tend 
to be built, and how these factors vary across different contexts. It would 
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also be possible to investigate why some corporate cities succeed and in 
which cases they fail. Along these lines the International New Town 
Institute19 based in the Dutch new town of Almere, has started to maintain a 
database of satellite cities, including both the state-led projects of Europe 
and elsewhere, as well the more recent privately built projects along the lines 
of those profiled in this thesis.   
I have focussed on two foreign developed projects in particular, 
although there are several other satellite cities being developed by local 
companies that have been announced since I began this research. The first 
of the case studies was Camko City, a project funded by South Korean 
investors and involving several other South Korean actors including 
construction companies, banks, and development consultants. The large 
Indonesian property developer Ciputra is developing the second case study, 
GPPIC. The major difference between the satellite cities in Phnom Penh 
and those built previously in Indonesia is that foreign capital and companies 
are more centrally involved in the projects in Phnom Penh. This is through 
funding arrangements, the use of transnational consultants, or certain 
architectural and urban planning concepts.  
 It is for this reason that I have drawn upon a relational methodology 
(see chapter 4). I have suggested that to understand the increasing 
privatisation of urban development and planning in Phnom Penh requires a 
relational look at the countries from which the flows of capital and concepts 
originate. In the South Korean case the opportunities for the 
internationalisation of urban development companies were closely related to 
the economic policy of the South Korean state. The state gives considerable 
support for businesses to operate and move production overseas, both 
because the limited domestic market has begun to be exhausted and wage 
increases were harming export competitiveness (Dent, 2002). However, 
regarding the Indonesian company Ciputra, the Indonesian state is less 
active in supporting overseas business. Arguably, given that Indonesia is a 
much less wealthy country than South Korea, the state has fewer resources. 
                                                
19 See http://www.newtowninstitute.org/, last accessed 11-07-12. 
219 
 
 
The relationship between the state and business in this case is more one of 
patronage and cronyism (Eklöf, 2002). 
 Although a relational methodology involves investigating networks 
and flows, territorial factors are also inseparable (McCann & K Ward, 
2010). Cities are not bounded territories, but territorial approaches can help 
to illuminate the diversity of cities (J Robinson, 2005). While the private 
sector is conceptualising and developing these satellite cities, I argued that 
the Cambodian state also has a crucial role. On the one hand this is 
influenced by a state that is acting entrepreneurially, yet in other ways is 
reflective of a weak and ineffective state. Satellite cities in Cambodia are 
promoted by the state in three main ways. As the country made the 
transition from communism to a free-market economy, Cambodia was 
opened to foreign capital and a new investment law was approved. The law 
provides significant incentives to foreign investors, giving Cambodia one of 
the most favourable investment regimes in Asia. The state also has the 
ability to rationalise satellite city development by promoting discourses of 
employment generation and housing creation, although as I have argued, 
the employment created is often temporary in nature and the housing is 
priced out of reach of the vast majority of Cambodians. Indeed, the current 
level of real demand is questionable, as the number of people who can 
afford these properties is limited to the wealthiest few percent. Many of the 
properties have been purchased speculatively, with the intention of renting 
to foreign tenants. Despite this, the state works closely with private 
developers to enable some of them to acquire ‘land concessions’ for the 
construction of these projects at below market rates. Most satellite cities have 
been built on former marshland, as these are the only uninhabited spaces 
remaining (although they are used extensively for fishing and growing water 
vegetables). The future environmental consequences of filling in lakes and 
marshland that absorb rainwater are likely to be huge.  
In this thesis I have limited the scope to focus on how large 
megaprojects such as satellite cities arrive to and are negotiated in Cambodia. I 
believed that it was useful to ‘stand back’ from the micro-scale and present a 
wider picture. However, there are several areas that require further 
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research. A view from the bottom is crucial, and future research could build 
upon the ethnographic approaches developed in the context of Vietnamese 
urban expansion (DiGregorio, 2011; Leaf, 1999, 2002; Sun & T V Kim, 
2008). Potential points of departure could include investigating how the 
residents of agricultural peri-urban villages are negotiating urban 
encroachment, and how they are affected by the pressure to sell land or 
having their land forcibly taken away from them. Comparative studies that 
examine the similarities and differences between Cambodian and other 
cases would also be worthwhile. 
Further research could also investigate the impact of foreign, large-
scale private sector investment in urban development on political 
geographies and urban citizenship. Capital cities are typically spaces that 
nation-states engineer in order to exhibit their nation building objectives and 
demonstrate their political power, through independence squares and iconic 
buildings, for example (Logan, 2009). But to what extent is this affected 
when large areas of cities are under the control of private companies rather 
than the government? On the other hand, as I have shown in the case of 
Phnom Penh, states acting entrepreneurially have sought to use these 
projects to make their cities and nations appear modern and developed. To 
what extent is this successful? How do citizens and investors actually 
perceive these projects?  
As a related point, at the city scale, research could investigate the 
implications of large areas built and managed by private sector for urban 
democracy and governance. The total area of land managed by private 
companies building satellite cities in Phnom Penh is almost 5,000 hectares, 
which is significantly larger than the 3,000 hectares of the four central city 
districts. In cities in other countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, the 
figures are even greater. In some cases they therefore are becoming more 
significant than ‘satellites’ of existing cities. The land held by other private 
companies for speculation or future urbanisation is likely to be much higher 
although in the Cambodian case exact figures are not publicly available. 
Some of these projects are many times larger than typical urban political 
units such as communes or districts are. Normally, these units would have 
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elected representatives, but the ‘managers’ of satellite cities are unelected 
businesspeople. What is the role of local government in the management of 
satellite cities? Residents of satellite cities generally pay a management fee or 
service charge to the company to cover services such as water supply and the 
maintenance urban environment, in a similar fashion to municipal taxes. Do 
residents pay local taxes or are they able to negotiate reduced taxes in a 
similar way to businesses in Special Economic Zones? If in the future a large 
proportion of the wealthy live in private cities, will this affect the financial 
health of city governments in developing cities? The impact of large-scale 
private involvement on the day-to-day functioning of the urban system 
requires more detailed research. 
 I have also suggested that the increasing influence of private actors in 
urban development and planning is symptomatic of a weak state. This is 
reflective of broader arguments that neoliberal influences have caused 
deterioration in the state’s ability to control urbanisation because of 
deregulation and the downsizing of public services (Taşan-Kok, 2010). 
However, as is now commonly illustrated, neoliberalisation is seen as a 
variegated and hybrid process (England & K Ward, 2007). In Cambodia, 
Springer (2010, 2011) has argued that what constitutes ‘actually existing’ 
neoliberalism is the ways that elites have co-opted neoliberal reforms 
through the patronage system in order to achieve private benefits. In this 
case, a weak state is not necessarily to be conflated with a small state. The 
Cambodian government remains bloated, dominated by competing internal 
factions who want a claim to power (Hughes & Un, 2011).  
 In this thesis I have applied these ideas to urban planning. I argued 
that Roy’s (2009b) concept of informal planning is relevant to the nature of 
urban development in Phnom Penh, and the informal nature of planning is 
a significant driver of large-scale private sector urban development. In 
particular, the way that land is granted as concessions for some satellite city 
developments is often extra-legal. Roy (2004) terms this a process of 
informalised vesting, where the state can devalue current uses, often peasant 
agriculture, and replace with new gentrified developments on the urban 
fringe. The land for Camko City was declared a ‘development zone’ and a 
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‘financial development district’, although the exact details of the land 
transactions behind this project were not publicly available, something 
which emphasises the informal nature of urbanisation. GPPIC represents a 
slightly different mode of informality, where in this case Ciputra partnered 
with a local company owned by the family of a Deputy Prime Minister and 
former high-ranking military general. Indeed many of the urban 
development projects given concessions to public land are owned by 
businesspeople personally connected to the government, holding positions as 
senators, for example. The lack of clear distinction between the state, the 
ruling party, and the market is a distinguishing feature of Cambodia’s 
political economy, and a similar situation prevails in the agricultural and 
forestry industries (Le Billon, 2002).  
 In the European context, Swyngedouw et al. (2002) suggest that 
urban mega-projects are allowed through exceptionality measures, such as 
freezing planning tools and bypassing or altering statutory regulations. In 
the Cambodian case, however, I have suggested that this occurs in a more 
informal fashion. When these projects are approved at high levels of 
government with little respect for existing urban planning regulations, those 
with urban planning knowledge are left only to facilitate and have no real 
power in directing the future development of the city. This means that any 
attempts to apply planning laws and policies are thwarted. The legal 
framework itself has not kept pace with the type of large-scale urban 
development now occurring. At the city scale, the Phnom Penh masterplan 
remains unapproved, and the satellite cities being built do not appear to be 
part of any strategic plan for the development of the city. This is something 
that holds true across a number of contexts where satellite cities have been 
built, particularly Indonesia (Winarso, 1999; Zhu, 2010). In addition, the 
role of the state is weakened because it lacks the funds for urban planning 
and infrastructure development. The level of public finance generation 
through taxation is low and is lessened because of the pervasiveness of 
corruption. On top of this, there are no higher education programs 
focussing specifically on urban planning; rather the subject is appended on 
architecture and engineering courses. As a result, much of the expertise for 
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urban planning has come from outside the country, particularly from 
France, the former colonial power, and more recently Japan.    
 
9.2 Mobility and Asian urbanisms 
 The second fundamental theme is how mobility defines 
contemporary urban development. Cities are constituted by different types 
of mobility, and following Appadurai (1990), this can be thought of in terms 
of the networks of capital, concepts, ideas, culture and people. The influence 
of globally mobile actors on the design, planning, and financing of cities is 
generally considered to be significant and on the increase (Guggenheim & 
Söderström, 2009; Olds, 2001). These networks are driven by the 
transnational activities of architects (McNeill, 2009b), planners (Healey & 
Upton, 2010), as well as other actors such as social movements (McFarlane, 
2009). In this research I have built upon the current trend for the study of 
urban policy mobilities (for example Cook, 2008; K Ward, 2006) by linking 
these ideas to the production of satellite cities, and thus considering private 
sector actors. As I mentioned in the previous section, the satellite cities in 
Phnom Penh are mostly either developed with foreign capital or use 
architectural styles imported from abroad that are very different from 
vernacular architecture. I have here extended the introductory remarks by 
Shatkin (2011, p. 79), who suggested that satellite cities are the “purest form 
of inter-referenced urbanism”. Indeed, they represent not just the circulation 
of a policy, type of building, or idea, but an entire urban system.  
 What is significant here is the intra-Asian scope of these connections. 
I have illustrated how much of the networks pertinent to the production of 
satellite cities in Phnom Penh are from within Asia, including but not 
restricted to South Korea and Indonesia. Satellite cities defy singular 
geographies, and exhibit diverse poles of influence. The findings contest the 
assertions of Dick and Rimmer (1998), who upheld that satellite cities in 
Indonesia represent a convergence upon American models of urbanism. 
While in some ways satellite cities represent a typical post-modern form of 
global urbanism, these global influences are always localised in unique ways 
(Irazábal, 2009). They are also produced through distinct networks, and the 
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way in which the networks are structured varies between different cases. In 
the South Korean case, I argued that the flows are linked to broader 
relationship between Cambodia and South Korea. The significant level of 
South Korean investment in Cambodia is also due to the perceived 
commonalities in the business operating environment, the building of 
networks of friendship, and the prediction that Cambodia would experience 
a similarly rapid economic transformation as South Korea in the second half 
of the 20th century. In contrast, the Indonesian case did not exhibit such 
‘broad’ networks, and was instead actuated by the activities of one company, 
Ciputra, and their expansion to overseas markets. The networks of East 
Asian capital have arguably circumvented French-led attempts to create a 
masterplan for the city, something that mirrors wider geopolitical influences 
in contemporary Cambodia. The power of Western donors is weakened as 
China and other East Asian countries become alternative sources of funding 
and development assistance, support that invariably comes without the 
pressure for ‘good governance’ improvements such as anti-corruption and 
legal reforms (Sullivan, 2011). 
In this research I have focused in detail on two satellite cities being 
developed by a South Korean and Indonesian company respectively, and 
these were the first such projects in Cambodia. However since they were 
announced, there are many more satellite city and gated community 
projects, as Chapter 6 outlined. It would be interesting to know to what 
extent the satellite cities developed by foreign companies have subsequently 
influenced local urban development projects. Where did the concept of 
these projects by local companies originate from? Did the two satellite cities 
covered in this thesis influence the locally developed projects? Did local 
developers spot the potential and attempt to copy? This influence could be 
in terms of the concept of gated urbanism or the architectural style. 
Nevertheless, as I have already stated, much of the capital behind these 
projects is still from overseas, particularly from China. In terms of 
architecture and urban planning a mix of local and foreign companies are 
employed. A-Seven Corporation, a Thai architecture and planning firm, has 
worked on many of the projects. 
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 Through focusing on the influence of regional capital and expertise 
on the production of satellite cities, this thesis has contributed to theoretical 
debates which seek to extend the analysis of global urbanisation outside the 
boundaries of solely Western theories, practices and cities. In studying 
satellite cities, there are no obvious antecedents in the West to compare. As I 
have shown, the circumstances that make possible the development of 
satellite cities are generally identifiable in developing countries where weak 
urban planning regulations and patronage systems are combined with high 
levels of inequality. In avoiding viewing urbanism in Phnom Penh through 
the lens of developmentalism (J Robinson, 2006) or focusing solely on 
subaltern resistances (Ong, 2011), I have attended to Roy’s (2009a, p. 829) 
observation that “much less is known about the complex connections, 
exchanges, and references through which cities (everywhere) are worlded”. 
The idea of ‘worlding’ has been developed by Roy and Ong (2011) as the 
basis of a global urban studies which problematises political economy and 
postcolonial frameworks. In this thesis, what has proven most relevant is 
their concept of worlding as a way of viewing the inter-connections between 
cities and creation of what they term an inter-Asian urbanism.  
 Worlding is also considered an essentially unstable process (Roy, 
2011a). This instability is highlighted here by the fact that urban mega-
projects have invariably not proceeded as planned. The future of Camko 
City appears insecure after a scandal engulfed the financial backers, and 
GPPIC is developing at a much slower pace than anticipated. Circulations 
may also fleetingly change path. Capital flows fluctuate and the footloose 
nature of capital means that divestment can occur just as easily as 
investment. Myanmar and Cambodia, for example, are becoming closer 
politically, and better connected with the recent introduction of flights 
between the two countries. There is talk of investment rushing to Myanmar 
as the country opens up and becomes the new hot investment destination 
much like Cambodia was perceived in the 2000s (Lim, 2012). The garment 
industry is becoming concerned that investors may move over to Myanmar 
(Jakarta Post, 2012), but urban development actors could also shift to a new 
frontier market.    
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 Fundamentally, this thesis raises the wider question: is there such a 
thing as an ‘intra-Asian urbanism’? (I refer to ‘intra’-Asian because of the 
centrality of interactions within East Asia). For one, it has to be said that 
‘Asia’ is not a singular geographic unit and it defies clear boundaries (Roy, 
2011a). Drawing upon Spivak’s (2008) book Other Asias, Roy (2011a) suggests 
that Asia cannot be defined through its location, but more as a perpetual 
emergence. Hence, Asia is defined through its circulations, and here I have 
contributed to investigating what Roy (2011a, p. 331) terms its “citationary 
structure”. But when studying the Asian region it is important not to obscure 
connections to other parts of the world. I am also in agreement with authors 
who have cautioned against speaking of a single Southeast Asian city (P 
Rimmer & Dick, 2009), and it is in such a way that Bunnell et al. (2002) 
refer to ‘the city in Southeast Asia’.  
 It has been argued by some that regional-area studies are 
“increasingly indefensible” (P Rimmer & Dick, 2009, p. 14) because of the 
intense diversity of local context that defies generalisation. However, my 
findings suggest that Ching (2000, p. 244) is right in asserting that 
“globalization and regionalization are complementary processes...regions 
are important sites where the contending forces of global integration and 
local autonomy converge”. Regional or area studies are valuable because of 
the way they bring into view often marginalised regions (J Robinson, 2003), 
present a detailed engagement with context and are often inter-disciplinary 
in nature (Pollard et al., 2009). Waley (2012) has begun to apply these 
theoretical insights to Asian urban studies, and I have taken forward these 
ideas by illustrating how the activities of regional urban development actors 
are steering the production of new urban forms.  
On the question of what an East Asian urbanism may look like, I 
have identified several commonalities, although this is an introductory 
endeavour and would require more extensive further research. In particular, 
this may include the close relationship between property development 
companies and the state (see also Hogan et al., 2012), as well the extensive 
connections between East Asian cities. The origin for neoliberal urban 
development is different in the East Asian case, and therefore produces 
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different outcomes than in the West (Hill et al., 2012). Focusing particularly 
on China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and Singapore, Shin (2011) argues 
that there a number of distinctive commonalities amongst the ‘accelerated 
urbanism’ of East Asia. These include the state’s use of property-related 
revenues to finance urban infrastructure, strong developmentalist states, and 
the importance of real estate capital built on home-ownership. These 
factors, Shin argues, are behind the distinctive ‘vertical urbanism’ found in 
East Asian cities. 
 Carefully applied, a focus on the East Asian region is fruitful because 
the region consists of cities that may be separated by conventional urban 
studies, and thus allows an avoidance of Western theorisations (Bunnell et 
al., forthcoming). In this case, I have highlighted the connections between a 
number of cities, including Phnom Penh, Seoul and Jakarta, bringing 
together countries and cities that may typically be divided between studies of 
‘Third World’ cities and ‘global’ cities. Furthermore, Yeung (2010) argued 
that studies of flows and networks are less well developed in Western 
contexts. It is in this way that the methodological framework developed in 
this thesis may provide the support to question dominant approaches in 
urban studies, and perhaps possesses wider theoretical significance beyond 
East Asia itself. 
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Appendix I  
 
List of interviews 
 
 
 
No. Respondent Position and Organisation 
 
Area of discussion 
1 Sales Consultant, Grand Phnom Penh 
International City  
Types of demand for GPPIC 
2 United Nations Development Program 
Advisor, Municipality of Phnom Penh 
Role of Municipality 
3 Freelance Consultant of Urban Planning 
Issues 
General discussion on urban 
planning issues in Cambodia 
4 Country Manager, Real Estate Agent 
(foreign company) 
Real estate market; consumer 
demand 
5 Director, NGO working with urban poor 
communities 
Perspective of civil society on 
urban development issues; 
problems with satellite cities 
6 Research Fellow and Programme 
Coordinator, Economy, Trade and 
Regional Cooperation Programme, 
Cambodia Development Resource 
Institute 
Cambodia’s foreign 
investment policy 
7 Ex-Director, UN HABITAT Cambodia General discussion of urban 
planning issues 
8 Country Manager, Real Estate Agent 
(foreign company) 
Real estate market; property 
demand 
9 General Manager, Real Estate Agent 
(local company) 
Real estate market; property 
demand 
10 Vice-Director, Office of Urbanisation 
(formerly Bureau of Urban Affairs), 
Municipality of Phnom Penh 
Role of the Municipality in 
urban planning, City 
Masterplan 
11 Officer, Department of PR and 
Investment Promotion, Cambodian 
Investment Board, Council for the 
Development for Cambodia 
Cambodia’s foreign 
investment policy 
12 Deputy Director General, Ministry of 
Land Management, Urban Planning, and 
Construction; Deputy General Secretary, 
General Secretariat for the Council for 
Land Policy 
Role of national government 
in urban planning; national 
housing policy 
13 Deputy Country Managing Director and 
Head of Real Estate Practice Group, 
legal firm 
Legal aspects of property 
investment 
14 Deputy Director, Department of 
Economic Integration and ASEAN, 
Ministry of Economy and Finance 
Cambodia’s foreign 
investment and regional 
integration policy 
15 Business Advisor, Real Estate Agent 
(local company) 
Real estate market; property 
demand 
16 Deputy Director, Department of PR and 
Investment Promotion, Cambodian 
Investment Board, Council for the 
Cambodia’s foreign 
investment and regional 
integration policy 
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Development for Cambodia 
17 Counsellor, Sales and Marketing Team, 
World City Co. Ltd. (Camko City) 
Camko City development 
process 
18 Chairman, Korean Chamber of 
Commerce Cambodia (KOTRA) 
Korean investment 
19 Director General, Korean Trade 
Investment Promotion Agency 
Korean investment 
20 Officer, NGO Forum of Cambodia 
(worked on resettlement issues) 
Situation of urban poor 
21 Lecturer in Urban Design and Planning; 
Architect 
General discussion on urban 
planning 
22 Director, Office of Urbanisation 
(formerly Bureau of Urban Affairs), 
Municipality of Phnom Penh 
Role of the Municipality in 
urban planning, City 
Masterplan 
23 Formerly Sales and Marketing Manager, 
GPPIC; Sales and Marketing Manager, 
ING Holdings (AZ City) 
Demand for satellite city 
developments 
24 Meeting with two people: Manager and 
Director (Cambodia office), Korea 
Global Construction Office, 
International Contractors Association of 
Korea 
Korean urban development 
companies in Cambodia and 
worldwide 
25 Estates Manager, GPPIC GPPIC development 
26 Meeting with two people: Country 
Manager and Consultant, Hong Kong-
based property investment and 
development company 
Experience of undertaking 
property development; 
relationship with government 
27 Urbanist and artist General discussion on urban 
planning issues 
28 Senior Urban Planner and Architect, 
Ciputra (GPPIC) 
Ciputra’s project in Cambodia 
29 Manager, World City Co. Ltd. (Camko 
City) 
Camko City development 
30 Independent Consultant, urban housing/ 
legal issues 
Legal aspects of urban 
development 
31-
49 
Local community members near Camko 
City 
Perceptions of Camko City; 
impacts 
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Appendix II 
 
Interview Guides 
 
Camko City management 
• What is the structure of the business?  
• Why did you enter Cambodia, and how? With which levels of 
government did you have to negotiate with? 
• How do you find doing business in Cambodia? 
• Where did the financing for the project come from? 
• Were any incentives given by the CDC? 
• When was the land purchased?  
• What kind of buyers are you trying to attract?  
• Do you think there is a market for Camko, and other similar 
developments? 
• Why do people want to live here? 
• Is the next phase going to start soon? 
• Later phases include Financial Development District. When finished, 
what role do you see for Camko compared to the existing city centre? 
• Where did the idea for Camko City come from?  
• Did you employ architects, planners, consultants, or any other actors?  
• Did you try to adapt the project to the local context? 
• Did you visit other similar projects in the region? What have you learnt 
from them? 
• What kind of relationship do you have with the local/ national 
government here?  
• Why is Korea so active in urban development projects in Phnom Penh?  
• Why do you think this type of project is popular in Phnom Penh, and in 
neighbouring countries? 
• Private infrastructure – why own power plant? What about solid waste 
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and water? 
 
Grand Phnom Penh International City management 
• What is the structure of the business? What is the history of Ciputra 
group? 
• Why did Ciputra enter Cambodia, and how? With which levels of 
government did you negotiate?  
• Where did the financing for the project come from? Were any incentives 
given by the Council for Development of Cambodia? 
• When was the land purchased?  
• What kind of buyers are you trying to attract? Why do people want to 
live here? Do you think the market in Cambodia is big enough?   
• When finished, what role do you see for GPPIC compared to the 
existing city centre?  
• Where did the idea for GPPIC come from?  
• What influences did you have for the design? Are the houses the same in 
all Ciputra projects? Did you adapt the design/ planning for the 
Cambodian context?     
• Why do you think this type of project is popular in Phnom Penh, and in 
neighbouring countries? 
• What kind of relationship do you have with the local/ national 
government here? Do they provide any infrastructure?    
• Do you allow public access? What are the advantages and disadvantages 
for local residents? 
• How is electricity and water supplied?  
 
Government officers 
• What exactly is the role of your Ministry in urban planning? 
• What kind of relationship do you have with other government 
departments, and the private sector?  
• What are your views on foreign investment in real estate? What do you 
think are the positive and negative impacts on Phnom Penh? 
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• Do you think that the number of houses constructed for low- and 
middle-income people is enough, bearing in mind the rapid population 
growth and in-migration to Phnom Penh?  
• What do you think about property speculation? Can and should this be 
controlled? 
• Does your organisation have a role in attracting investment? 
• What is your view on the satellite cities in Phnom Penh? 
• Are these developments happening because of the lack of funding and 
expertise in the public sector?  
• These projects are becoming something of a model for urban 
development in Southeast Asia. Why do you think they are so popular?  
• Do you see any problems with this type of urban growth?  
 
Local communities  
1. Demographic information 
• Gender.  
• Occupation. 
• Income.  
• Housing tenure. 
• Length of time living in the area.  
2. Perceptions 
• What is your view on the new satellite city?  
• Are you able to go there?  
• Would you like to in the future?  
3. Effects 
• How does it affect you?  
• What are the benefits?  
• Are there any negative impacts?  
• How has the area changed since you have been living here?  
• Were people evicted to make way for the development?  
• Did they receive compensation?  
• Where did they relocate to?  
